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English Summary  II 
English Summary 
This dissertation is an investigation from an ecological rationality perspective 
of how people make decisions in a social world. It focuses on two exemplary social 
contexts: situations in which people collectively make decisions in small groups and in 
which people use another person’s advice. Of particular interest in all the reported 
studies were the questions of what environmental factors influence the use and 
performance of different decision strategies, and how they do so. The studies thus were 
aimed at linking the framework of ecological rationality with research on group 
decision making and advice taking, respectively, to derive new insights for the related 
research streams.  
A first project compared the performances of individuals and two-person 
groups, or dyads, in a strategy-learning task. The task was to learn with the help of 
feedback the most adaptive strategy for a given task environment. One environment 
favored the take-the-best strategy, that is, relying on the best discriminating cue and 
ignoring the rest; to perform well in the second environment required using the 
weighted additive strategy, which weights and adds all available cues. Results show 
that both individuals and dyads learned to select the most appropriate strategy over 
time, with a steeper learning rate in dyads when take-the-best was adaptive.  
A second project investigated whether small groups apply decision strategies 
conditional on the group’s composition in terms of task-relevant features. The focus 
here was on the recognition heuristic, so the task-relevant features that influenced the 
potential performance of group strategies were the validities of the group members’ 
recognition and knowledge. Results of an experiment with 3-member groups working 
on a paired-comparison task support the hypothesis that groups indeed adaptively apply 
the strategy that leads to the highest theoretically achievable performance.  
A third project investigated the impact of task difficulty on the use of advice 
from an ecological rationality perspective. Task difficulty was shown to influence 
statistical properties of the environment, which, in turn, were shown to determine the 
theoretical accuracy of choosing and averaging, two prominent advice-taking strategies. 
Results of an experiment also showed that people used different advice-taking 
strategies depending on the difficulty of the task. 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Menschen 
Entscheidungen in sozialen Kontexten treffen. Es werden Entscheidungen in zwei 
exemplarischen Kontexten aus der Perspektive der ökologischen Rationalität 
untersucht: Situationen, in denen Menschen Entscheidungen zusammen mit anderen in 
kleinen Gruppen treffen, und Situationen, in denen sie Rat suchen. Von besonderem 
Interesse sind in allen Studien der Dissertation die Fragen, wie und welche 
Umweltfaktoren die Verwendung und Güte von verschiedenen Entscheidungsstrategien 
beeinflussen. Die Studien haben zum Ziel, den Forschungsrahmen der ökologischen 
Rationalität mit der Gruppenforschung und Literatur zum Thema „Ratgeben“ (advice 
taking) zu verknüpfen, um für die jeweiligen Forschungsstränge neue Erkenntnisse zu 
gewinnen. 
In einem ersten Projekt wurden die Leistungen von Einzelpersonen und 
Zweiergruppen in einer Strategielernaufgabe miteinander verglichen. Die Aufgabe war, 
mit Hilfe von Feedback, die Strategie zu lernen, die adaptiv in Bezug auf die Struktur 
der Umwelt war. Dabei gab es in der ersten Aufgabenumwelt eine adaptive Strategie, 
die auf den besten diskriminierenden Cue setzt und die weniger validen Informationen 
ignoriert (take-the-best), wohingegen die adaptive Strategie in einer zweiten 
Aufgabenumwelt darauf basierte, alle vorhandenen Informationen zu verrechnen 
(weighted additive). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl Einzelpersonen als auch 
Gruppen die jeweils beste Strategie gelernt haben, wobei Gruppen einen schnelleren 
Lernerfolg zeigten, wenn take-the-best adaptiv war. 
Ein zweites Projekt untersuchte, ob kleine Gruppen Entscheidungsstrategien 
verwenden, die auf ihre Zusammensetzung hinsichtlich aufgabenrelevanter Faktoren 
abgestimmt sind. Diese Frage wurde mit einer Paarvergleichsaufgabe untersucht, in der 
die Verwendung der Rekognitionsheuristik eine große Rolle spielt. Die 
aufgabenrelevanten Faktoren, die die Güte verschiedener Gruppenstrategien 
beeinflussten, waren dadurch die Validität der Wiedererkennung und des Wissens der 
Gruppenmitglieder. Ergebnisse eines Experiments mit 3-Personen-Gruppen 
unterstützten die Hypothese, dass Gruppen dazu in der Lage sind, den Strategien zu 
folgen, die am erfolgversprechendsten sind. 
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Ein drittes Projekt untersuchte den Einfluss von Aufgabenschwierigkeit auf 
die Verwendung von Ratschlägen aus einer ökologisch rationalen Perspektive. Dazu 
konnten wir zeigen, dass sich Aufgabenschwierigkeit in verschiedenen statistischen 
Merkmalen der Umweltstruktur niederschlägt, die wiederum die potentielle Güte von 
zwei häufig verwendeten Strategien (mitteln und auswählen) beeinflussten. Zudem 
zeigten die Ergebnisse eines Experiments, dass Personen ihre Strategien, mit denen sie 
Ratschläge mit ihrer eigenen Meinung integrieren, auf die Aufgabenschwierigkeit 
abstimmen. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
In our daily lives, we usually make decisions within a social context. Together 
with our friends, we decide where to go for a weekend trip. We seek advice from our 
parents on how to raise a child. Similarly, in the context of work, we seldom make 
decisions on our own. Take academia as an example. A quick survey of the more than 
600 research reports published in Science in 2012 reveals that less than 10% were 
written by a single author, while more than 90% were coauthored by at least one other 
researcher. Leaving aside alternative reasons for coauthorship, research is an inherently 
collaborative endeavor. As one’s own resources and time are limited, information 
sharing and joint decision making are necessary for planning, conducting, and writing 
up studies. In addition, academia is a field in which giving and taking advice are 
common: More senior and experienced researchers instruct and supervise students 
working on their theses or recommend ways to cope with data analysis problems, for 
example. 
Decision making has been found to take place most often within a group of 
people (Kerr & Tindale, 2004) or under the advice of another person (Bonaccio & 
Dalal, 2006). This dissertation explores—within the context of the larger research 
program on decision making under uncertainty—how people make decisions under 
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uncertainty in groups and with the help of others and, more generally, how the 
environment at large shapes behavior. More precisely, the studies presented here focus 
on the following three research questions: (1) How do people make decisions within a 
social context? (2) Does social decision making differ from individual decision 
making? (3) What environmental factors influence the use and performance of 
strategies employed by groups for making decisions or by individuals for integrating 
advice?  
In three distinct projects conceived for publication as stand-alone articles, I 
explored these questions and aimed to link the concept of ecological rationality with 
research on group decision making and advice taking, respectively, to derive new 
insights for each related research stream. Before I successively report on the research 
projects in Chapters 2 to 4, in this Introduction I briefly summarize the central ideas of 
ecological rationality, the common starting point of the three studies. This is followed 
by an outline of the crucial importance of studying decision making within a social 
context and an overview of the three studies, including the specific focus of each of the 
three projects. 
The Concept of Ecological Rationality and a Key Research Gap 
Human rational behavior … is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure 
of task environments and the computational capabilities of the actor. 
Simon, 1990, p. 7 
 
Central to the concept of ecological rationality is the question of what specific 
decision strategies fit to particular environments, that is, are successful in those 
environments, and how humans select them (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research 
Group, 1999; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). These are the two 
blades of Herbert Simon’s (1990, p. 7) scissors. The most successful strategies are 
often heuristics, or simple rules of thumb.  
Heuristics are understood here as decision strategies that ignore some of the 
available information. They are fast and frugal and exploit the structure of the 
environment. A strategy is considered ecologically rational to the degree that it 
matches the environmental structure. The recognition heuristic is a prototypical 
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example of a heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; 2002; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
2011). It predicts that in a binary choice task in which one, but not the other, option is 
recognized, the recognized option will score higher on a criterion. The heuristic works 
well for tasks where recognition is highly correlated with the criterion. Another 
example is take-the-best (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Take-the-best sequentially 
searches for information starting with the most valid cue, checking its values for the 
options at hand, and stopping the search as soon as a discriminating cue is found. The 
option with the higher value is then chosen. This heuristic benefits from a 
noncompensatory cue structure, that is, it performs well when the distribution of cue 
validities is highly skewed or dispersed and/or when cues are highly redundant 
(Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006, 2007). 
These two examples illustrate the basic assumption of the concept of 
ecological rationality: that humans possess a repertoire of heuristics suited for solving 
tasks in different domains. This repertoire has been termed the "adaptive toolbox" 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). No single strategy is assumed to 
be universally superior (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).  
What heuristics does the adaptive toolbox include? Todd and Gigerenzer 
(2012) gave an overview of a dozen heuristics (see their Table 1-1, pp. 9–10) assumed 
to be part of the toolbox. Further, additional social heuristics were listed by Hertwig 
and Herzog (2009, see their Table 1, pp. 684–685). Though even more heuristics are 
believed to exist, not all are presumed to be in the toolbox of every person at any one 
time. Instead, its contents are subject to influences of individual learning and 
experience as well as environmental changes. 
Research of the past two decades has provided ample evidence that humans 
indeed select heuristics in an adaptive way when facing preferential choice (Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) and inductive inference (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003, 
2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) tasks. Most of this research, however, has focused on 
individuals (for an exception see Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). The three studies 
presented in the following chapters should thus complement existing research on the 
adaptive use of decision strategies by specifically extending the investigation to social 
settings, which has been a key perspective missing from the current literature. 
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The Practical and Theoretical Importance of Studying Social Settings 
The study of decision making in social settings is motivated by both its 
practical relevance as well as its theoretical importance. On the practical side, meetings, 
collaborations, and teamwork are ubiquitous not only in academia, as in the examples 
given above, but in almost every organizational context (Meyer, Shemla, & Schermuly, 
2011; Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008). Moreover, even when making decisions on their 
own, people often seek advice from (preferably more experienced) others.  
One core reason for the prevalence of teamwork is that teams have the 
potential to outperform people working alone, because they are able to pool 
information and combine multiple perspectives in an increasingly specialized and 
complex world (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Stasser, 1992). 
Interdisciplinary research, for example, is based on the idea that multiple experts from 
different disciplines pool their knowledge in order to draw a more comprehensive 
picture of a research issue than any expert alone could do. More generally, it has been 
observed that researchers frequently generate hypotheses in groups (e.g., Dunbar, 
1977). Another advantage in organizations and in society at large is that group 
decisions often enjoy greater legitimacy and acceptance than individual decisions 
(Allen & Hecht, 2004).  
Yet, small-group research has revealed a number of potential disadvantages of 
groups, such as process losses due to coordination difficulties (Steiner, 1972) or 
distraction (Baron, 1986). Take brainstorming as an example. Originally it was thought 
that brainstorming explicitly benefits from group settings: Osborn claimed that “the 
average person can think up twice as many ideas when working in a group than when 
working alone” (if his four rules of brainstorming were adhered to; Osborn, 1957, p. 
229). Decades of research on brainstorming has not, however, supported this claim (for 
a meta-analysis see Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). Indeed the conclusion reached 
today holds that effective brainstorming is achieved by the combination of an 
individual and a group brainstorming phase (e.g., Stroebe, Nijstad, & Rietzschel, 2011). 
The results from this field of research imply that there is no consensus in favor 
of or against group work. Distinguishing the conditions under which groups perform 
well from those when it is better to assign tasks to individuals is, obviously, of great 
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practical importance. In fact, it paves the way for intelligent design of social systems, 
by informing the building of teams and organizations so as to maximize the potentials 
of both groups and individuals. Taking an ecological rationality perspective promises to 
contribute to a differentiated understanding of these complex issues. 
The second motivating force for studying decision making in social settings is 
of a theoretical nature. The literature on group decision making in social psychology 
and on individual decision making in cognitive psychology address very similar 
questions; yet these two streams of research so far remain largely unconnected. The 
three studies reported in this dissertation show how fruitful it can be to combine the 
literature of the two disciplines in order to shed light on specific questions, such as 
whether a group's selection of appropriate decision strategies depends on its 
composition in terms of certain task-relevant features (Chapter 2).  
Beyond contributing to finding answers to such specific open research 
questions, revealing the parallels between the two corresponding research streams in 
social and cognitive psychology can inspire theory building in both fields. Obvious 
similarities exist, for example, in the heuristics used by individuals, such as take-the-
best and tallying, and formal group decision-making strategies, such as the best 
member rule and the simple majority rule (cf. Reimer & Hoffrage, 2012). Reimer and 
Hoffrage (2012) suggested that “these formal similarities between the individuals’ 
strategies and social combination rules allow us to extrapolate some of the lessons from 
the ecological rationality of decision strategies for individuals to the ecological 
rationality of social combination rules” (p. 356). Comparing the formalization of 
heuristics in terms of their ecological rationality and basic building blocks—decision 
rules governing search, stopping search, and deciding—with tests of formal models of 
decision making may inspire further research on the following two important questions. 
First, can equivalences be identified in the decision rules used by individuals and 
groups? Second, what environmental structures, including group composition, make 
different group decision rules ecologically and socially rational? 
In a similar vein, recent advances in research on the use of advice have shown 
how applying a new framework can provide fresh insight into seemingly established 
findings: Taking an ecological rationality perspective and using individual-level 
analyses, Soll and Larrick (2009) revealed that humans use mainly two distinct 
strategies when integrating advice—choosing and averaging—and do not apply one 
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overall strategy, namely, adjusting by 30% toward the advice, as previous research had 
concluded (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Soll 
and Larrick’s proposed model analytically derived predictions about the relative 
performance of these two strategies. In Chapter 4, this model is discussed and applied 
in detail. 
Finally, one area that might benefit from integrating the two literatures of 
social and cognitive psychology is the study of differences between individuals’ and 
groups’ information processing and decision making (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 
1997). Conceptualizing groups as information-processing entities where cognition is 
distributed across individuals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Hinsz et 
al., 1997; Larson & Christensen, 1993) has enabled researchers to “assess if, when, and 
how group information processing is similar to, or different from, its individual-level 
counterpart” (Hinsz et al., 1997, p. 44). It could be informative, for example, to study 
the similarities and differences between groups and individuals when they are learning 
a decision strategy that fits to the environment (Chapter 2). This could fill a research 
gap recognized only recently by Reimer and Hoffrage (2012): “more empirical studies 
are needed to determine the extent to which groups do (or can) use heuristics when 
forming a decision. … We also need to explore how sensitive groups and their 
individual members are to particular structures of their environment” (pp. 358–359). 
Thus it is clear that extending research on decision making from the individual 
to the group level and applying an ecological rationality perspective to the study of 
decision making in social settings have both practical relevance and the potential to 
inspire theories in social and cognitive psychology. In the remainder of this section I 
provide an introduction to the chapters to follow that form the core of this dissertation. 
The main topics are briefly outlined and the specific facets of ecologically rational 
behavior they cover are highlighted. 
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Overview of the Studies in this Dissertation  
The first study, reported in Chapter 2, explored the question of how the 
environment shapes decision strategies used in a multiple cue comparison task. The 
issue has been studied before in individuals (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) and is extended here to the group level. More 
specifically, groups and individuals were confronted with an unfamiliar task and it was 
observed how quickly and how well they adapted their decision strategy over repeated 
trials. The task environment was manipulated so that it favored either the take-the-best 
strategy (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) or the weighted additive strategy (Dawes, 
1979) in two experiments—the first a between-subjects design and the second a within-
subject design. The weighted additive strategy searches for all cues per option, 
multiplies each cue value by its weight, and finally selects the option with the larger 
weighted sum. Weighted additive performs well in environments with a compensatory 
cue structure, that is, where cues are similarly valid and nonredundant, thus adding new 
evidence when acquired. 
In the second study, reported in Chapter 3, the environmental structure was 
held constant and the focus was on how the cognitive capabilities of multiple human 
minds and the groups’ specific compositions influenced strategy use and performance. 
Unlike the study in Chapter 2, which dealt with “inferences from givens,” this study 
explored “inferences from memory” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). In an experiment, 
study participants met in three-member ad-hoc groups and discussed which of two 
German companies had a higher market capitalization. The recognition heuristic plays 
an important role in such tasks when people work individually (e.g., Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Marewski & Schooler, 2011); here I investigated the adaptive use of 
recognition by small groups (cf. Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). How would groups 
value the contribution of members who used the recognition heuristic and thus based 
their decisions on a lack of knowledge? Would groups select decision strategies that 
took advantage of the composition of the group in terms of the knowledge/recognition 
distribution across members? 
The final study, in Chapter 4, examined how task difficulty influences the 
effectiveness and use of different advice-taking strategies. While the concept of 
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ecological rationality has shaped much of the research in the area of judgment and 
decision making over the last decades, this approach is relatively new in the advice-
taking literature. In this third study I focused on the judge–advisor system (JAS) in 
quantitative estimations. In the JAS, judges give an initial estimate, receive advice in 
the form of another person’s estimate, and then have a chance to revise their first 
estimate. Imagine that you (the judge) have to estimate the number of days you and 
your colleague will need to submit a paper together. Your colleague (the advisor) also 
gives an estimate. When asked for a final estimate, you could either average the two 
initial estimates, choose your own estimate, or choose your colleague’s.  
Applying ecological rationality to the study of advice taking, in this study I 
approached the questions of whether tasks of different levels of difficulty require 
different strategies and, if so, whether humans act accordingly. First, I explored the 
statistical properties of easy, intermediate, and difficult task environments and 
determined their impact on the theoretical performance of different advice-taking 
strategies, such as averaging and choosing. Thereafter I derived predictions from Soll 
and Larrick’s (2009) probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model. Last, I tested if 
humans use averaging and choosing to different extents contingent on environmental 
properties.  
In sum and as the core common thread, the three studies of this dissertation 
explored heuristic decision making in social contexts from an ecological approach. 
Chapter 5 contains a summary and discussion of the main findings and prospects for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The environment matters:       
Comparing individuals and dyads        
in their adaptive use of decision strategies1 
Kämmer, J. E., Gaissmaier, W., & Czienskowski, U. 
 
Abstract 
Individuals have been shown to adaptively select decision strategies depending 
on the environmental structure. Two experiments extended this research to the group 
level. Participants (N = 240) worked either individually or in two-person groups, or 
dyads, on a multi-attribute paired-comparison task. They were randomly assigned to 
two different environments that favored one of two prototypical decision strategies—
weighted additive or take-the-best (between-subjects design in Experiment 1 and 
within-subject design in Experiment 2). Both individuals and dyads learned to select 
take-the-best over time when it was adaptive, with a steeper learning rate in dyads. 
Selecting weighted additive when it was adaptive was equally likely for individuals and 
dyads. Information search data support this finding. Analyses of nominal dyads indicate 
that real dyads performed at the level of the best individuals. 
                                                 
 
1 A version of this chapter was published in 2013 in Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 299-329. 
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Introduction 
Imagine a group of geologists searching for profitable oil-drilling sites for an 
oil company. Before this group can pick one of several possible sites, it has to decide 
how to make this decision. First, it needs to decide what information to search for and 
in what order. Different methods are available for inferring the quality of the available 
sites, such as chemical and seismic analyses, which differ in their success rate. Second, 
the group needs to decide when to stop searching for information and, third, how to 
integrate the pieces of information to make a decision. For example, it could 
commission all available analyses and weight and add the results. Alternatively, it 
could proceed sequentially, starting with the most successful method and deciding as 
soon as one result clearly favors one site. 
This example illustrates the idea that decision makers can choose from a 
repertoire of different decision strategies, for which Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC 
Research Group (1999) have coined the term “adaptive toolbox.” This idea goes back 
to Herbert A. Simon (1956) who saw cognition as an adaptation to the environment. 
Different environments require the use of different decision strategies to be successful, 
as no single strategy will be universally superior (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; yet 
there is a lively debate about whether a Bayesian approach to cognition could be such a 
universal strategy, see e.g., Jones & Love, 2011; for comments see Bowers & Davis, 
2012a; Bowers & Davis, 2012b; Griffiths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012). A strategy 
is considered ecologically rational to the degree that it matches the environmental 
structure. The important questions are whether people are good at deciding how to 
decide, and how they do so. This fundamental problem is known in the literature as the 
strategy selection problem (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006; for alternative accounts see Newell & Lee, 2011; for a debate see Glöckner, 
Betsch, & Schindler, 2010; Marewski, 2010). 
Within the existing literature on adaptive strategy selection in humans (e.g., 
Bröder, 2003; Christensen-Szalanski, 1978, 1980; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Payne 
et al., 1988, 1993; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), most of the 
research has focused on adaptive decision making in individuals (for rare examples see 
Kämmer, Gaissmaier, Reimer, & Schermuly, 2012; Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). 
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Many decisions in real life, however, are made in a social context, for example, under 
the advice of another person (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) or in a group of people 
(Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Levine & Smith, 2012). In fact, teams are ubiquitous in all 
sectors of organizations today, as, for example, in the healthcare system or aviation 
(Manser, 2008; Waller, 1999). Reasons for this prevalence are mainly seen in (a) their 
potential superiority to individuals as they can combine multiple perspectives, areas of 
expertise, and resources to work on complex problems (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & 
Keys, 1994; Stasser, 1992) and (b) their large potential for adaptation to a dynamic 
environment (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006; Randall, Resick, & 
DeChurch, 2011). Because of its practical relevance, the current study extends research 
on the adaptive use of decision strategies to the group level and addresses the following 
questions: Do groups learn to select the decision strategy that fits best to a novel 
environment, and how well do they do so in comparison to individuals? 
Comparing Individuals with Groups 
Comparing individual with group performance has a long tradition in 
psychology (e.g., Watson, 1928) that has documented both the superiority of groups as 
well as their inferiority to individuals under certain conditions. Some of the 
inconsistencies can be resolved when taking the specific task context and methodology 
employed into account, as performance of individuals and groups is a function of the 
available resources, strategies of their use, task context, and methodology (cf. Bottger 
& Yetton, 1988; Hill, 1982). We will add to this list that the environmental structure 
plays an important role too (cf. Gigerenzer et al. 1999). For a fair comparison between 
individual and group performance, it is additionally important to specify the dependent 
measure: The performance of a collective (or interactive) group can be compared to (1) 
the average individual performance, (2) the most competent member of a statistical 
aggregate or nominal group (Hill, 1982), and / or (3) a statistically pooled response 
(e.g., averaging continuous guesses in research on the wisdom of crowds, see e.g., 
Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011). For example, research shows that 
collective groups outperform the average individual on intellective tasks, that is, tasks 
for which a correct answer exists and is demonstrable (for an overview see Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004). In highly demonstrable tasks, groups are likely to adopt the opinion of 
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the best member (“truth wins”), so that groups may also perform at the level of their 
best member. Very few studies have shown that groups may even outperform their best 
members (e.g., Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002). In brainstorming research, on the 
other hand, collective groups were shown to underperform nominal groups in terms of 
quantity of generated ideas (for an overview see Stroebe, Nijstad, & Rietzschel, 2011).  
In terms of memory capacity, collective groups were shown to remember more than the 
average individual but less than nominal groups (Betts & Hinsz, 2010). These few 
examples illustrate that no general conclusion concerning group superiority can be 
drawn and that the comparison measure matters. 
To assess group performance in the following experiments, we will therefore 
compare it with the average as well as best individual of a nominal group. Besides 
being a statistical benchmark, nominal groups can be seen as simulating a group 
decision process, in which members observe each other’s performance on the first trials 
or receive feedback about each other’s performance in a similar task, and then agree on 
following the suggestions of the best member instead of deciding on every trial jointly. 
If collective groups perform at the level of nominal groups, neither process losses nor 
process gains had an impact on their performance (Steiner, 1972). Not reaching the 
potential would point to process losses, for example, due to coordination difficulties 
(Steiner, 1972), production blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) or distraction (Baron, 
1986). 
By studying how well groups learn to use the appropriate strategy in an 
unknown task environment, we extend research that compares individual with group 
performance to a strategy learning task. At the same time we add to decision making 
research that has focused on the ability of individuals to adaptively select strategies in 
different environments (Bröder, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). For example, task 
characteristics such as costs of information search or time pressure were found to foster 
limited information search and noncompensatory ways of information integration (e.g., 
Bröder, 2003; Christensen-Szalanski, 1978, 1980; Payne et al., 1988, 1993). Moreover, 
environment characteristics such as the dispersion of cue validities and information 
redundancy have been found to influence decision making in a systematic way (e.g., 
Dieckmann & Rieskamp; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). As 
groups can be conceptualized as information processing entities where cognition is 
distributed across individuals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; Hinsz, 
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Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Levine & Smith, 2012) and groups face similar conditions 
like individuals when making decisions, we expect that the same principles found for 
individuals also hold for groups. Our first hypothesis is therefore that groups are able to 
learn to use appropriate decision strategies contingent on the task environment. We also 
ground this prediction on research on group decision making that has shown that 
groups apply similar decision strategies to those applied by individuals (Reimer, 
Hoffrage, & Katsikopoulos, 2007; Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). Lastly, we base our 
prediction on organizational psychological research on team adaptive capacity (i.e., the 
capacity to gather information from the environment and “to make functional 
adjustments”, cf. Randall et al., 2011, p. 526) that certifies groups adaptive team 
performance when encountering novel conditions in a number of applied settings (such 
as by airline crews, Waller, 1999; see also Burke et al., 2006; LePine, 2003).  
How fast will groups learn to adapt their decision strategy? One important 
mechanism behind strategy selection is learning from feedback (Rieskamp & Otto, 
2006). While feedback generally enhances learning and motivation (Nadler, 1979), 
studies in psychology (e.g., Davis, 1969; Laughlin & Shippy, 1983; Tindale, 1989; see 
Hill, 1982, and Hinsz et al., 1997, for reviews) and behavioral economics (Kocher & 
Sutter, 2005; Maciejovsky, Sutter, Budescu, & Bernau, 2010) have shown that groups 
require fewer feedback trials than the average individuals to reach asymptotic levels of 
learning. Reasons for this superiority of groups may be a stronger reliance on 
memorization (Olsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2006) and better processing of feedback 
information (Hinsz, 1990). This leads us to the expectation that groups will learn faster 
to select adaptive decision strategies than individuals in any environment:  
In sum, we hypothesize that groups will learn faster to adapt their decision 
strategy to an unfamiliar environment over time than the average individual. We will 
run exploratory analyses to test whether they will even be as good as the best 
individual. 
Two Prototypical Decision Strategies 
To investigate these hypotheses, we conducted two experiments on a two-
alternative forced choice task, in which participants had to select the more profitable 
oil-drilling site. Each alternative (i.e., oil-drilling site) was described on a range of 
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attributes (henceforth: cues) such as the results of seismic analysis. In line with 
research on individuals (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), our focus was on environments 
in which two prototypical decision strategies work well: take-the-best (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1999) and weighted additive (WADD). Both strategies make predictions 
about the information search and choice behavior (Bröder, 2003; Payne et al., 1988; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), and their success depends on the environmental structure. 
Take-the-best looks up the best (i.e., most valid) cue for both alternatives. If 
this cue discriminates between them (i.e., is positive for one, but negative for the other), 
take-the-best selects the alternative with the positive cue value and ignores all other 
cues (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). Think of our introductory example: if the group 
considers seismic analysis as the most valid cue and it indicates a high quality for oil-
drilling site X but not for Y, the group would administer no further tests and would 
choose oil-drilling site X. If seismic analysis, however, showed positive results for both 
sites, a group using take-the-best would acquire the next best cue, and so on, until a 
discriminating cue is found. A frequent criticism is that people violate the stopping rule 
and search for more information than necessary, that is, acquire information after the 
first discriminating cue (Newell & Shanks, 2003; Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003). 
This is particularly common when information search does not incur any costs (e.g., 
Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007). However, others have argued that it does not rule out 
take-the-best when people look up too many cues as long as the final choice is based on 
a single cue (see Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). In this regard, our experiment constitutes 
a hard test bed as information search did not incur any costs. We will report a method 
to test whether unnecessarily acquired information influenced the decision, which 
would more strictly speak against a consistent use of take-the-best than the mere numbe 
of acquired cues. 
In contrast, WADD looks up all cues for both alternatives, multiplies each cue 
value by its weight, and then selects the alternative with the larger weighted sum. 
Variants of WADD take instead of the validities chance-corrected validities (Glöckner 
& Betsch, 2008) or logodds as weights (termed Naïve Bayes; Bergert & Nosofsky, 
2007; Lee & Cummins, 2004). Strictly speaking, WADD is assumed to integrate all 
available cues (e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999). However, WADD also 
works with limited information search, namely, if one assumes that WADD searches 
cues sequentially according to their validity and stops search as soon as no additional 
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cue can overrule a preliminary decision (cf. Rieskamp & Dieckmann, 2012). On this 
basis, we can define “necessary information” as the minimum number of cues WADD 
has to search for so that no additional cue could possibly compensate for the decision 
based on the acquired cues. Searching for fewer than necessary cues would violate the 
search rule of WADD (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). The advantage of these two models 
is that they formulate testable predictions on information search, stopping, and choice 
rules, which can also be tested in groups. 
As this is the first study that studies the adaptive use of take-the-best and 
WADD in groups, we also intend to explore how groups apply strategies as compared 
to individuals. Is the accordance with the strategy’s search and stopping rules higher in 
groups than in individuals? Do groups apply strategies more consistently than 
individuals (Chalos & Pickard, 1985)? We will explore these questions on the basis of 
process and outcome data. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 constitutes a first test bed for our assumptions on adaptive 
strategy selection in groups as opposed to individuals. To investigate whether 
participants learn to select strategies adaptively, that is, contingent on the 
environmental structure, we randomly assigned them to one of two environments, 
which were constructed to discriminate between the use of take-the-best and WADD: 
Take-the-best led to the highest performance in the take-the-best-friendly environment 
and WADD in the WADD-friendly environment. In such environments, people’s 
accordance with the best-performing (i.e., adaptive) strategy has been shown to 
increase over time when working alone (Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiffer, 2006; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). The task in each case was to select the more profitable of two 
oil-drilling sites based on a range of cues, with outcome feedback after each trial. 
Participants were randomly assigned to work alone or in two-person groups (hereafter: 
dyads). 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants included 120 people (60 females; Mage = 26.3 years, SD = 3.7), of 
whom 77% indicated being a student. Participants received €12.96 on average (SD = 
0.83; €1 ≈ $1.37 at the time). To complete the experimental task, individuals took on 
average 36 min (SD = 12) and dyads 50 min (SD = 21). 
Design and procedure 
The experiment had a 2 × 2 × 3 (Participant [individual, dyad] × Environment 
[take-the-best-friendly, WADD-friendly] × Block) factorial design. The first two 
factors were between subjects, the third within subject. Upon arrival, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions, forcing equal cell 
sizes of 20 units. They were seated in front of a touch screen either individually or in 
same-sex dyads. After answering demographic questions, participants completed a 
practice trial and then worked on the experimental task. Dyads were encouraged to 
discuss their information search and agree on a joint decision (see Appendix A for 
instructions). 
Experimental task 
The oil-drilling task (Czienskowski, 2004) is a MouseLab-like task (Payne et 
al., 1988) that asks participants to choose the more profitable of two oil-drilling sites in 
a sequence of trials. Each oil-drilling site was described by six cues and their validities 
(which correspond to the actual validities in the set; see Figure 1). Validities in 
decreasing order in both environments were (in percentages, with the discrimination 
rates for the take-the-best-friendly and WADD-friendly environment in parentheses): 
78% (.35; .69), 71% (.54; .65), 65% (.65; .77), 60% (.58; .58), 56% (.69; .69), 53% 
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(.58; .58).2 Cues appeared in alphabetical order. Cue validities and cue names were 
randomly paired once before the experiment and stayed fixed throughout the 
experiment and for all participants. “Validity” was described as the proportion of 
correct answers using that cue alone when the cue was applicable (i.e., discriminated 
between the two alternatives). The cues were framed as tests that could be 
commissioned (i.e., clicked on) to inform choice. Figure 1 illustrates the two decision 
strategies, WADD and take-the-best, with screenshots of the task interface. At the 
beginning of each trial, all boxes contained question marks. They could be clicked on 
separately to reveal whether the cue had a positive (“+”) or a negative (“-”) value, 
which remained visible until a choice was made. Clicking on cues was cost free. 
Outcome feedback followed each trial. For each correct choice, the participant’s 
account increased by 1,000 petros, a fictitious currency, and equivalent to €0.10. 
 
Figure 1. Screenshots of the task interface including six cues for each oil-drilling site (X and 
Y) illustrating the search behavior of a weighted additive strategy (WADD, left) and take-the-
best (right). WADD required looking up all cues to calculate the weighted sum for each 
alternative. Take-the-best looked up the cue with the highest validity (here: seismic analysis) 
first, and, as this one did not discriminate, it looked up the cue with the second highest validity 
(geophones) next. As this cue discriminated, take-the-best reached a decision and ignored the 
remaining cues, which is why they are still hidden (“?”). 
 
                                                 
 
2 The differently high discrimination rate of the most valid cue had no effect on the opening 
rate of this cue as a a MANOVA with the percentages of trials in which the most valid cue was 
opened for object A and object B as dependent variables and the two conditions (individuals vs. 
dyads; take-the-best-friendly vs. WADD-friendly environment) as independent factors revealed 
(all Fs < 1). 
Chapter 2: The environment matters  20 
The task comprised three blocks, each consisting of the same set of two times 
26 items (adapted from Rieskamp & Otto, 2006, Study 2; for the complete item sets see 
Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A). The items within each block were randomly 
ordered with the restriction that the left and the right oil-drilling sites were equally 
often correct. Overall, 50% of the total item set were critical items, that is, items for 
which the two strategies make opposing predictions. To create a WADD-friendly 
environment, items were constructed by means of genetic algorithms such that WADD 
reached an accuracy of 88%, while take-the-best reached an accuracy of only 62%. In 
the take-the-best-friendly environment, accuracies were reversed: 88% for take-the-best 
and 62% for WADD.3 
Results 
The results section is structured as follows: We first investigate whether 
participants learned to adapt their strategy to the environment by analyzing 
performance changes over the three trial blocks. Performance is measured as the 
percentage of correct trials out of the 156 trials. To better compare performance 
between individuals and dyads, we will also report analyses on nominal dyads. To 
evaluate the adaptivity of strategy use, we will focus on accordance rates with the most 
appropriate strategy in each environment. Lastly, we will test how participants 
conformed to the corresponding search and stopping rules. 
Performance 
To investigate performance changes over the three blocks, we conducted an 
ANOVA with repeated measures with the block as within-subject factor and the 
environment and individuals vs. dyads as between-subjects factor, and the accuracy per 
block as dependent variable. Figure 2 depicts the results. Accuracy generally increased 
over time, Fblock (1.65, 125.594) = 28.294, p < .001, ηp2 = .27 (Greenhouse-Geisser 
                                                 
 
3 The theoretical accuracy of alternative strategies such as Tally, WADD with chance corrected 
weights and Naïve Bayes lay in between these two benchmarks. In detail (first value for 
WADD-friendly environment, second value for TTB-friendly environment), theoretical 
accuracies were: Tally (.79, .58), WADD with chance corrected weights (.73; .77), Naïve 
Bayes (.69; .81). 
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corrected). This improvement was more pronounced in the take-the-best-friendly 
environment, FBlock x Environment (2, 152) = 15.341, p < .001, ηp2 = .17. Most importantly, 
individuals and dyads started from the same level, but dyads then improved more 
quickly than individuals, FBlock x Ind. vs. Dyads (2, 152) = 4.588, p = .01, ηp2 = .06. Overall, 
dyads were not better than the average individual, however, Find. vs. dyads (1, 76) = 1.84, p 
= .18, ηp2 = .02. Lastly, mean performance was lower in the take-the-best-friendly 
environment (MTTB = 0.81, SD = 0.05) than in the WADD-friendly environment 
(MWADD = 0.85, SD = 0.05), Fenvironment (1, 76) = 11.779, p = .001, ηp2 = .13. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean accuracy per block of dyads (n = 20) and individuals (n = 20), in the WADD- 
(left) and take-the-best- (TTB-) friendly (right) environments. Error bars: ±1 SE. 
Comparison with the best individual 
To create nominal dyads, all 20 individuals of the individual condition in each 
environment were exhaustively paired, leading to 190 nominal dyads per environment. 
To determine the performance of each nominal dyad, we took the performance of the 
“best” (i.e., most accurate) member of a nominal dyad. “Best” was operationalized in 
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two ways: The best individual was either the one who made more accurate choices (a) 
overall (“best member overall”) or (b) in the first 26 trials, which equals half a block 
(“best member in 26 trials”). As measure (a) has been criticized for being accessible to 
the researcher only a posteriori (Miner, 1984), measure (b) is supposed to reflect the 
idea that groups first determine their best member and afterward adopt this person’s 
choices (Henry, 1995).  
We found that in both environments real dyads (MTTB = 0.82, SD = 0.05; 
MWADD = 0.85, SD = 0.05) reached the benchmark provided by the nominal dyads, be it 
by the best member overall (MTTB = 0.83, SD = 0.04; MWADD = 0.87, SD = 0.03) or by 
the best member in 26 trials (MTTB = 0.82, SD = 0.05; MWADD = 0.86, SD = 0.04), but 
did not exceed it.4 
Strategy use 
To understand the reasons for the accuracy differences, we next explored the 
accordance rates with the two best performing strategies take-the-best and WADD in 
their respective environments. Accordance rates measure how often the strategy 
predictions match the actual choices and may be interpreted as a measure of 
consistency of using a certain strategy. Accordance is highly correlated with accuracy 
but less influenced by randomness. To illustrate, a (100%) consistent use of the most 
appropriate strategy in each environment would have resulted in an accuracy of only 
88%. 
Again, we conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
study strategy use over time. The three blocks were entered as within-subject factor, the 
two environments and individuals vs. dyads as between-subjects factors, and the 
accordance rate with the adaptive strategy as dependent variable (see Figure B.1 in 
Appendix B). Mirroring performance, accordance generally increased over time, Fblock 
(1.74, 132.40) = 41.530, p < .001, ηp2 = .35 (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected). This 
increase was more pronounced in the take-the-best-friendly environment, FBlock × 
Environment (2, 152) = 22.695, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. Again, dyads adapted more quickly than 
                                                 
 
4  We did not test these differences statistically because of the largely unequal sample sizes (n = 
190 nominal dyads vs. n = 40 real dyads; cf. Field, 2009). Moreover, it can be seen from the 
values that no practically relevant differences can be observed. 
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individuals in the take-the-best-friendly environment and were to a greater extent in 
accordance with WADD in the last block of the WADD-friendly environment, FBlock × 
Individuals vs. Dyads (2, 152) = 3.284, p = .04, ηp2 = .04. No overall differences between 
individuals and dyads were revealed, Findividuals vs. dyads (1, 76) = 2.195, p = .14, ηp2 = .03. 
Information search and stopping rule 
As accordance rates have been criticized for being too imprecise to reveal 
cognitive processes from behavioral data (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003), we will provide in 
the following some additional measures to validate conclusion that participants 
improved over time because they learned to use the most appropriate strategy. In 
particular, we will look at information search behavior and investigate how it accorded 
with the information search and stopping rules predicted by take-the-best and WADD. 
Before we can do that, however, we have to determine the decision strategy each 
individual and dyad most likely used. For this, we used Bröder and Schiffer’s (2003) 
maximum-likelihood method of strategy classification. With this method, the best-
fitting model from take-the-best, WADD, Tally and guessing5 can be determined, 
whereby the fit is determined in reference to the likelihood of the data given the model 
(see Bröder & Schiffer, 2003, for details). 
In the take-the-best-friendly environment, 13 individuals and 18 dyads were 
classified as adaptively using take-the-best, while in the WADD-friendly environment 
18 individuals and 19 dyads were classified as adaptively using WADD. On the 
surface, they did not differ in their information search, as these participants searched in 
both environments on average for 80.7% (SD = 16.3) of the available cues (ANOVA: 
all Fs < 1.7). The number of cues was more than necessary for take-the-best (on 
average, 4.46 boxes (SD = 2.01) were opened in addition to the first discriminating cue 
in the take-the-best-friendly environment), indicating that cost-free cues triggered 
extensive cue acquisition. This is congruent with previous findings, which showed that 
introducing a search cost after a learning phase led to a decrease in cue acquisition (i.e., 
                                                 
 
5 Tally is considered as a fourth alternative besides the strategies with the highest expected accuracy in 
the two respective environments and a baseline guessing model, as it is usually done (e.g., Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2006). Tally (or Dawes’ rule; Dawes, 1979) assumes that people sum up the positive cues and 
choose the option with the larger total sum. It thus searches for all information. In the WADD-friendly 
environments, it performed second best (79%) and in the take-the-best-friendly environment it performed 
worse than take-the-best (58%). 
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an increase in accordance with the take-the-best stopping rule) in a take-the-best-
friendly environment but not in a take-the-best-unfriendly environment. This indicated 
that people had learned different choice rules though not differing in their stopping rule 
in the learning phase (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; Rieskamp & Dieckmann, 2012). 
In fact, searching for cues does not necessarily imply that the cues are integrated; 
search is often continued to enhance confidence in decisions already made (Harvey & 
Bolger, 2001; Newell et al., 2003; Svenson, 1992). 
We therefore now introduce two more fine-grained measures of strategy use: 
(1) To validate WADD as a choice rule, we checked how often participants that were 
classified as adaptive WADD-users opened fewer cues than necessary, in short “too 
few” (recall that necessary means that no further evidence would overrule the decision 
based on the acquired cues). (2) To validate take-the-best as choice rule, we analyzed 
those cases, in which participants who were classified as adaptively using take-the-best 
opened less valid cues that contradicted the first discriminating (more valid) cue, and 
checked whether this less valid cue overruled their decision—which, according to take-
the-best, it should not. In other words, we counted how often the decision of take-the-
best users was overruled by compensatory evidence (“compensatory choices”). 
Figure 3 depicts the results for these two measures. In the left panel, the results 
concerning the WADD-users can be seen. It shows that, in the first block, WADD-
users opened on average about 1 box less than necessary. This number decreased over 
blocks to a mean number of 0.46 boxes, Fblock (1.458, 48.101) = 11.171, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.25 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), with no differences between individuals and 
dyads, Findividuals vs. dyads (1, 32) = 2.373, p = .13, ηp2 = .07. In other words, WADD-users 
became more consistent with their search rule but still opened slightly too few boxes. 
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Figure 3. Two measures of strategy use concerning the stopping rule, (a) in the WADD-
friendly environment and (b) in the take-the-best friendly environment. (a) The left panel 
depicts the mean number of too few cues that have been looked up, that is, cues that should 
have been opened so that the decision could not be overruled by additional evidence. This 
measure was calculated for the 18 individuals and 19 dyads who were classified as adaptive 
WADD-users. (b) The right panel depicts the proportion of those trials in which people decided 
against the first discriminating cue based on less valid cues that were additionally opened, 
although, according to take-the-best, these less valid cues should not have overruled the first 
discriminating cue. This measure was calculated for the 13 individuals and 18 dyads who were 
classified as adaptive take-the-best-users. Error bars: ±1 SE. 
 
In the right panel of Figure 3, the results concerning the adaptive take-the-best 
users can be seen. It shows the percentage of those cases, in which participants saw 
contradictory evidence,6 which overruled the decision as suggested by take-the-best. In 
                                                 
 
6 The amount of contradictory evidence can be measured in different ways, for example, by 
calculating the weighted sum of all those cues that were opened after the first discriminating 
one, for each option X and Y, and compare these sums with each other. If the first 
discriminating cue is pointing to X, for example (i.e., having a positive value for X), but the 
weighted sum of cues opened after the first discriminating one is larger for Y, this is regarded 
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the first block, individuals and dyads decided in around 35% of cases, in which they 
saw contradictory evidence, against take-the-best. Over time, this proportion decreased, 
Fblock (2, 52) = 29.909, p < .001, ηp2 = .54, and it did so more strongly for dyads (where 
it decreased to about 15%) than for individuals (where it decreased to about 25%), 
FBlock × Ind. vs. Dyads (2, 52) = 3.654, p = .03, ηp2 = .12. 
Summary  
To summarize, in Experiment 1 we sought to test whether and how well 
individuals and dyads learned to select the appropriate strategy in an unknown task 
environment. It provided some evidence that not only individuals but also dyads are 
able to adapt to different, but stable environmental structures. Dyads even showed a 
faster adaptation process, but they did not surpass the potential given by the best 
individual. The high performance rates were supported by the finding that the majority 
of participants were classified as using the adaptive strategy. Accordance rates mirrored 
performance results and indicated a more consistent use of take-the-best by dyads. 
Convergent evidence came from process measures: information search became more 
consistent over time, and again to a greater extend for dyads in the take-the-best 
friendly environment. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and 
extend them to a task in which environmental structures changed over time and a new 
strategy had to be learned. Experiment 2 thus comprised two phases: the learning 
phase, which was identical to Experiment 1 and varied the environmental structure 
between participants, and the relearning phase, in which participants were confronted 
with the alternative environment. Consequently, each participant encountered both 
environments (the take-the-best-friendly and the WADD-friendly) from Experiment 1, 
                                                                                                                                              
 
as a trial with contradicting evidence. We report the results for this measure. An alternative 
way would be to count the number of discriminating cues that follow the first discriminating 
one and to which direction they point. If, after the first discriminating cue, more discriminating 
cues follow that point into the other direction (Y), this would be regarded as contradicting 
evidence. These measures yield very similar results. 
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one after the other. Experiment 2 thus provides a stricter test for adaptive strategy 
selection by varying the environmental structure within subjects, as Payne et al. (1988) 
have suggested. 
Since Experiment 2 contained a change in the environment that rendered 
another strategy adaptive, it differed in some important aspects from Experiment 1. 
While the learning phase of Experiment 2 was equivalent to Experiment 1 (with the 
difference that people were informed at the beginning that there would be two phases), 
the relearning phase of Experiment 2, though structurally corresponding to the learning 
phase, required additional subtasks. These subtasks were (a) to detect the need for 
change, (b) to find and apply a new and better strategy than the one selected in the 
learning phase, and (c) to overcome a—now maladaptive—routine established in the 
learning phase. 
When people are faced with familiar problems, routinized decision behavior 
has many advantages, such as allowing for efficiently dealing with a situation and for 
immediately reacting and performing well. On the group level, having developed a 
routine reduces the need for consideration, coordination, and negotiation (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990). When a situation changes, however, and some novel decision 
behavior is—unnoticeably—required, routines become maladaptive. In fact, individuals 
as well as groups have difficulty overcoming maladaptive routines, especially with 
increasing routine strength or when they are under time pressure (e.g., Betsch, Fiedler, 
& Brinkmann, 1998; Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001; Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2006; Reimer, Bornstein, & Opwis, 2005; for a review of theories, see Betsch, 
Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002). The additional requirements make the relearning phase 
more difficult than the learning phase of Experiment 2 and than Experiment 1. We thus 
expected an overall lower performance in the relearning phase. This enhanced 
difficulty has one additional advantage, as it leaves more room for learning to take 
place. In fact, one could argue that in Experiment 1, the lack of learning in the WADD-
friendly environment was observed due to a ceiling effect as participants, both 
individuals and dyads, had started out with an already very high accordance to WADD. 
If performance is already high and people do the upper benchmark of performance, 
they might not see any need to change their strategy, which might be the reason for the 
lack of further improvement in the WADD-friendly environment. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 120 people (60 females; Mage = 24.2 years, SD = 3.7), of 
whom 83% indicated being a student. Participants received €24.7 on average (SD = 
1.55). To complete the oil-drilling task, individuals took on average 53 min (SD = 15) 
and dyads 72 min (SD = 24). 
Design and procedure 
Again, the experiment had a 2 × 2 × 3 (Participant [individual, dyad] × 
Starting Environment [take-the-best friendly, WADD friendly] × Block) factorial 
design, and phase as an additional factor (Phase 1, Phase 2). The first two factors were 
between subjects, the third and fourth within subject. Upon arrival, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions, forcing equal cell 
sizes of 20 units. As in Experiment 1, participants worked with a touch screen either 
individually or in same-sex dyads. After answering demographic questions, participants 
completed a practice trial and then worked on the experimental task, which was exactly 
the same in each phase as in Experiment 1. The difference was that this time all 
participants worked on the two environments consecutively, one half first on the take-
the-best-friendly environment and then on the WADD-friendly environment with a 
break in between, the other half on the reverse order. Participants were told at the very 
beginning that they had to work on two phases, finding profitable oil-drilling sites first 
in the United States and then in Argentina (or vice versa, counter-balanced per 
environment). We provided this country hint in all conditions to suggest to participants 
that something might have changed and to thereby secure a minimum level of 
adaptivity; it has previously been shown that without a hint almost no adaptivity can be 
observed in a changing environment, resulting in a floor effect (Bröder & Schiffer, 
2006). 
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Results 
Performance 
To investigate performance changes over the three blocks of each phase, the 
percentage of correct trials was entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
three blocks and the two phases as within-subject factors, and the starting environment 
and individuals vs. dyads as independent variables. As can be seen in Figure 4, 
accuracy generally increased over time in both phases, Fblock (1.82, 138.57) = 90.458, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .54 (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected). This increase was more pronounced 
in the take-the-best-friendly environment, independent of the phase, FBlock × Environment (2, 
152) = 2.929, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. Dyads were on average better than individuals, Find. vs. 
dyads (1, 76) = 3.939, p = .05, ηp2 = .05. This difference was driven by the take-the-best-
friendly environment: dyads were better in the take-the-best-friendly environment in 
both the learning and the relearning phase (though to a lesser degree in the second 
phase), but did not differ from individuals in the WADD-friendly environment in both 
phases, FPhase x Ind. vs. Dyads × Environment (1, 76) = 3.601, p = .06, ηp2 = .05. Moreover, 
different learning curves were observable: individuals mainly improved from the first 
to the second block, but dyads kept on improving to reach a higher final level, FBlock × 
Ind. vs. Dyads (2, 152) = 3.617, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. 
As expected, average performance of all participants dropped from the first to 
the second phase, Fphase (1, 76) = 63.416, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. In other words, 
participants suffered from the change in the environment. However, the direction of 
change played an important role. Learning to apply WADD in the second (relearning) 
phase when it had not been adaptive before was more likely than adopting take-the-best 
as a novel strategy. Thus, when the take-the-best-friendly environment constituted the 
starting environment, participants’ performance did not differ between the phases. This 
was not the case in the reverse experimental order. In both phases, performance was 
higher in the WADD-friendly environment than in the take-the-best-friendly 
environment, respectively. The drop from the first to the second phase was much less 
pronounced when the WADD-friendly environment constituted the second 
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environment than when the take-the-best-friendly environment came second, FPhase x 
Environment (1, 76) = 52.855, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, which indicated a preference for WADD.  
 
Figure 4. Individuals’ and dyads’ average performance in the two experimental orders: (a) The 
left panel depicts the rates of performance with the adaptive strategies in the experimental order 
of first the take-the-best-friendly and then the WADD-friendly environment; (b) the right panel 
depict the results for the reverse order. Error bars: ±1 SE. 
Comparison with the best individual 
Again we compared the performance of real dyads with that of nominal dyads. 
Nominal dyads were composed by exhaustively pairing the 20 individuals of the 
individual condition of each environment and performance was determined by giving 
each nominal dyad the score obtained by the better of the two individuals (“best 
member overall” and “best member in 26 trials”). In the take-the-best-friendly 
environments, real dyads (Mphase 1 = 0.81, SD = 0.07; Mphase 2 = 0.73, SD = 0.04) reached 
the baseline provided by the nominal dyads in both phases, be it by the best member 
overall (Mphase 1 = 0.82, SD = 0.05; Mphase 2 = 0.73, SD = 0.03) or the best member in the 
first 26 trials (Mphase 1 = 0.81, SD = 0.05; Mphase 1 = 0.71, SD = 0.04). Also in the 
WADD-friendly environments, real dyads (Mphase 1 = 0.85, SD = 0.06; Mphase 2 = 0.78, 
SD = 0.08) were close to the performance of the best member overall (Mphase 1 = 0.88, 
SD = 0.03; Mphase 2 = 0.81, SD = 0.04) and of the best member in 26 trials (Mphase 1 = 
0.87, SD = 0.03; Mphase 1 = 0.79, SD = 0.05). 
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Strategy use 
Strategy use over time (i.e., accordance rate of the adaptive strategy in each 
environment) was entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with the three blocks and 
two phases as within-subject factors and the environmental of the first phase and 
individuals vs. dyads as independent variables (see Figure B.2 in Appendix B). 
Within each phase, accordance generally increased over time, Fblock (1.693, 
128.705) = 119.992, p < .001, ηp2 = .61 (Greenhouse–Geisser corrected). Like 
performance, average accordance with the adaptive strategy dropped from the first 
phase to the second, Fphase (1, 76) = 100.145, p < .001, ηp2 = .57; this drop was 
particularly deep when participants were confronted with the take-the-best friendly 
environment in the second phase, FPhase x Environment (1, 76) = 28.770, p < .001, ηp2 = .28; 
and increase in accordance was steepest in this environment and phase too, FBlock x Phase x 
Environment (2, 152) = 12.594, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Overall, accordance with the adaptive 
strategy was lower in the take-the-best-friendly environment than in the WADD-
friendly environment, Fenvironment (1, 76) = 7.132, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. 
Dyads achieved higher accordance rates with take-the-best in the take-the-
best-friendly environment than individuals in both phases, but slightly lower 
accordance rates with WADD in the WADD-friendly environment in both phases, 
FPhase x Ind. vs. Dyads × Environment (1, 76) = 8.201, p = .01, ηp2 = .10, so that dyads only 
slightly surpassed individuals in overall accordance with the most adaptive strategy 
(Mindividuals = .77, SD = .01 vs. Mdyads = .80, SD = .01), Find. vs. dyads (1, 76) = 3.454, p = 
.07, ηp2 = .04. 
Information search and stopping rule 
Again we used the maximum-likelihood method of Bröder and Schiffer (2003) 
to classify participants as using one of the following strategies: take-the-best, WADD, 
Tally, or guessing. In the first phase, 16 individuals and 18 dyads were classified as 
adaptively using take-the-best in the take-the-best-friendly environment. In the 
WADD-friendly environment, 18 individuals and 18 dyads were classified as using 
WADD. In the second phase, no individual and only seven dyads were classified as 
adaptively using take-the-best in the take-the-best-friendly environment. In the 
WADD-friendly environment, more participants, namely thirteen individuals and 
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thirteen dyads, were classified as adaptively using WADD, probably indicating that 
WADD was either easier to learn or a default strategy when encountering a changing 
environment, as other studies have argued before (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). 
Restricting the number of participants to the adaptively classified and entering 
individuals vs. dyads and the environment as independent variables and the mean 
number of acquired cue as dependent variable into an ANOVA per phase revealed that 
participants in the first phase searched for more information in the WADD-friendly 
environment (M = 84.3%, SD = 14.0) than in the take-the-best-friendly environment, 
where search was still quite high (M = 69.1%, SD = 20.4), Fenvironment (1, 66) = 12.899, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .16. Due to the lack of classified individuals as take-the-best users in the 
second phase only a comparison within dyads was possible. Here, the mean number of 
acquired cues was not an indicator of strategy use as no differences were revealed 
between environments (overall M = 77.8%, SD = 14.3). This amount of information 
acquisition again exceeded the amount required by take-the-best (on average, 3.75 
boxes (SD = 2.12) were opened after the first discriminating cue in the first phase and 
6.59 boxes (SD = 1.72) in the second phase in the take-the-best-friendly environment). 
We next analyzed how many fewer cues than necessary were opened by the 
adaptive WADD-users. Figure 5a depicts the results for the first half. An ANOVA with 
repeated measures revealed that individuals and dyads became more consistent with the 
WADD stopping rule over time, Fblock (1.515, 51.527) = 10.795, p < .001, ηp2 = .24 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the second half, participants started with opening 
on average 1.30 cues (SD = 1.10) too few, which decreased to 0.90 (SD = 1.15) in the 
last block, again indicating an increasing consistency with WADD though the absolute 
numbers were higher than in the first phase, Fblock (1.136, 27.276) = 3.987, p = .03, ηp2 
= .14 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected; see Figure 5b). 
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Figure 5. Mean number of “too few” cues opened by participants who were classified as 
WADD-users in the WADD-friendly environment, (a) in the first phase (n = 18 individuals and 
n = 18 dyads) and (b) in the second phase (n = 13 individuals and n = 13 dyads). Error bars: ±1 
SE. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the proportion of trials, in which adaptive take-the-best users, 
who opened more contradictory than supportive evidence after the first discriminating 
cue, were influenced by this evidence and chose the option not favored by the first 
discriminating cue. As in experiment 1, a steady decrease in those compensatory 
choices is observable also in the first phase, Fblock (2, 60) = 26.985, p < .001, ηp2 = .47. 
In phase 2, no comparison between individuals and dyads was possible as only seven 
dyads but no individuals were classified as adaptive take-the-best users. They showed a 
similar decreasing trend, though on a higher absolute level, Fblock (2, 12) = 39.148, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .87. 
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Figure 6. Average proportion of compensatory choices (i.e., deciding against the first 
discriminating cue) out of trials in which more contradicting evidence than supporting evidence 
was opened, (a) in the first phase (n = 16 individuals and n = 18 dyads) and (b) in the second 
phase (n = 7 dyads). This measure was calculated for those participants who were classified as 
adaptive take-the-best-users. Note that no individuals were classified as take-the-best users in 
the second phase, why no results can be displayed for individuals in the right panel. Error bars: 
±1 SE. 
Summary 
In sum, Experiment 2 mainly replicated the findings of Experiment 1 and 
tested them in a relearning phase. In the learning phase, dyads were superior to 
individuals in learning to adaptively follow take-the-best but did not differ in following 
WADD. The relearning phase apparently constituted a much harder test bed, showing 
that performance was much lower than in the learning phase. Again, dyads were 
superior to individuals in learning to adaptively follow take-the-best but did not differ 
in following WADD. Dyads performed at the level of the best members. Strategies 
were more consistently used in the first phase than in the second, and dyads applied 
take-the-best more consistently than individuals, which was indicated by information 
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search behavior and accordance rates and more extremely shown by the classification, 
which revealed that no single individual was using take-the-best in the second phase. 
Discussion 
Two experiments were conducted to investigate whether and how well two-
person groups, or dyads, as opposed to individuals, adaptively follow decision 
strategies (here: the prototypical strategies take-the-best and WADD). While 
Experiment 1 tested adaptive strategy selection in a between-subjects design by 
allocating participants to either a take-the-best-friendly or a WADD-friendly 
environment, Experiment 2 employed a within-subject design, in which all participants 
faced both environments, one after the other. This rendered Experiment 2 a stricter test 
of adaptive strategy selection, because a new strategy became adaptive and had to be 
learned. In fact, abandoning a maladaptive routine in the second phase became a very 
hard task for most participants. Besides replicating previous findings of adaptive 
strategy selection in individuals (e.g., Bröder, 2003), both experiments provide 
experimental evidence for adaptive strategy selection in groups. Interestingly, 
performance analyzes revealed that groups were better than the average individual at 
learning take-the-best when it was adaptive, that is, required fewer trials to reach 
asymptotic performance levels (Experiment 1) or achieved on average higher 
performance levels (Experiment 2). They did not differ from the average individual, 
however, when following WADD was adaptive. Comparisons with nominal groups 
revealed that groups performed at the level of the best individuals. 
Performance Differences 
We hypothesized that groups would be able to adapt to an unfamiliar 
environment by following the most appropriate strategy. This hypothesis is based on 
the assumption that groups can be conceptualized as information processing systems 
and hence apply similar (cognitive) strategies like individuals (Hinsz et al., 1997). We 
found that groups were as good as the average individual in experiment 1 and better in 
experiment 2, which was mainly driven by performance differences in the take-the-
best-friendly environment. 
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One reason for this high group performance might be that groups had a higher 
probability of containing at least one individual who was above the mean ability level 
of people working alone (Lorge & Solomon, 1955). We therefore compared 
performance levels of the interacting groups with that of nominal groups. If real groups 
perform better than the best member of a nominal group, this would be an indicator of 
process gains from interaction. If real groups perform worse than nominal groups and 
thus do not reach their potential, process losses have occurred (Steiner, 1972). In our 
case, we found that real groups performed by and large as well as nominal groups in 
both environments. In other words, they were not much better than had they only 
identified the best individual. This finding could be taken to argue against investing in 
group interaction. Some caution is warranted, though, because another conclusion 
could be that it is already satisfactory for groups to reach the potential given by the 
performance of their best member, since groups rarely perform better than individuals, 
according to a vast amount of literature (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Laughlin et al., 
2002; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002). Moreover, groups usually have difficulties with 
identifying their best member without help (e.g., Henry, 1995; Henry, Strickland, 
Yorges, & Ladd, 1996). Even more relevant may be that group decision making has 
other advantages, such as legitimacy and acceptance, which may play an important role 
in many organizational contexts (see Allen & Hecht, 2004, for more benefits).  
Much more pronounced than overall performance differences between 
individuals and groups were performance differences between environments. 
Performance was higher in the WADD-friendly environment than in the take-the-best-
friendly environment, indicating that WADD was easier to learn. This asymmetry in 
favor of WADD replicates previous findings on the individual level (Bröder, 2003; 
Bröder & Schiffer, 2003, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) and extends them to the group 
level. Replicating this asymmetry for the relearning phase as well, that is, showing that 
learning WADD is more likely than learning take-the-best even when it has not been 
adaptive before, supports the idea of WADD being a default strategy. The following 
reasons for an asymmetric preference for WADD are discussed in the literature: It may 
stem from the belief that “more is better” (Chu & Spires, 2003) or simply reflect an 
exploration phase in which people try to get a sense of which pieces of information are 
useful before settling on a decision strategy (McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979). 
Similarly, Hogarth and Karelaia (2006) argued from a prescriptive perspective that in 
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unknown environments linear models perform better than one-reason decision 
strategies. From a descriptive perspective, it may also reflect an overgeneralization of 
the applicability of normally reasonable strategies (Payne et al., 1993, p. 206) and may 
have been enhanced by leading the participants to focus on accuracy, which has been 
found to foster WADD (Creyer, Bettman, & Payne, 1990). 
What this result also indicates is that the take-the-best environment constituted 
a much harder environment, and most differences between individuals and groups were 
found here (as discussed below). 
Learning Curves 
Previous research has found that groups are faster in learning (e.g., Davis, 
1969), and our results point into the same direction. Again, the environment played an 
important moderator: The learning curve in the take-the-best-friendly environment was 
steeper for dyads than for individuals, with either individuals reaching the same level of 
accordance in the final block (Experiment 1) or dyads staying on a higher level in all 
blocks (Experiment 2). In the relearning phase of Experiment 2, routine effects led to 
an overall decrease in participants’ performance, but mostly when the take-the-best-
friendly environment was encountered second. Such negative transfer effects have been 
widely documented before (e.g., Betsch & Haberstroh, 2005). But although individuals 
and dyads started at a similarly low level of accordance with the adaptive strategy in 
Phase 2, the dyads’ superiority again became apparent: Dyads were more likely to 
abandon WADD when it was no longer adaptive, while only the best individuals were 
successful in doing the same, as the comparison with nominal dyads suggests. In fact, 
not a single individual was classified as adaptively using take-the-best in the second 
phase, but seven dyads were. This result also suggests that giving people many 
opportunities to encounter a novel task that requires abandoning a routine is especially 
beneficial for dyads, although they might appear as or even more prone to routines than 
individuals in the first place (Reimer et al., 2005). 
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Information Search Behavior and Adherence to the Stopping Rule 
In a last step, we analyzed consistency of strategy use by measuring 
accordance with the information search, stopping and choice rule of the respectively 
most appropriate strategy. All measures indicate an increase in consistency over time 
and again a higher consistency by groups in the take-the-best-friendly environment. 
This higher decision consistency in groups is consistent with work by Chalos and 
Pickard (1985). 
As a measure of accordance with the information search and stopping rules, 
the mean number of acquired cues is usually taken (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2003; 
Rieskamp & Dieckmann, 2012). This measure, however, did not allow for separating 
strategies in our experiments as people opened most of the cues on average (in 
experiment 1 and the second phase of experiment 2). This is not an uncommon finding 
in tasks in which information search is cost free (e.g., Bröder, 2003). Though violating 
in the strict sense the stopping rule of take-the-best in particular, it is not the only 
indicator of consistent strategy use (cf. Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; Hogarth & 
Karelaia, 2007). We therefore proposed two more fine-grained measures: the number of 
cues that were opened too few in order to allow the decision proposed by WADD not to 
be overruled by subsequent information. As a measure of take-the-best, we analyzed 
the number of trials in which people were influenced by less valid information. Despite 
the plausibility of these measures and their insights into strategy use, only a restricted 
evaluation is possible as no established thresholds exist and no comparison with 
previous studies is possible. Future studies should further validate these measures. 
Summary and Open Questions 
To summarize the results, individuals and groups were equally good at 
applying the default strategy of weighting and adding all available information when 
this was required (WADD), but groups were better at learning to consider cues in a 
sequential manner, to ignore irrelevant cues, and to integrate them in a non-
compensatory way when it was adaptive (take-the-best). Such a superiority of small 
groups has been documented before in other learning tasks (e.g., Hill, 1982). This study 
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demonstrates it in a strategy selection task and thus contributes to research on the 
adaptive capacity of teams (e.g., Burke et al., 2006; Randall et al., 2011). 
Plausible explanations for the superiority of dyads in the take-the-best-friendly 
environment can be derived from the literature that discusses reasons for the superiority 
of groups in intellective tasks in general (e.g., Laughlin, VanderStoep, & Hollingshead, 
1991) and a faster learning rate of groups in particular. These are (a) the greater 
likelihood of recognizing the correct answer due to a larger sample size; (b) a better 
joint memory due to better error correction ability (e.g., Hinsz, 1990; Vollrath, 
Sheppard, Hinsz, & Davis, 1989) and/or better encoding (Weldon, Blair, & Huebsch, 
2000; for an overview of findings on collaborative group memory, see Betts & Hinsz, 
2010); and (c) the capacity to process more information and use decision rules more 
consistently (Chalos & Pickard, 1985). Additionally, articulating the decision 
procedure during discussion may enhance awareness and a deeper processing rendering 
more likely to detect the appropriate strategy (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996). 
The aforementioned reasons, however, would also suggest a superiority of 
dyads in the WADD-friendly environment, which we did not find. One might argue 
that a ceiling effect was responsible for not finding this. This explanation, however, can 
be excluded by taking into account the second phase of experiment 2 where 
performance dropped and no similarly high levels as in the first phase were reached. 
What might explain the asymmetric finding of group superiority when 
learning take-the-best? We speculate that the possibility for social validation in a 
dyadic setting may be one reason for our finding that dyads were more prone to be less 
influenced by irrelevant cues (i.e., cues that were less valid than the best discriminating 
cue). The approval of one’s partner may replace looking up or taking into consideration 
more cues to feel reassured in one’s decision. Another reason may be that a better 
calibration of cue orderings may be the result of collaborating with another person, as 
exchanging information with others can speed up learning the order in which cues 
should be considered (Garcia-Retamero, Takezawa, & Gigerenzer, 2009). Since this 
was only helpful in the take-the-best-friendly environment, the observed asymmetry 
may have appeared. It may also be the case that groups per se rather overweight 
apparently important cues (Gigone & Hastie, 1997), which may be unhelpful in certain 
environments, such as one that is WADD friendly, but advantageous in others, such as 
a take-the-best-friendly environment. Last, the information search steps and integration 
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rule of take-the-best might be much easier to verbalize than those of WADD, rendering 
take-the-best easier to communicate and teach to another person once it had been 
detected as the appropriate rule (for a related argument that simple, sequential strategies 
are easier to learn than strategies that weight and add all pieces of information, see 
Wegwarth, Gaissmaier, & Gigerenzer, 2009). Taken together, the aforementioned 
aspects might offer some explanations of the superiority imbalance. More research is 
needed to test these assumptions and shed light on the mechanisms underlying the one-
sided superiority. 
Moreover, future research should address the question of whether and to what 
extent this superiority effect can be found “in the wild,” that is, in real groups where 
ignoring irrelevant information may facilitate and improve decision making in certain 
environments. Admittedly this is an unusual endeavor in the light of much group 
research that aims at finding ways of fostering the quantity of information considered in 
and by groups (e.g., Frey, Schulz-Hardt, & Stahlberg, 1996; Larson, Foster-Fishman, & 
Keys, 1994; Parks & Cowlin, 1996; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989; Wittenbaum & 
Stasser, 1996). This line of research has been stimulated by the repeated finding that 
groups would not exhaust their potential of pooling more information but mainly 
discuss shared information known to every member (e.g., Stasser, 1992; Wittenbaum & 
Stasser, 1996). In those studies, the option with the highest overall sum score was often 
defined as the best solution though (i.e., Tally; cf. Reimer & Hoffrage, 2012; for a 
critique see Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006). Therefore, groups ignoring part of the available 
information necessarily performed worse than the benchmark strategy. This limitation 
to one type of environment restricts the possible findings concerning group adaptivity. 
Our results draw an optimistic picture that groups are able to adapt to different 
environments. The lesson here is that not the mere quantity of information determines 
the success of a group (cf. Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006) but rather its adaptive integration 
of information, which may, in certain environments, mean to ignore irrelevant 
information. 
This study is just one step towards studying adaptive strategy selection in 
groups. Limited generalizability is given by its focus on inferences from givens and a 
rather abstract, completely unfamiliar experimental task. In everyday life, people may 
probably experience some resemblance between new and old situations and thus be 
able to exploit their repertoire of strategies better (without having to encounter the same 
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decision problem for 156 times). A parallel, real-world example may illustrate some of 
the factors that are missing due to our choice of an unfamiliar task: Take a selection 
committee where group members receive information on the applicants and meet in 
order to make a selection. Here, strategic interests may come into play and may 
influence information sharing and weighting. The example also alludes to factors that 
may cause more performance differences between individuals and groups in 
information-intense environments: having to actively search for, remember information 
and decide which to search for in the first place. The MouseLab-like experimental 
setup, which presents all available information to participants, certainly simplifies the 
task in these respects (cf. Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). Therefore, studying more 
naturalistic settings would be worth to study in future 
Another limitation results from our focus on just two environments and two 
strategies. Although take-the-best and WADD have been identified as two prototypical 
decision strategies (Bröder, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006), many more heuristics are 
part of the toolbox (for an overview see table A.1-1 in Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012, pp.8-
9) and many more factors shape the environment than just the payoff structure (such as 
the time or costs for acquiring information). Therefore, future research may extend our 
findings to a broader set of decision domains. On the side of the decision maker, further 
influencing factors, worthy to study, may be intelligence, working memory load (cf. 
Bröder, 2003), the size of the group, or its composition (Kämmer et al., 2012). 
Conclusion 
Adaptive capacity is essential for individuals and groups who are engaged in 
judgment and decision making (Burke et al., 2006; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Randall et 
al., 2011). It enables people to adjust their operations in (changing) environments 
accordingly. The selection of an appropriate strategy from the adaptive toolbox, for 
example, will lead to efficient and effective decision making in an uncertain 
environment. Specifically, using take-the-best or WADD when appropriate allows for 
tailoring one’s amount of information needed and way of integrating it to the structure 
of the environment. The current study showed that both individuals and dyads engage 
in adaptive strategy selection and that dyads are superior in the adaptive use of take-
the-best, but not in the adaptive use of WADD. Thus, in contrast to the common (and 
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partly justified, see Richter, Dawson, & West, 2011) belief of organizations in the 
superiority of teams (Allen & Hecht, 2004), no generalized verdict in favor of groups 
can be derived from this study. Instead, it demonstrates how important it is to take the 
environmental structure of the task into account when comparing individual with group 
strategy learning and performance. 
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The adaptive use of recognition in         
group decision making1 
Kämmer, J. E., Gaissmaier, W., Reimer, T. & Schermuly, C. C. 
 
Abstract 
Applying the framework of ecological rationality, the authors study the 
adaptivity of group decision making. In detail, they investigate whether groups apply 
decision strategies conditional on their composition regarding task-relevant features. 
The focus here is on the recognition heuristic, so that task-relevant features, which 
influence the potential performance of group strategies, are the validity of the group 
members’ recognition and knowledge. Forty-three 3-member groups performed an 
inference task in which they had to infer which of two German companies had the 
higher market capitalization. Results based on the choice data support the hypothesis 
that groups adaptively apply the strategy that leads to the highest theoretically 
achievable performance. Time constraints had no effect on strategy use but on the 
proportions of different types of arguments discussed. Possible mechanisms that may 
underlie the adaptive use of recognition in group decision making are discussed. 
                                                 
 
1 This chapter is in press in Cognitive Science under the same title. 
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Introduction 
How do groups make decisions? And which factors influence their decision 
processes? Interestingly, the social psychological literature on group decision making is 
addressing very similar questions as the cognitive psychological literature that studies 
individual decision making, yet these two bodies of literature are as of now largely 
unconnected. Here, we show that it could be fruitful to combine the two to investigate 
an important aspect of group decision making: Do groups select decision strategies 
adaptively, given their composition regarding some task-relevant features, and how do 
they do so? The framework of ecological rationality has been applied successfully to 
study these questions in individuals, and here we show how it can be combined with 
classic models of group decision making to gain important insights for both research 
areas. 
Teamwork has become a common form of organizational collaboration 
(Meyer, Shemla, & Schermuly, 2011; Salas, Cooke, & Rosen, 2008), especially to 
handle complex problems. Among the major advantages of groups are (1) that they 
possess the potential to pool more information and combine multiple perspectives 
(Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Stasser, 1992), (2) that work can be divided 
among several group members, and (3) that the work in groups is important for the 
satisfaction and well-being of people (Scholl, 2005).  (4) Additionally, groups have a 
good potential to adapt to a (dynamic) environment (cf. Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & 
Kendall, 2006; Randall, Resick, & DeChurch, 2011). Research suggests, for example, 
that context variables and task demands affect strategy selection in groups. On the other 
hand, it has also shown that groups are far from being perfect in adapting their 
strategies. For instances, studies on the truth-wins principle suggest that groups often 
overlook a correct solution to a problem if the member who favors it cannot 
demonstrate its correctness (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Laughlin, VanderStoep, & 
Hollingshead, 1991). Moreover, research on social loafing (Karau & Williams, 1993) 
and hidden profiles (Stasser & Titus, 2003) showed that team work and decision 
processes in teams can also be dysfunctional (for a review on group performance, see 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004). For example people may be less motivated when working in a 
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group than when working alone (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979) or suffer from 
coordination losses (Steiner, 1972). 
As the performance of teams can influence organizational success (Peterson, 
Owens, Tetlock, Fan, & Martorana, 1998), it is crucial to understand how groups make 
decisions. In particular, it is important to understand whether and how groups adapt 
their decision making process to both the composition of their group members and the 
structure of the task environment. Not all strategies are viable for all groups. Some 
strategies may need more expert knowledge than other, for instance. At the same time, 
not all strategies are viable for every particular task or situation. For example, there is 
ample evidence that the success of different decision strategies for combining 
individual inferences is conditional on certain task characteristics (Davis, 1992) and / or 
group composition features (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977). 
We propose the framework of ecological rationality to study the adaptivity of 
group decision making in detail. This framework assumes that people posses a 
repertoire of specialized decision strategies with which they can solve specific tasks in 
specific environments, which was coined the “adaptive toolbox” (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999). Importantly, none of the 
available strategies is an all-purpose tool that can be successfully applied to every 
situation. Rather, the success of a strategy is anchored both in the structure of the task 
environment and how much a strategy fits in this regard, and in the cognitive 
capabilities of the mind, both of which also determine which strategy is selected (e.g., 
Simon, 1956). 
Groups can be conceptualized as information processing systems where 
cognition is distributed across individuals (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). We 
therefore propose that the notion of the adaptive toolbox can be transferred to groups as 
well. On the group level, the success of a strategy is still anchored in the structure of 
the task environment, as it is for individuals. But instead of the cognitive capabilities of 
one human mind, what matters on the group level are the cognitive capabilities of 
several human minds and their composition. In a different set of studies we have shown 
that groups adapt their decision strategies to the structure of the task environment 
(Kämmer, Gaissmaier, & Czienskowski, 2012). Here, we investigate whether and how 
groups adaptively select a particular decision strategy in relation to their composition 
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with respect to a task-relevant feature. In doing so, we focus on a very simple decision 
strategy that has been studied extensively in individuals: the recognition heuristic 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
 
Recognition heuristic: If one of two alternatives is recognized and the other is not, then 
infer that the recognized alternative has the higher value with respect to the criterion. 
 
To clarify the terms used in this paper (see also, e.g., Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 
2004), the recognition heuristic is only applicable in situations in which individuals 
recognize just one out of two objects. In these cases, the recognition heuristic predicts 
that the recognized object will have the higher value on some outside criterion. If both 
objects are recognized, people cannot rely on recognition to discriminate between the 
two, but they have to rely on further knowledge. The exact nature of this further 
knowledge and how it is applied is not further specified for the purpose here (see 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Thus, relying on knowledge in this context only means 
that both objects are recognized and are distinguished based on some other strategy 
than recognition. Finally, individuals who recognize neither object are assumed to 
guess.  
Besides being well researched in individuals, we believe that this heuristic is 
highly suited to study adaptive decision making in groups, because it is (1) precisely 
specified, allowing to assess its success for each group and (2) has been previously 
shown to play an important role also in the context of group decision making (Reimer 
& Katsikopoulos, 2004). 
We expect that for some groups it is more worthwhile to follow the 
recognition heuristic than for others. This allows us to find out whether groups relied 
on recognition in an adaptive manner. That is, do those groups for whom relying on 
recognition would be particularly successful rely more on it than groups for which 
other knowledge is better? Which variables influence whether a group relies heavily on 
recognition? And how can groups tell whether they should rely on recognition? 
We will now first introduce research on the recognition heuristic in individuals 
before describing how it applies to the group context. Then, we will spell out in more 
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detail what our specific questions and predictions are regarding adaptive decision 
making in groups. 
The Recognition Heuristic in Individuals 
The recognition heuristic is a prominent decision strategy in choice tasks for at 
least two reasons: First, recognition has a natural retrieval advantage over knowledge, 
which has to be searched for in memory with cognitive effort (Pachur & Hertwig, 
2006). The recognition heuristic exploits the capacity for recognition, which is 
fundamental to the human mind (Standing, 1973). Due to the retrieval advantage, the 
recognition heuristic is often regarded as a default decision strategy (Marewski, 
Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010). The second reason is an 
ecological one. Failure to recognize a name can be informative and facilitate decision 
making. Environmental mediators such as the media make it more likely that people 
encounter objects in their daily lives that are well-known and score high on a variety of 
criteria than those that score low. Consequently, objects scoring high on a criterion are 
often also more likely to be recognized. It was shown, for instance, that people are 
more likely to recognize larger cities (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), more successful 
political parties (Gaissmaier & Marewski, 2011), better colleges (Hertwig & Todd, 
2003), and companies with high market capitalization (Marewski & Schooler, 2011). In 
domains with such interrelations and for people whose recognition rate highly 
correlates with the criterion (i.e., who have a high recognition validity, see Table 1), it 
is ecologically rational to rely on the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
2011). 
Over the last 10 years of research on the recognition heuristic, the conditions 
under which it is rational to rely on the heuristic have been specified and evidence has 
been provided that people adopt this heuristic in environments in which it yields 
accurate inferences (for a review, see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; for an overview of 
current studies, see special issues edited by Marewski, Pohl, & Vitouch, 2010, 2011a, 
2011b; for a critical position, see Hilbig, 2010, and Pohl, 2011). People appear to select 
their strategies in an adaptive way by relying on recognition information when 
recognition is systematically related to a criterion but discounting it when it is not 
related (e.g., Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pohl 2006). For example, there is a positive 
Chapter 3: The adaptive use of recognition  49 
correlation of r = .64 between the recognition validity and the proportion of judgments 
consistent with the recognition heuristic across 11 studies (Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, 
Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011). 
Recognition-Based Decision Models in Groups 
To understand the decision process of groups better, it is important to clarify 
how groups are influenced by their members’ recognition or lack thereof when forming 
joint judgments. Imagine a situation in which a number of people are asked to jointly 
infer which of two objects scores higher on a criterion. Some group members recognize 
only one of the two objects and form their inference on the basis of the recognition 
heuristic. Other members will only guess, while others again are more knowledgeable 
and they base their inference on additional information, which they retrieve from 
memory.  
How do groups integrate their members’ individual inferences in the described 
situation? The recognition heuristic applies to situations in which correct answers exist 
but where exact criterion knowledge is not available. Thus, an individual cannot 
demonstrate the correctness of a solution without additional sources, why this kind of 
task may be best described as having many features of a judgmental task (Davis, 1992; 
Laughlin, 1980), in which some form of a majority rule will best model the decisions of 
a group (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). The most common majority 
rule is the simple majority rule, which infers that each group member has the same 
influence on a group decision and that the group chooses the option that receives the 
most votes. In addition to this rule, Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004) proposed two 
oligarchic majority models that assign group members different weights in the voting 
process dependent on their individual decision strategy. The recognition-based model 
assumes that members using the recognition heuristic are more influential, while the 
knowledge-based model assumes that members using knowledge are (for further 
details, see Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004, pp. 1011). More specifically, (1) the 
recognition-based model (RBM) assumes that the simple majority of those group 
members who can use the recognition heuristic (i.e., those who recognize one but not 
the other object and choose the recognized one) determines the group choice, while all 
others are ignored, including those that have to rely on knowledge. (2) Conversely, 
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according to the knowledge-based model (KBM), the majority of members who can use 
knowledge (i.e., those who recognize both objects) determines the group choice, while 
the opinions of all other members are ignored. Imagine, for example, a three-member 
group has to infer whether company A or company B has a higher market 
capitalization. Two members may have heard of A before, but do not recognize B, and 
thus infer (applying the recognition heuristic) that A has a higher market capitalization. 
The third member, on the contrary, recognizes both names and infers that B has the 
higher market capitalization based on some knowledge cues. According to RBM, the 
group choice would be A, while according to KBM, the group choice would be B. Note 
that both models are noncompensatory and predict that just one individual (in this case 
the knowledge-using member) can overturn a majority. 
Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004) empirically tested the models with three-
member groups having to infer which of two American cities had the larger population. 
One of the major results was that, overall, RBM predicted the observed group choices 
better than KBM. This finding is surprising and counterintuitive as it shows that 
members lacking knowledge can dominate group decisions and trump a majority of 
members who recognize both objects and are, thus, more knowledgeable. This 
behavior—adhering more often to RBM than to KBM—was functional, though, 
because it increased groups’ overall performance. 
Despite this main finding of recognition dominating group decisions most of 
the time, in a considerable number of cases, recognition did not trump the vote of a 
majority of group members who could use their knowledge. A closer look at their 
results (see their Figure 3, p. 1019) reveals that there was a similarly large variance in 
strategy adherence among groups as has elsewhere been found in individuals (Pachur & 
Hertwig, 2006). Why groups relied on different strategies and whether they behaved 
adaptively in doing so, however, remained unexplored. We therefore aimed to study 
differences between groups who predominantly use RBM and those who 
predominantly use KBM and to explore strategy selection by testing the idea that 
groups select their strategies in an adaptive way. Extending this adaptiveness 
hypothesis to the group level, we assumed that groups are more likely to use RBM than 
KBM when RBM yields more accurate inferences, and vice versa. We next introduce 
the idea that groups, like individuals, adaptively select a strategy from their toolbox; we 
Chapter 3: The adaptive use of recognition  51 
examine this hypothesis in more detail and discuss how time constraints may affect the 
adaptive selection of strategies. 
The Adaptive Selection of Strategies in Group Decision Making 
Given the adaptive use of the recognition heuristic in individuals, we aimed to 
test if groups are also able to select their strategies according to the theoretical accuracy 
of RBM and KBM. The theoretical accuracy of RBM and KBM informs about how 
often relying on the person using the recognition heuristic or using knowledge, 
respectively, will lead to correct inferences. As individual decision makers use the 
recognition heuristic in particular when recognition is a good predictor (termed item 
and environment adaptivity by Pachur, 2011), we expected similar findings for groups. 
The quality of a group strategy (i.e., theoretical accuracy) likely depends on 
the average quality of individual strategies (here: recognition or knowledge validity) 
and / or of choices when decisions that were previously made on an individual level are 
integrated on the group level (e.g., Hastie, 1986; Laughlin, 1999). For example, groups 
are well advised to follow the opinions of their most knowledgeable members when 
these members are more often correct than their less knowledgeable members. We 
therefore expect that groups with a large number of members with high knowledge 
validity (or a high average knowledge validity per group) would rely predominantly on 
KBM. The opposite is expected for groups with a high average recognition validity. 
This latter assumption is supported by the study of Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004) 
where the great adherence with RBM was accompanied by a high recognition validity 
and a low validity of group members’ knowledge in every single group (on average .81 
vs. .58, respectively). The reason for this uneven distribution was a methodological 
one: To be able to test for less-is-more effects, Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004) had 
selected a subsample of American cities such that the validity of the recognition 
heuristic was considerably higher than the validity of group members’ knowledge. 
Their study was the first showing that the less-is-more effect also exists on the group 
level, namely, that limited knowledge can result in a better inferential accuracy than 
more complete knowledge (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Hertwig & Todd, 2003).  
In sum, the major goals of the current study were to find out if groups apply 
KBM and RBM in an adaptive way and whether the use of the two different strategies 
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is accompanied by a certain group composition regarding the knowledge and 
recognition validity. At the same time, we explored how groups might actually select 
strategies adaptively. In general, the influence of group members highly depends on the 
timing of contributions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009) and confidence levels (Stasser & 
Davis, 1981). Here, it would be most adaptive if members with high recognition or 
knowledge validities had the strongest impact on the group decisions, respectively. Yet 
recognition and knowledge validities are most probably not directly accessible by 
individuals, so that they have to be inferred based on cues (Pachur, 2011). Potential 
cues include how quickly objects are recognized, how much other knowledge can be 
retrieved from memory or how trustworthy the source of recognition is evaluated. 
How Is Strategy Use Reflected in Discussion Behavior? 
An advantage of studying simple heuristics in a group setting is that people are 
urged to verbalize their strategies and reasons, making them easily observable. 
Although we cannot expect that verbalized reasoning exactly mirrors the strategies 
actually used (as those might not be accessible to people, e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), 
the process may still reveal participants’ subjective, important reasons and provide a 
source for new insights for researchers (see Keller, Gummerum, Canz, Gigerenzer, & 
Takezawa, in press, for a similar claim). This may help to address the question of 
whether people really use the recognition heuristic (Hilbig, 2010), that is, whether they 
are relying on their recognition when the recognition heuristic models their choices 
best. Translated to the group level, the question is whether groups that predominantly 
use RBM also mention the recognition cue—constituting a behavioral correlate of 
RBM—more often during discussion than groups that predominantly use KBM 
(Reimer, Hertwig, & Sipek, in press). Thus, we measured the frequency with which the 
recognition cue was mentioned during discussion and also whether the recognition cue 
was perceived as a particularly valid argument compared to other pieces of information 
to test the hypotheses that the recognition cue is more frequently used by RBM than by 
KBM groups. 
Another behavioral indicator of why groups predominantly adopt proposals by 
particular members may be derived by analyzing who speaks first when facing a new 
task. Previous studies have revealed that members speaking very early in a group 
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discussion are more likely to exert influence than members speaking later (Abele, 
Stasser, & Groebe, 2012; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Shaw, 1961; Stasser, 2012). 
Therefore, we coded whether the member that could rely on the recognition heuristic or 
the member that has to rely on further knowledge spoke first, and hypothesized that in 
RBM groups the member using the recognition heuristic would more often contribute 
very early, while in KBM groups this should be the knowledge-using member. 
Do Time Constraints Affect Strategy Use and Discussion Behavior? 
Previous research on individual decision making has shown that time 
constraints have an impact on the extent to which different strategies are adaptive and 
on which strategies are used (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski, 1978, 1980; Marewski & 
Schooler, 2011; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; 
Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; Svenson, Edland, & Slovic, 1990; Zakay, 1985). From 
group research and the attentional focus model (Karau & Kelly, 1992) we know that 
time constraints urge groups to focus on fewer and on more valid cues (Kelly & 
Loving, 2004). Because of its retrieval primacy, the recognition heuristic should 
become such a particularly valid cue. We thus included two time conditions (with and 
without time constraints) to explore the following assumptions. Time constraints should 
foster the use of RBM as RBM involves only one type of argument, the recognition 
heuristic, and should thus be a less time-consuming strategy than KBM, as KBM 
requires an exchange of arguments for each alternative. On the behavioral level, we 
expected to find an increased use of the recognition cue by RBM groups when they are 
under time constraints than when they are not as a sign of it being a particularly 
diagnostic cue for them.  
Overview of Research Questions 
In sum, we aimed to test whether groups select their strategies in an adaptive 
way, In addition to differentiating between groups that predominantly used RBM and 
groups that predominantly used KBM, we aimed to find out whether their choices led 
to the highest achievable accuracy. Moreover, we investigated whether time constraints 
affected the use of these strategies as opposed to no time constraints. Finally, to 
identify potential mechanisms behind adaptive strategy selection we assessed group 
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composition features and behavioral correlates of the two decision strategies, which has 
rarely been done in previous research but is often asked for in the literature 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Scholl, 2007). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred thirty-two students (86 female, 46 male) from the Humboldt 
University Berlin, Germany, participated in the study. Their age ranged from 20 to 57 
years with a mean age of 26.11 years (SD = 5.7). The three-member groups (n = 44) 
were randomly assigned to one of the two time conditions (with vs. without time 
constraints). Participants received performance-contingent payment for their 
participation and group performance in the economic comparison task [with an average 
compensation of about €17 ($26)]. One group had to be excluded from the analyses 
because of incomplete recording of individual answers. Thus, the final sample 
consisted of 43 groups (23 groups in the condition with time constraints and 20 groups 
in the condition without time constraints). 
Experimental Task 
In the economic comparison task, two German company names were 
presented and the one with the higher market capitalization had to be selected (task 
adapted from Marewski & Schooler, 2011, Experiment 5). The market capitalization 
reflects the current total value of a company and equates to the price a purchaser would 
have to pay for a full takeover (Glossary of Deutsche Börse Group, n.d.). Similar to the 
population comparison task used by Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004), this is a 
magnitude inference task and rather a judgmental task (see introduction).  
A sample of 100 company names, ranging from hardly to widely recognized, 
was selected from the 130 companies that were listed on the three major German stock 
exchanges in 2008 (DAX, MDAX, SDAX; see Table C.1 in Appendix C for the 
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complete list).2 On the basis of the individual recognition-test results, the 100 
companies were randomly paired with each other once for each group separately for the 
paired-comparison task. The only restriction for the pairing was that the chance of 
obtaining pairs in which both RBM and KBM were applicable and differed in their 
predictions for the group choices (critical pairs) was maximized.3 The resulting 50 pairs 
did not contain any company name twice. The two company names appeared 
simultaneously and in random position on the screen. Participants were asked to infer 
which company had the higher market capitalization. The correctness of answers was 
evaluated according to the market capitalization of the companies as of the month 
preceding the study. The term market capitalization was explained to the participants as 
defined above (see Appendix C for screenshots of the experimental paradigm). 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of the time 
conditions and to a three-member group. The experiment consisted of three parts, 
which lasted altogether approximately 1.5 hr. All tasks were administered through a 
PC. In the first part, participants individually completed a recognition test in which they 
were asked to indicate which of the 100 company names they recognized. The names 
were presented on a computer screen in random order and answers had to be indicated 
by pressing one of two keys (recognition or no recognition). Then, the paired-
comparison task was administered individually. It contained 50 comparison pairs, being 
the same for the three participants that constituted a group in the second part, but not 
across groups. 
For the second—the group—part, participants were asked to sit around a table 
facing a computer screen and a camera. Group members were instructed to come to 
joint decisions for the same 50 pairs of the individual paired-comparison task. They 
were asked to take turns typing the joint decision in a clockwise fashion so that no 
group member would play the role of a moderator or leader. Moreover, they were told 
that it was not possible to correct the decision after it was made and that they would not 
                                                 
 
2 For the purpose of eliminating the completely unknown companies, we conducted a pilot study (that 
contained only a recognition test) with 40 lay people (24 females, mean age 23.5 years, SD = 2.5). 
3 This was achieved by basing the pairing on the recognition answers of each member and maximizing 
the numbers of pairs in which only two members recognized each company. 
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be given any feedback about the correctness of their answers until the end of the 
experiment. Finally, to increase their motivation, participants were informed that they 
would receive exclusively performance-contingent payment, namely, that each correct 
group decision would earn €0.50 ($0.78) for each person and that each member of a 
group would receive the same amount of money at the end of the experiment. 
In the condition with time constraints, we restricted the discussion time of 
each comparison pair to 30s in total. The time a group had available to reach a decision 
was visualized by a countdown on the screen above the pair. The time between having 
answered one pair and releasing the next one (by pressing the space bar) was not 
restricted. Groups in the condition without time constraints were told that they could 
take the time they needed for their discussion. 
In the third part, participants were asked to individually answer demographic 
questions and a manipulation check item: “I felt time pressure during the discussion” 
(answered on a scale from 1 I totally disagree to 5 I totally agree). Answers indicated 
that the respective time condition was successfully manipulated, Mwithout time constraints = 
1.30, SD = 0.58 vs. Mwith time constraints = 3.56, SD = 1.18; t(117) = -12.78, p < .001, d = 
2.44. Last, they completed the argument recall task, which asked, “Which important 
arguments stated during discussion that spoke for or against a high market 
capitalization of a company do you recall? Please write down the four most important 
arguments speaking for a high market capitalization and the four most important ones 
that speak against it. Please rank them according to their importance (high scores 
indicate great importance).” Note that this recall task referred only to cues used as 
arguments and (in retrospect) to the complete discussion. Upon completion of the 
individual questionnaires, participants were debriefed, paid, thanked, and released. 
Dependent Measures 
All dependent variables are shortly explained in Table 1. From the answers to 
the two individual tasks (the recognition task and the paired comparisons), the 
dependent variables recognition and knowledge validity were calculated. To evaluate 
how well each decision model explained the group inferences, their predictive 
accuracies were calculated, that is, the proportion of trials in which the predictions of a 
model and the actual group choice converged. Moreover, we computed their theoretical 
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accuracies, that is, the proportion of trials in which the models would choose the 
company with the higher market capitalization; and the achieved accuracy or 
performance of groups, that is, how often a group chose the company with the higher 
market capitalization. 
 
Table 1 
Dependent measures. 
Measure Explanation 
  
Recognition validity α α = R / (R + W), 
“where R is the number of correct (right) inferences the 
recognition heuristic would achieve, computed across all pairs in 
which one object is recognized and the other is not, and W is the 
number of incorrect (wrong) inferences under the same 
circumstances” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p.78). 
  
Knowledge validity β Proportion of correct answers when both objects are recognized 
  
Predictive accuracy of 
RBM and KBM 
Percentage of correctly predicted group choices a model makes for 
pairs in which it is applicable 
  
Theoretical accuracy of 
RBM and KBM 
Relative frequency with which a model yields correct choices 
  
Achieved accuracy / 
performance 
Observed number of correct choices per group 
 
To explore how groups implemented their decision strategy, we analyzed the 
videotaped discussions and the answers to the argument recall task. The frequency of 
cues mentioned during discussion was determined on the basis of the Discussion 
Coding System (DCS; Schermuly & Scholl, 2011, 2012).4 The general procedure of the 
DCS is to divide the interaction process into acts, which can be a sentence or several 
                                                 
 
4 The DCS was applied by two trained coders. Six video-taped discussions of 30 min each were coded by 
both coders to determine the intercoder agreement [being κ = 0.82 for (1) the recognition cue and κ = 
0.83 for (2) knowledge cues], which was satisfactory and thus justified the decision to have the remaining 
37 discussions coded by only one coder each. Due to incomplete or partly damaged videotapes, 
approximately 3% of the observation data (66 of 2,150 comparison pairs) are missing. 
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sentences of the same topic, and then to code the functional and interpersonal meaning 
and content of each act. The content of an act was coded into two main categories:     
(1) An act was coded as a recognition cue when a person used the recognition heuristic 
as an argument or simply let the other members know that she/he recognized one 
company name but not the other. It was also coded when a person used the recognition 
cue of another member or the whole group as an argument. Example statements are, “If 
you do not even recognize company A, it cannot be big,” and “Let’s take company A, 
since we all recognize it.” (2) Acts were coded as knowledge cues when a group 
member provided cues about a company other than recognition. Again it did not matter 
whether a person simply stated his/her cue knowledge (e.g., “I know that company B 
produces drugs”) or used a cue as an argument for or against a high market 
capitalization (e.g., “Company A is a bank, and banks have money”), although the 
latter was much more often the case (the same holds for category 1). Note that category 
2 is wider than the recognition-cue category as it contains different kinds of cues. To 
evaluate the answers to the argument recall task, all (pro and con) arguments that 
included “(no) recognition” or “(no) renown” were coded as recognition cues together 
with their ranking (0 not mentioned, 1 lowest rank, 4 highest rank). 
Results 
Individual Condition 
In their individual condition, participants recognized on average 46 out of 100 
companies (SD = 11.99; range 22–84) and were correct in 60.9% of the 50 inferences 
(SD = 8.4, min = 40%, max = 82%). Confronted with pairs where they recognized both 
companies, they made 66.2% correct inferences (SD = 15.5), that is, their average 
knowledge validity was .66. With pairs where they recognized neither company they 
had an average guessing accuracy of 49.4% (SD = 13.5). Finally, with pairs where they 
recognized just one company, they made 71.5% correct inferences (SD = 14.7). Their 
average recognition validity was .69. Thus, different from the study by Reimer and 
Katsikopoulos (2004), the average recognition and knowledge validities were very 
similar to each other in this study. On average, participants individually adhered to the 
recognition heuristic in 83.0% of situations (SD = 12.8) in which it was applicable. 
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Group Condition 
All groups together accomplished 43 × 50 = 2,150 inferences. On average, 
groups answered 66.4% (SD = 9.4, min = 44%, max = 84%) of all choices correctly. 
We first tested whether the two time conditions had an impact on the predictive 
accuracies of RBM and KBM. There were no differences regarding the predictive 
accuracies or RBM and KBM between the time conditions, respectively, neither for 
RBM: t(41) = 0.003, p = .997, d = 0.001, nor for KBM: t(41) = 0.818, p = .42, d = 
0.25.5 Therefore, the subsequent analyses concerning strategy use are based on the joint 
data set from both time conditions, consisting of 43 groups or 2,150 comparison pairs.  
We next analyzed how often each strategy was applicable, and how often the 
groups’ choices were in accordance with each strategy. The simple majority rule (SM) 
was applicable to all 2,150 cases and 74.6% of its predictions matched the group 
choices. Note that, as Reimer & Katsikopoulos (2004), we will focus on RBM and 
KBM rather than SM subsequently, as they and their correlates will be more 
informative regarding adaptive strategy selection. RBM was applicable to 1,243 cases 
(57.8%) and 74.7% of its predictions agreed with the group choices. KBM could be 
applied to 1,015 cases (47.1%), and 80.6% of its predictions agreed with the group 
choices.6 The higher overall predictive accuracy of KBM was functional because the 
overall theoretical accuracy of KBM was higher (72.9%) than that of RBM (70.8%). As 
a first hint of adaptive strategy selection, the overall predictive accuracy of KBM 
(RBM) on the group level was positively correlated with the theoretical accuracy of 
KBM (RBM), rKBM(41) = .23, p = .13, n = 43; rRBM(41) = .39, p = .01, n = 43. That is, 
groups for whom a strategy yielded more accurate inferences also tended to adhere to 
that strategy more often, which held particularly true for RBM. 
Because the two subsamples in which RBM and KBM were applicable only 
overlapped partially, we also considered the subset of situations where both restricted 
                                                 
 
5 None of the dependent variables was affected by the time condition, except the behavioral correlates 
(see below), as a multivariate ANOVA with the predictive and theoretical accuracies of RBM and KBM, 
respectively, and the achieved accuracy per group as dependent variables, and the time conditions as 
independent variable revealed, Ftime(5, 37) = 0.700, p = .63, ηp2 = .09. 
6 Both models fail to make predictions if there is no majority of one kind, but members using the same 
individual strategy contradict each other. In 14 of the 907 trials (1.5%) in which RBM made no 
prediction (2,150 – 2,143) RBM failed to make a prediction because there was a contradiction between 
two recognition heuristic users. In 225 or the 1,135 trials (19.8%) in which KBM made no prediction 
there was a contradiction between two knowledge users. 
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majority models were applicable (n = 811). Here, 81.0% of the predictions made by 
KBM and 74.4% of those made by RBM agreed with the group choices. Again, the 
theoretical accuracy of KBM was higher (73.4%) than that of RBM (71.9%; for 
correlations see below). An analysis of the 181 situations in which the two decision 
schemes made contrasting predictions (critical pairs) showed that KBM matched the 
group choices in 115 situations (64%), and RBM in 66 (36%). In sum, aggregate 
analyses suggested a higher predictive accuracy of KBM overall, together with a higher 
theoretical accuracy of KBM. If not stated otherwise, the following analyses were 
based on the subset of 811 situations in which both models could be applied. 
Classification of groups as RBM or KBM groups  
Figure 1 depicts the predictive accuracies of the two strategies for each 
individual group, ordered according to the predictive accuracy of RBM. It shows that 
the overall differences between the predictive accuracies of KBM and RBM per group 
are not negligible but range between 3.7 and 50 percentage points (M = 14.5, SD = 8.9). 
The large variance of the predictive accuracies of KBM and RBM suggests differences 
in the strategy use between groups. As with individuals, different groups obviously 
preferred different strategies and differed in the extent to which they adhered to one of 
the two strategies. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of correct predictions by the knowledge-based model (KBM) and the 
recognition-based model (RBM), for each group (bars indicate the percentage of situations in 
which KBM and RBM made correct predictions for the group choices). Groups are sorted in a 
descending order according to the predictive accuracy of RBM. Along the x-axis, the total 
number of situations per group in which both models, KBM and RBM, made predictions, are 
displayed (overall n = 811).  
 
To test the adaptiveness hypothesis our next step was to classify groups. 
Several studies on heuristic decision making have argued that systematic individual 
differences in decision strategies are rather the rule than the exception, and thus, only 
analyses that take the individual as the unit of analysis allow for a proper assessment of 
the underlying processes of cognitive strategies (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; 
Marewski, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Pachur, Bröder, & Marewski, 2008). Thus, 
in addition to comparing mean values, we conducted analyses on the level of individual 
groups by classifying each group as an RBM group when more of its choices were 
matched by the predictions of RBM than by KBM (i.e., if the predictive accuracy of 
RBM was higher than that of KBM) and vice versa. As shown in Figure 1, the group 
choices of 27 groups could be best explained by KBM with a mean predictive accuracy 
of 83.7%, as opposed to a mean predictive accuracy of 66.9% of RBM, paired t(26) = 
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9.187, p < .001, dz = 1.77. We classified these groups as KBM groups. Conversely, the 
data of 11 groups could be best explained by RBM with a mean predictive accuracy of 
85.0%, as opposed to a mean predictive accuracy of 75.9% of KBM, paired t(10) = -
8.517, p < .001, dz = 2.56. We classified those groups as RBM groups. The data of five 
groups could be equally well described by both models (with a mean predictive 
accuracy of 85.4%). These five groups were excluded from further analyses, so that the 
following results are based on the 38 classified groups.7 Table 2 summarizes all key 
differences between RBM and KBM groups reported so far and subsequently. 
 
Table 2 
Summary of key differences between RBM and KBM groups, summarized across time 
conditions (means, SD in parentheses). 
 RBM groups KBM groups 
   
N 11 27 
Predictive accuracy of RBM1 85.0% (8.6) 66.9% (9.5) 
Predictive accuracy of KBM1 75.9% (8.6) 83.7% (9.8) 
Theoretical accuracy of RBM1 78.8% (8.1) 67.3% (7.4) 
Theoretical accuracy of KBM1 71.8% (9.9) 72.0% (11.6) 
Achieved group accuracy1 80.3% (9.7) 73.7% (12.3) 
Individual recognition validity .74 (.13) .66 (.13) 
Individual knowledge validity .66 (.12) .67 (.15) 
Individual speed of recognizing a company (in msec) 1,551 (408) 1,803 (623) 
Individual speed of not recognizing a company (in msec) 1,556 (376) 1,738 (668) 
Accordance with recognition heuristic when it led to a 
- correct choice1 
- incorrect choice1 
 
91.1% (7.3) 
59.5% (19.8) 
 
80.1% (15.5) 
38.9% (15.1) 
Relative frequency of speaking first of 
- member using the recognition heuristic1 
- member using knowledge1 
 
53.4% (17.0) 
34.7% (17.4) 
 
45.1% (17.3) 
49.2% (17.8) 
1 Based on 811 pairs where strategies made different predictions. 
                                                 
 
7 We run the same classification procedure also including the predictive accuracy of the simple majority 
rule (SM) into the comparison. Ties between the predictive accuracies of RBM or KBM and SM 
respectively were resolved in advantage for RBM or KBM. This classification resulted in 10 RBM 
groups, 24 KBM groups and 6 SM groups. Using those 34 RBM and KBM groups rather than all 38 
groups yields the same results as all subsequent analyses. 
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Was the strategy choice of groups adaptive? 
To test the assumption that groups behaved adaptively, we analyzed the 
theoretical accuracies of the two models for KBM and RBM groups. We first 
conducted a second classification of all groups based on the theoretical accuracies of 
the two models. As with the predictive accuracies, the analysis compared the 
theoretical accuracies of the two models for each group and classified a group as a t-
RBM group (t-KBM group) if the theoretical accuracy of RBM (KBM) was higher. 
Figure 2 depicts the theoretical accuracy of the two strategies for each group (and also 
the achieved accuracy, to which we refer in the next section). As expected, the 
theoretical accuracies differed between groups, which suggests that different strategies 
were adaptive for different groups: Of the 38 groups, 18 were classified as t-KBM 
groups (for whom the theoretical accuracy of KBM was on average 12.0 percentage 
points higher than that of RBM) and 14 as t-RBM groups (for whom the theoretical 
accuracy of RBM was on average 11.8 percentage points higher than that of KBM). For 
six groups the theoretical accuracies were identical.  
If strategy selection were adaptive, the classification of groups based on 
predictive accuracy (i.e., their choices) should be similar to the classification based on 
the theoretical accuracy of the strategies. If we look at those 32 groups for which the 
theoretical accuracies allowed a classification, we find a convergent classification rate 
of 71.9% (23 out of 32) with the classification based on the predictive accuracies. The 
theoretical accuracy of KBM (RBM) was positively correlated with the predictive 
accuracy of KBM (RBM) on the group level, rKBM(36) = .39, p = .02, n = 38; rRBM(36) 
= .48, p = .003, n = 38. 
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Figure 2. Achieved accuracy and theoretical accuracy of KBM and of RBM for each of the 38 
categorized groups in the subset of situations in which both models were applicable (n = 811). 
The graph displays the values of RBM groups on the left and those of KBM groups on the 
right. Within these categories, groups are sorted according to their achieved accuracy in 
descending order. It can be seen that for RBM groups, the theoretical accuracy of RBM was 
higher and closer to the observed performance than the theoretical accuracy of KBM, and vice 
versa for KBM groups. 
 
Adaptive behavior should be mirrored by a high performance level. To look 
into this aspect, we compared the achieved accuracy per group with the accuracy that 
would have been achievable if groups had consistently used one of the two decision 
strategies (i.e., the theoretical accuracies; see Figure 2). These analyses were also run 
for the subset of situations in which both models could be applied. On average, we 
observed a mean achieved accuracy of 80.3% for the 11 RBM groups. The mean 
theoretical accuracy of RBM for RBM groups was 78.8% and of KBM only 71.8%, 
paired t(10) = -2.192, p = .05, dz = 0.37. The 27 KBM groups made fewer correct 
choices in the subset than RBM groups, namely, 73.7%, on average.8 The mean 
theoretical accuracy of KBM for KBM groups was 72.0% and of RBM only 67.3%, 
paired t(26) = 1.942, p = .06, dz = 0.66. Thus, as the classification of the groups on the 
                                                 
 
8 One reason could be that KBM group members received more difficult pairs by accident. This was, 
however, not the case: The mean differences between the market capitalizations of the two companies of 
a pair were equal for KBM and RBM groups (MKBM = 11,242,721,413, SD = 17,046,506,195 vs.  
MRBM = 11,535,090,275, SD = 17,261,293,274), t(1898) = -0.338, p = .74, d = -0.02. 
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basis of the theoretical accuracies had already suggested, these results support the 
conclusion that groups chose their strategies in a majority of trials in an adaptive way 
by picking the strategy that yielded the higher accuracy.  
Mechanisms behind adaptive strategy use 
One determinant of the quality of group strategies (i.e., their theoretical 
accuracy) might be the quality of individual members’ strategies and choices (i.e., the 
knowledge and recognition validity). In fact, the theoretical accuracy of KBM was 
highly correlated with the average knowledge validity (r(36) = .65, p < .001, n = 38) of 
the members of a group; similarly, the theoretical accuracy of RBM was highly 
correlated with the average recognition validity (r(36) = .74, p < .001, n = 38). 
Interestingly, in RBM groups, the members’ average recognition validity (M = .74, SD 
= .13) was considerably higher than their knowledge validity (M = .66, SD = .12), as in 
the study by Reimer and Katsikopoulos (2004). Conversely, in KBM groups, the 
average recognition (M = .66, SD = .13) and knowledge (M = .67, SD = .15) validity 
were very similar to each other. 
One possible cue to one’s knowledge and recognition validities are one’s 
recognition times (Pachur, 2011). An ANOVA with repeated measurements with the 
individual recognition judgment (recognized vs. not recognized) as the within-subjects 
factor and the type of group as the between-subjects factor revealed that RBM group 
members had indeed faster recognition times than KBM group members (recognition 
judgments: MRBM = 1,551 msec, SD = 408 vs. MKBM = 1,803 msec, SD = 623; no-
recognition judgments: MRBM = 1,556 msec, SD = 376 vs. MKBM = 1,738 msec, SD = 
668; Fgroup type(1, 112) = 3.59, p = .06, ηp2 = .03. Thus, RBM-group members may have 
inferred their higher recognition validity from their faster recognition times. 
Adaptation on individual trials within groups 
It is a simplifying assumption that groups use one strategy consistently, which 
is however necessary for the classification and to derive conclusions about differences 
between groups. Nevertheless, it is of course possible that groups also adapt their 
strategy to individual trials. An interesting measure of strategy adaptation on the trial 
level is to distinguish cases in which the recognition heuristic leads to a correct 
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decision and those where it leads to an incorrect decision (the difference of these two 
proportions is termed discrimination index; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008). Members of RBM 
and KBM groups both individually accorded with the recognition heuristic to a similar 
degree when it led to a correct as when it led to an incorrect decision (RBM-group 
members: Mcorrect = 93.6%, SD = 11.9 vs. Mincorrect = 88.4%, SD = 19.9; paired t(29) = 
1.445, p = .16, dz = 0.26; KBM-group members: Mcorrect = 91.0%, SD = 15.7 vs. 
Mincorrect = 86.8%, SD = 22.9; paired t(63) = 1.300, p = .20, dz = 0.16). 
Groups, in contrast, showed a more selective accordance with the recognition 
heuristic and accorded with it more often when it led to a correct decision than when it 
led to an incorrect decision, and this was more strongly the case for KBM groups than 
for RBM groups (RBM groups: Mcorrect = 91.1%, SD = 7.3 vs. Mincorrect = 59.5%, SD = 
19.8; paired t(10) = 5.115, p < .001, dz = 1.54; KBM groups: Mcorrect = 80.1%, SD = 
15.5 vs. Mincorrect = 38.9%, SD = 15.1; paired t(26) = 8.659, p < .001, dz = 2.03). Thus, 
both RBM and KBM groups showed a more selective accordance with the recognition 
heuristic than individuals, indicating that groups incorporate information beyond 
recognition more strongly than individuals. Congruent with the classification of groups 
as RBM or KBM group, the selectivity of accordance was much less pronounced in 
RBM groups than in KBM groups: Only in RBM groups, the majority of choices (i.e., 
> 50%) less selectively accorded with the recognition heuristic both when it led to a 
correct as well as when it lead to an incorrect decision, which was not true for KBM 
groups. 
Behavioral correlates of RBM and KBM 
Did RBM groups differ in their group discussions from KBM groups? We first 
focused on the very first act of the discussion concerning each trial. Independent of the 
content of the first argument, we coded who spoke first. Did members who could rely 
on the recognition heuristic predominantly speak first in RBM groups, while members 
who could rely on knowledge did so in KBM groups? In fact, members who could rely 
on the recognition heuristic spoke first slightly more frequently in RBM groups (M = 
53.4%, SD = 17.0) than in KBM groups (M = 45.1%, SD = 17.3), Fgroup type (1, 34) = 
1.806, p = .19, ηp2 = .05., while those members who could rely on knowledge spoke 
first more often in KBM groups (M = 49.2%, SD = 17.8) than in RBM groups (M = 
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34.7%, SD = 17.4), Fgroup type (1, 34) = 6.559, p = .02, ηp2 = .16. No differences between 
the time conditions were revealed.9 Speaking first thus nicely mirrored the group 
strategy on the behavioral level. 
We then analyzed the arguments exchanged during the decision process. Did 
RBM groups mention the recognition cue more often than KBM groups in general? 
And did RBM groups under time constraints mention the recognition cue more often 
than RBM groups without time constraints? First, we computed the average joint 
number of all recognition and knowledge cues that were exchanged per trial (within the 
subsample of 811 trials). We then entered this number into an ANOVA with the two 
time conditions and two group types as independent variables. No difference was 
revealed between the group types, Fgroup type (1, 34) = 1.00, p = .33, ηp2 = .03, but—quite 
naturally—there was a difference between the time conditions: Groups with time 
constraints discussed fewer cues (M = 2.39, SD = 0.77) than groups without time 
constraints (M = 3.97, SD = 1.79), Ftime(1, 34) = 7.12, p = .01, ηp2 = .17. Next, we 
computed the relative frequency of the recognition cue with regard to all cues and took 
this as the dependent variable in a second ANOVA. It revealed a main effect of time, 
namely, that the relative frequency of the recognition cue in groups with time 
constraints was higher (M = 14.3%, SD = 8.1) than in groups without time constraints 
(M = 9.4%, SD = 5.6), Ftime(1, 34) = 10.56, p = .003, ηp2 = .24; in other words, groups 
exchanged a greater proportion of knowledge cues when they had time. More 
interestingly, it revealed that, RBM groups under time constraints mentioned the 
recognition cue much more often (M = 20.3%, SD = 7.4) than RBM groups without 
time constraints (M = 6.36% , SD = 3.24) and than KBM groups in both time 
conditions (Mwith time constraints = 10.7%, SD = 6.4; Mwithout time constraints = 10.4%, SD = 5.8), 
FTime x Group type(1, 34) = 9.51, p = .004, ηp2 = .22.  
The results of the argument recall task show a similar picture. Recall that 
every participant was asked to name arguments pro and con, so that the recognition cue 
(recognition or no recognition) could be named zero times, once, or twice per person. 
For the following analyses, we counted the number of people who recalled the 
                                                 
 
9 Mere differences in the base rate of members using the recognition heuristic (R members) or 
knowledge (K members) in the first trial between RBM and KBM groups cannot account for this result 
[R members: Fgroup type (1, 34) = 1.384, p = .25, ηp2 = .04; K members:  Fgroup type (1, 34) = 0.721, p = .40, 
ηp
2 = .02]. There were also no differences between time conditions [R members: Ftime (1, 34) = 1.380,  
p = .25, ηp2 = .04; K members: Ftime (1, 34) = 0.258, p = .62, ηp2 = .01]. 
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recognition cue at least once and found that 25 out of 33 RBM-group members (75.8%) 
and 59 out of the 81 KBM-group members (72.8%) did so. Figure 3 depicts the 
percentage of times the recognition cue was not mentioned (0) and rated as low (1) to 
high (4) importance by people who recalled the recognition cue at least once. It shows 
that, in the condition without time constraints, the recognition cue was ranked more 
often as of high importance by RBM-group members and was more often not 
mentioned by KBM-group members. In the condition with time constraints, more 
RBM-group than KBM-group members rated the recognition cue as of moderately high 
(3) and high (4) importance, while the reverse was true for the low (1) and moderately 
low (2) importance ratings. To summarize, the observed frequency and importance 
ratings of the recognition cue indicate that the recognition cue was perceived as a valid 
cue and is a behavioral correlate of RBM, under time constraints in particular.  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of times the recognition cue was recalled by participants who mentioned it 
at least once in the argument recall task (n = 84), on the left for the condition without time 
constraints (n = 45) and on the right for the condition with time constraints (n = 39). 
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Discussion 
In many instances in everyday life as well as in organizations, decisions are 
made by groups (Salas et al., 2008). Here, we applied the framework of ecological 
rationality to investigate an important aspect of group decision making: Are groups 
able to select strategies adaptively? From this perspective, transferred from the 
individual to the group level, the success of a decision strategy is anchored both in the 
structure of the task environment and in the composition of the individual minds of the 
group. We focused on the second aspect, that is, on whether and how groups adapted 
their strategy to group composition.  
Summary of Results 
To this end, we studied two particular decision strategies: one restricted 
majority rule that assumes that only the votes of group members that can rely on 
knowledge determine the group decision (KBM); and another that assumes that only 
the votes of group members that can rely on the recognition heuristic are taken into 
account (RBM). Our main purpose was to test if groups select these two strategies in an 
adaptive way in a paired comparison task. Adaptivity was defined as the degree to 
which the strategy was chosen that also yielded the more accurate inferences. In fact, 
we found that the choices of most groups were best predicted by the strategy that also 
led to the highest theoretical accuracy. Therefore, groups, on average, achieved a 
performance level that was close to the best they could achieve theoretically (see Figure 
2).  
In addition to our general question on adaptive strategy selection, we tested the 
effect of time constraints on strategy use. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find 
that time constraints led to an increased use of RBM (no difference in predictive 
accuracy of RBM between time conditions). Our rationale behind this assumption was 
that RBM would require fewer arguments than KBM, rendering it a faster and more 
frugal strategy. No differences in the total number of arguments, however, were found 
between strategies. Consequently, on first sight, this result seems to contradict findings 
in individual decision strategy research showing that the use of noncompensatory 
decision rules increases with decreasing time available (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski, 
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1980; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Svenson et al., 1990; Zakay, 1985). On second sight, 
however, this result is plausible for two reasons. First, on the group level, one can 
regard both RBM and KBM as noncompensatory strategies in that a minority of group 
members can trump a majority. Second and more importantly, the indifference in 
predictive accuracies of RBM and KBM supports the adaptiveness findings, as KBM 
and RBM did not differ in their theoretical accuracies between the time conditions in 
the first place (see footnote 4). In other words, RBM would not have been more 
adaptive under time constraints. Time constraints in the group phase may not have 
influenced decision strategies anymore, because opinion formation had already taken 
place individually preceding the group discussion, and there were no time constraints in 
this individual phase of the experiment. It would be an interesting question for future 
research to test whether time pressure faced by individuals who make a decision prior 
to meeting in a group has an impact on the group strategy.  
Interestingly enough, we found an effect of time constraints on discussion 
behavior, namely, that time constraints led to an increase in the relative frequency of 
the recognition cue being discussed as compared to knowledge cues by all groups and 
in particular by RBM groups. This enhancement effect seems to support the assumption 
that recognition is a very valid cue (Kelly & Loving, 2004) and that it plays a special 
role in decision making. Ratings of the freely recalled arguments again revealed the 
higher importance of the recognition cue for RBM groups, as more RBM-group 
members than KBM-group members mentioned and perceived the recognition cue as 
highly important. The number and persuasiveness of arguments may cause a group to 
shift to an alternative that has not been favored by a majority before (Hinsz & Davis, 
1984). Despite these supportive differences in the relative frequencies, the absolute 
numbers reveal that mentions of the recognition cue constituted only a small proportion 
of all mentioned cues. A technical reason for this finding may be that the categories had 
different widths: While the recognition cue was counted only when it was mentioned as 
such, the knowledge-cues category comprised all cues containing information about the 
companies at hand, such as the company’s sector or products. Another reason might be 
seen in the justification pressure caused by the group setting, which often leads people 
to use more information than they initially used in individual decisions (Huber & 
Seiser, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
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As a final behavioral correlate, we assessed who spoke first and found that this 
was indeed an indicator of the group strategies used, with members classified as 
knowledge users speaking more often first in KBM groups and vice versa in RBM 
groups. In addition to regarding speaking first simply as a behavioral correlate, it may 
also be seen as a process measure and a reason why groups end up with using one 
strategy or another (cf. Stasser, 2012). Indeed it has been found elsewhere that the first 
answers provided have a strong impact on the final group answer (Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009). More research is needed to tease apart whether contributing early is only an 
indicator or a driving force for selecting a certain decision (rule). In sum, we found 
evidence for the adaptive selection of two strategies in small groups, that time 
constraints had no impact on this selection but enhanced the usage of one of the most 
valid cues, the recognition cue.  
Mechanisms Behind Adaptive Strategy Selection 
How did group members decide whether to follow those members who could 
rely on the recognition-heuristic—in an adaptive way? These questions rephrase a 
question that is also central to the concept of the recognition heuristic as part of the 
adaptive toolbox for individual decision making. More generally, this fundamental 
problem of how people decide how to decide is known in the literature as the strategy 
selection problem, and a number of approaches to strategy selection have been 
proposed (e.g., Payne et al., 1988, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006; Scheibehenne, 
Rieskamp, & Wagenmakers, 2012; for an alternative account see Newell & Lee, 2011; 
for a comment see Cooper, 2000; for a debate see Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 2010; 
Marewski, 2010). Note that we do not claim that people have direct access to the 
theoretical accuracies of different strategies and then consciously decide which one to 
follow (neither is this an assumption of any of the strategy selection accounts). Rather 
we hypothesize some plausible mechanisms that lead groups on a trial-by-trial basis to 
adopt a certain choice and that leads them—with regard to the accomplishment of the 
complete task—to appear to predominantly follow one rule. 
In our case, one scenario could be that KBM serves as a default strategy, as 
“more knowledge” (here: recognizing both objects rather than just one) is typically 
assumed to be better. Something similar was observed in individuals who often start 
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out with decision strategies that consider all pieces of information (see e.g., Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2006). This would mean that groups pool their available knowledge and 
follow the most knowledgeable member(s) by default, and only follow members who 
can rely on the recognition heuristic (and who thus only recognize one object) if they 
have strong reasons to do so. Such reasons could be that (1) the knowledge cues of 
knowledge-users may be in fact weaker than the recognition cue, or that (2) the 
knowledge cues do not suggest a direction for the decision (such as when people know 
that A is a bank and B is a car producer but do not know which sector scores higher on 
the criterion market capitalization), while the recognition heuristic always entails the 
direction. (3) A third possible reason is based on the assumption that the use of the 
recognition heuristic involves two distinct processes, namely the judgment whether an 
object is recognized or not and second the evaluation of whether recognition is a useful 
and reliable indicator given the task (see Volz et al., 2006, for evidence for the neural 
basis of these two processes). People may thus consider, for example, the source of 
recognition to evaluate the validity of their recognition (see Marewski, Gaissmaier, 
Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2009; Pachur, 2011). In the group setting, they may 
then communicate to the others their evaluation result by either directly naming the 
source or indirectly through their confidence level or other paralinguistic signals. 
An indicator for the plausibility of this default scenario may be seen in the 
large proportion of KBM groups in our study (27 to 11 RBM groups). The differences 
between the average group recognition and knowledge validities supports the idea that 
knowledge is only abandoned when the validity of recognition is substantially larger, as 
it amounted to only 1 percentage point for KBM groups on average but to 8 percentage 
points for RBM groups (in favor of the recognition validity). Note that this latter 
difference is still smaller than it was in the groups studied by Reimer and 
Katsikopoulos (2004) where the average difference between recognition and 
knowledge validities was as high as 23 percentage points, which could explain why the 
RBM played a stronger role there. 
A second possible scenario may be outlined as follows: group members have 
access to the quality and adaptivity of their recognition and knowledge, which they 
communicate to the other members, for example, by their confidence or knowledge 
cues, or by the timing of putting forward their arguments (namely by speaking first; 
e.g., Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), and by this lead the group decision into one direction. 
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How could people access the quality of their recognition? One hypothesis concerns the 
role the recognition speed (i.e., fluency) might play. As Schooler and Hertwig (2005) 
argued, recognition speed can be taken as a proxy for the activation of a memory 
record: “the lower the activation, the more time it takes to retrieve a record” (p. 616). 
Activation of a memory record is a noisy process. The clearer the activation, the more 
systematic the image of the world around us should be, and thus the better people 
should be able to tell a truly recognized from a truly unrecognized object, rendering 
recognition a diagnostic cue (for the impact of additional knowledge in recognition 
cases on decision times see Hilbig & Pohl, 2009). If we now assume that people are 
sensitive to differences in recognition times and that fluency is often correlated with the 
criterion (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005), it 
seems plausible that people may (correctly) rely on fluency to infer their recognition 
accuracy (i.e., validity). So far, this mechanism has been proposed to explain the 
adaptive use of the recognition heuristic on the level of a single item (item adaptivity) 
as well as on the level of a particular environment (environment adaptivity) by 
individual decision makers (Pachur, 2011; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). We propose that it 
might also play a role on the group level, since fluency is also important in social 
interactions, because short recognition times elicit high confidence (Zakay & Tuvia, 
1998) or indicate certainty (Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, & Mattern, 2011), and greater 
confidence makes people more influential in a freely interacting group (Thomas & 
McFadyen, 1995; Zarnoth & Szniezek, 1997). Indeed, we found that RBM-group 
members gave slightly faster judgments in the recognition task than KBM-group 
members, which may have rendered them more confident and thus influential, causing 
those groups to rely more often on RBM. Notwithstanding the plausibility of the 
aforementioned possible mechanisms underlying the adaptive use of RBM and KBM, 
they deserve more future research. 
Limitations 
This study is of course only a first step towards studying adaptive strategy 
selection by groups. Its biggest limitation is its focus on one particular strategy, the 
recognition heuristic, which is only applicable in a limited set of situations. On the 
other hand, the heuristic and the tasks to which it can be applied are very well defined, 
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and the heuristic can be applied on the individual level and transferred to the level of 
groups. Despite its limited applicability, these aspects were ideal preconditions for 
testing adaptive strategy selection on the group level in relation to the composition of 
groups. Nevertheless, it would be important to expand this line of research to different 
models of group decision making and to different tasks.  
Another limitation of our study was that we studied ad-hoc groups that mainly 
consisted of students who were unfamiliar with the task. While this procedure had 
methodological advantages, it limits the generalizability of the findings. It would thus 
be important to study real groups in the future, with tasks or contexts they have 
acquired some expertise in.  
Implications 
The study demonstrates that the framework of ecological rationality is fruitful 
to study adaptive strategy selection in groups. As Pachur and colleagues (2008) 
concluded, individual differences in cognitive strategies appear to be the rule rather 
than the exception (see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). This is transferable to 
groups as well. By focusing on the group level and intergroup differences as an 
addition to aggregate analyses, the current study contributes to a more “ideographic” 
type of research as opposed to more “nomothetic” research, which focuses on 
identifying general laws of information processing. With the attempt to capture 
dependencies between decision strategies and group structures, the current study fits to 
the adaptive toolbox approach and extends it to the group level. It also demonstrates 
that group research can benefit from formal model testing as it allows to empirically 
test different models on a trial-by-trial basis and to derive quantitative evaluations of 
competing models. 
In this way it links to (1) team composition research, which focuses on the 
impact of team composition regarding surface (i.e., overt demographic characteristics) 
as well as deep-level attributes (such as personality traits or general mental ability) on 
processes and team effectiveness, especially in an organizational context (e.g., Bell, 
2007; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996); (2) social decision scheme research (Davis, 1973), 
which investigates the appropriateness of decision strategies for different task types 
(e.g., Hackman, Brousseau, & Weiss, 1976; Ladbury & Hinsz, 2009; Laughlin & Ellis, 
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1986; Shiflett, 1972; Stone, 1971) ; and (3) research that tries to connect social decision 
scheme literature with social influence literature by studying the interplay between 
member resources, social decision schemes and interaction processes, and their relation 
to team performance (e.g., Bottger & Yetton, 1988; Einhorn et al., 1977; Yetton & 
Bottger, 1982). 
The study also contributes to research on fast and frugal heuristics. It revealed 
that an overall highly predictive accuracy of the recognition heuristic for individual 
choices (here 83%) does not necessarily lead to a highly predictive accuracy of RBM 
for group decisions (overall 74%)—but only for those with a high group recognition 
validity (here .74; the predictive accuracy of RBM in RBM groups was 85%). Groups 
may be more sensitive in detecting how strongly someone believes in the recognition 
argument. While on an individual level there is little else one can do than to apply the 
recognition heuristic, on the group level there is the question of whether to mention 
(non-)recognition or not. Furthermore, in contrast to individuals, groups have the 
chance to gather information about both objects even if one object is not recognized by 
some, while an individual does not have access to information about the unrecognized 
object. Thus, on the basis of the information collected during the group discussion, it 
might be more reasonable and successful to decide against the previously unrecognized 
object if more arguments (or people) are in favor of it. Still, we argue that studying how 
people perform the same task as individuals and in groups can help to illuminate how 
heuristic strategies are used (see also Reimer, Hoffrage, & Katsikopoulos, 2007). Of 
more theoretical importance and relevant for the debate on which role recognition plays 
in decision making (e.g., Hilbig, 2010) is our finding that recognition was verbalized 
and used as an argument during discussion and perceived as a highly valid piece of 
information.  
The fact that we found a number of groups predominantly relying on their 
members using only recognition information (RBM groups) and that these groups 
performed very well (and even better than KBM groups) may be seen as another piece 
of evidence for the less-is-more effect on the group level (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). This result is of great practical importance, given the 
often observed difficulty that groups face when pooling and integrating many pieces of 
information (Stasser & Titus, 2003; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002; Winquist & Larson, 
1998). It implies that the performance of a group is not necessarily raised only by 
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raising the quantity of information exchanged, which was the goal of much previous 
research (e.g., Frey, Schulz-Hardt, & Stahlberg, 1996; Larson et al., 1994; Parks & 
Cowlin, 1996; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996; for a 
discussion see Reimer & Hoffrage, 2003). Rather, the adaptive selection of group 
decision strategies determines the success of a group. This means that a group has to 
select a strategy that fits to the structure of the task environment and to the features and 
composition of the group members (cf. Bottger & Yetton, 1988; Hill, 1982). 
Counterintuitively, to be successful therefore can sometimes require betting on less 
knowledgeable members. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The influence of task difficulty on advice-taking 
behavior: An ecological rationality perspective 
Kämmer, J. E., Moussaïd, M., Pipergias Analytis, P., & Neth, H. 
 
Abstract 
Many decisions are made in a social context, for example, under the advice of 
another person. Integrating the opinions of other people can boost one’s accuracy. 
Here, we investigated on the environmental circumstances under which two prominent 
strategies—averaging and choosing—are more or less effective and adaptive, and how 
people employed them. We report about an experiment in which participants (N = 90) 
gave initial estimates for general knowledge questions of three different levels of 
difficulty, and then received the estimate and confidence rating from another person 
(advice) before giving a second estimate. We found that items of different difficulty 
levels exhibited different statistical properties, thus constituting different environmental 
structures. These affected the (potential) performance of distinctive strategies (such as 
averaging and choosing), and the way people integrated advice, as suggested by the 
framework of ecological rationality. 
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Introduction 
Uncertainty shapes our lives; thus, as a coping mechanism, people often turn 
to others for advice. Dependent on the given situation, advice taking may have a small-
scale or a large-scale impact. Consider, for example, that you need to estimate the 
prospects of an investment. After seeking the advice of a consultant for this purpose 
you will have to decide how to integrate the advice with your own opinion. Would it be 
wise to follow the advice or, in case, it differs from your own guess, to go somewhere 
in between your guess and that of the advisor? Think of a different, more mundane, 
example: a game evening with your friends where you consult your game partner to 
give an answer in a quiz with general-knowledge questions. Whereas wrongly 
discounting or overweighting the advice may have little consequences in such a 
mundane situation, it may cost or win you a million in the quiz show “Who wants to be 
a millionaire?” What is the best way to use advice in these two game situations? 
Contemplate on the possibility that the questions in these two game situations differ in 
their difficulty, whereby the one in the quiz show might be much more difficult than 
the other. Given such a difference, should you—and will you—react with different 
strategies to make use of the advice in the two situations? 
The goal of the current study is to investigate the impact of task difficulty on 
advice-taking behavior, from a prescriptive as well as descriptive perspective. In other 
words, it studies whether different task difficulties require distinct advice-taking 
behaviors and whether people react accordingly. We focus here on the judge-advisor 
system (JAS; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001) that engages in 
quantitative estimations: Judges give an initial estimate, receive advice in form of an 
estimate of another person and then revise their first estimate. How people arrive at 
their initial estimates in the first place is not the topic of this paper but has been studied 
extensively elsewhere (see e.g., QuickEst heuristic, cf. Hertwig, Hoffrage, & 
Martignon, 1999). 
The underlying assumptions here are (1) that there exist multiple advice taking 
strategies and (2) that no single advice taking strategy will perform best in every task 
environment; rather distinct environmental structures favor different strategies (cf. Soll 
& Larrick, 2009). In estimation tasks, people were found to primarily rely on two 
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distinct advice taking strategies: choosing and averaging (Soll & Larrick, 2009). 
Averaging refers to taking the mean of (two) continuous estimates, whereas choosing 
refers to either staying with the own initial guess (choose the self) or adopting the 
advisor’s guess (choose the other). 
Our two main assumptions find their parallels in research on decision making 
(e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group, 1999; see below), namely in the 
ecological rationality framework. Its core idea is that behavior is a function of the 
(cognitive) resources at hand and the environmental structure, and its success depends 
on the fit between the two. Taking the perspective of ecological rationality to study 
advice-taking behavior, our main line of argument is thus (1) that tasks of different 
difficulty levels will constitute distinctive environments that (2) shape the effectiveness 
of alternative strategies and (3) also the behavior of judges. In the following, we will 
provide evidence for these three assumptions and also investigate whether people 
behave in an adaptive way, that is, select the most appropriate strategy. We start with 
briefly introducing the framework of ecological rationality in more detail. 
Ecological Rationality 
Central to the concept of ecological rationality is the idea that the human 
cognition is an adaptation to the structure of the environment and that people possess a 
variety of cognitive strategies to adaptively deal with problems in distinctive 
environments and with different capacities at hand (e.g., Simon, 1956). The analogy of 
an adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) provides an image of such a repertoire of 
strategies, of which none is an all-purpose tool but rather developed to fit to specific 
environmental structures. The question of whether, when and how people select 
appropriate strategies when being confronted with different task demands has been 
investigated in depth, and many scholars have provided evidence for adaptive strategy: 
For example, it has been shown that task characteristics such as costs of information 
search or time pressure influence decision making (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Christensen-
Szalanski, 1978, 1980; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993). Moreover, 
environment characteristics such as the dispersion of cue validities and information 
redundancy have been found to influence decision making in a systematic way (e.g., 
Dieckmann & Rieskamp; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). 
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Whereas the study of these relationships has been the focus of numerous studies on 
individual judgment and decision making (for an overview see Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012), little 
attention has been directed to social contexts such as group decision making or advice 
taking (for a few examples see Biele & Rieskamp, in press; Kämmer, Gaissmaier, 
Reimer, & Schermuly, 2012; Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004; Soll & Larrick, 2009). 
With this study, we aim to draw more attention to the question of whether people 
appropriately use advice in different environments, and by this build on recent work by 
Soll and Larrick (2009). 
Adaptive Advice-Taking Behavior 
Previous research has concluded that people engage in one general strategy 
when integrating advice, namely adjusting their own guesses by 30% towards the 
advice (termed the self/other effect; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000). Soll and Larrick (2009), in contrast, revealed that people mainly 
engage in two distinct strategies, choosing and averaging. The differences occurred due 
to the use of different methods: Whereas previous research had used aggregate 
analyses, Soll and Larrick (2009) conducted individual-based analyses. Thus, averaging 
and choosing may be considered as two tools in the toolbox of advice-taking behavior 
(cf. Hertwig & Herzog, 2009). Their effectiveness is determined by the structure of the 
environment (Soll & Larrick, 2009), whereby in advice situations the environment of a 
judge is constituted by the (distribution of) knowledge of all possible advisors. In the 
typical JAS of just one judge and one advisor, one person constitutes the 
“environment” of another person. Soll and Larrick (2009) identified two relevant 
environmental characteristics that shape the effectiveness of different advice taking 
strategies and summarized them in their PAR model. In the following, we will describe 
the PAR model and its predictions concerning the relative performance of averaging 
and choosing and highlight some links to related research. 
The PAR model (Soll & Larrick, 2009) 
According to the PAR model, three factors determine the relative accuracy of 
averaging versus choosing: the probability of detecting the better judge (P), the relative 
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accuracy of two judges (A), and the redundancy of errors (R) (cf. Soll & Larrick, 
2009). If a judge receives advice on a number of questions, probability p is defined as 
the probability of detecting the more accurate judge for the entire set of questions. It 
depends on the availability and appropriate use of good cues to expertise und thus 
describes a feature of the judge. The latter two factors, in contrast, describe 
environmental conditions. To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts an example. Assume the true 
answer to an estimation task is 500, and two judges estimate it to be 450 (x1) and 600 
(x2), respectively, thus erring by 50 (e1) and 100 (e2). The difference in their errors is 
then captured by the accuracy ratio A, which is the ratio between the (mean) absolute 
deviations from the truth (A = e2 / e1), indicating how different judges are in terms of 
their information or skills. In our example, the worse judge is twice as inaccurate as the 
better judge (A = 100 / 50 = 2). 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of an estimation task. Let the true answer be 500 (Truth) and x1 and x2 the 
estimates of two persons. Their respective errors are computed as the absolute distance to the 
truth (e1 = |Truth – x1| and e2 = |Truth – x2|). Averaging the two estimates [a = (e1 + e2)/ 2] yields 
a smaller error (ea = 25) than choosing either of the two judges (e1 = 50, e2 = 100). 
 
Redundancy is operationalized by the bracketing rate Br. In Figure 1, each of 
the two estimates lies on one side of the truth, thus bracketing the truth. In general, the 
bracketing rate is “defined as the proportion of questions for which the true answer lies 
strictly between the estimates of the two judges” (Soll & Larrick, 2009, p.784). Low 
bracketing rates indicate a larger correlation between the judges’ errors and a common 
bias towards one side of the truth (meaning that the majority of people tend to either 
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over- or underestimate the truth). Low bracketing rates may be, for example, the result 
of judge and advisor having a similar background, experience or exposure to the media. 
How do these three factors influence the performance of choosing and averaging? 
Choosing 
As mentioned before, choosing encompasses two distinct processes, namely 
that judges stay either with their own initial guesses or switch to the advisor’s guess. 
Although these two constitute two psychologically different processes, concerning their 
theoretical performance they can be regarded as one strategy if one assumes that judge 
and advisor come from the same population. A related strategy in group decision 
making may be seen in “follow-the-expert” (Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977) and 
in cognitive psychological research the take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). They have the logic in common to identify the better or best (judge, group 
member or cue) among the available ones and then to follow this one while ignoring 
the remaining ones. 
The PAR model predicts that large differences between judges (high A) favor 
choosing because one judge is clearly better than the other. Similarly, take-the-best 
performs well if cue validities are highly dispersed (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007; 
Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Moreover, for choosing to outperform averaging, a good 
cue to recognize these differences must be available (high p) and the judges’ errors may 
be correlated. Again, a parallel exists to group decision making, where only large 
differences in expertise between group members favour a best-member rule, whereas 
small or unknown differences in expertise favour a simple majority rule (Einhorn et al., 
1977). A common finding from small group research also highlights the importance of 
the third precondition for choosing to outperform averaging: If the true answer cannot 
be demonstrated or expertise is not recognized by the members of a group, the group 
performs below the level of the best member and is better off by following the majority 
(e.g., Bonner, 2004; Henry, 1995; Libby, Trotman, & Zimmer, 1987). 
Averaging 
Averaging simply refers to taking the average of the continuous estimates of a 
judge and an advisor to form a revised estimate. In Figure 1, the average estimate is 
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denoted a, and its corresponding error is ea. A corresponding strategy in decision 
making is unit weighting of cues (Dawes, 1979; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975), whereby 
(usually more than two) cues receive the same weight (.5 in the case of two cues) when 
being integrated.  
Research on the wisdom of crowds is a prominent example of pointing to the 
advantage of averaging multiple opinions (Galton, 1907; Surowiecki, 2004). The power 
of averaging has statistical roots. To start with, an estimate can be decomposed into a 
true value and an error term (Novick, 1966). Averaging estimates then can cancel out 
random errors and reduce systematic errors made by individual judges (Page, 2007; 
Soll, 1999; Surowiecki, 2004; Yaniv, 2004). In order for averaging to yield a smaller 
error than randomly choosing one single estimate, the estimates have to lie on both 
sides of the truth, that is, to bracket the truth (Larrick & Soll, 2006; see also Herzog & 
Hertwig, 2009). Hence, somewhat counterintuitively, even advice from non-experts can 
turn out to be useful, when it lies on the other side of the truth from one’s own estimate 
(e.g., Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates such a case where averaging 
yields a smaller error than either of the two initial estimates because the two estimates 
x1 and x2 bracket the truth. 
More generally, pooling the opinions of others, for example, by applying a 
majority rule (Hastie & Kameda, 2005) or averaging (multiple) quantitative guesses 
(Galton, 1907; Hogarth, 1978) often outperforms strategies that take into account only 
single opinions, and in the extreme, even single expert opinions (e.g. Krause, James, 
Faria, Ruxton, & Krause, 2011; Sjörberg, 2009). Independence of judgments (i.e., a 
high bracketing rate), however, is an essential precondition for averaging to perform 
well (Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Surowiecki, 2004). To illustrate, 
Herzog and Hertwig (2009) showed that the error of the second (here: advisor’s) 
estimate can even be three times as large as the judge’s initial estimate and averaging 
would still yield a better result than choosing the self—under the condition that the two 
estimates bracket the truth. 
In sum, the model predicts that averaging is superior when the more accurate 
judge can be identified only with a low probability, when accuracy differences are low, 
and when errors are uncorrelated, that is, bracket the truth. To make use of the high 
potential performance of choosing under conditions of high accuracy differences and 
redundant errors, a sufficiently high probability p is necessary. Lower probabilities of 
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identifying the better judge result in a larger range of situations in which averaging 
outperforms choosing (see Figure 3 in Soll & Larrick, 2009, p. 790). In other words, 
the relative advantage of choosing over averaging is a function of p. In a series of four 
experiments, Soll and Larrick (2009) provided first evidence for the predicted impact of 
the three conditions accuracy ratio, bracketing rate and probability on the potential 
performance of choosing and averaging. In the following, we will apply the PAR model 
to study the effect of task difficulty on advice taking, which has not been done before. 
Environmental Properties of Tasks with Varying Difficulty 
First, we argue that tasks of different difficulty levels constitute different 
environments, that is, are accompanied by different environmental characteristics. Task 
difficulty is typically measured as the proportion of correct answers (e.g., Lichtenstein 
& Fischhoff, 1977). Another possibility (which we employed) is to measure the 
perceived level of difficulty so to have a measure that is independent of accuracy and 
thus allows for investigating their interrelationships (cf. Lorenz et al., 2011). 
With increasing difficulty, the dispersion of answers in the distribution and the 
collective error increase (Kämmer, Pipergias Analytis, Neth, & Moussaïd, 2012). 
Figure 2 shows two schematic distributions of answers, one in an (idealized) easy task 
environment on the left and one in a difficult task environment on the right. 
       
Figure 2. Two schematic illustrations of an easy task environment (left) and a difficult task 
environment (right). 
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For easy tasks, the variance of estimates is rather low and estimates lie rather 
symmetrically around the truth, leading to a low collective error (as illustrated by the 
left panel in Figure 2). For difficult tasks, in contrast, estimates become more 
widespread and a systematic distortion to one side of the truth becomes more likely (in 
the right panel of Figure 2: an underestimation of the truth can be seen). The bracketing 
rate reflects such distortions and will thus be lower for difficult than for easy tasks. The 
accuracy ratio is related to variance and thus will also change with changing difficulty: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The accuracy ratio will increase with increasing difficulty. 
Hypothesis 2: The bracketing rate will decrease with increasing difficulty. 
 
The constellation under low difficulty will thus constitute environmental 
conditions that favor averaging, whereas the constellation under high difficulty will 
favor choosing. However, as pointed out before, the relative accuracy of the two is 
determined by the third variable in the PAR model, probability of detecting the better 
judge. In a JAS, we consider confidence being a potential cue for detection. In fact, 
confidence is a frequent and intuitive cue to judge the accuracy of a source (Sniezek & 
Van Swol, 2001). Confidence is seen as the strength with which a person believes in 
her estimate (Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997). Informing people about 
the advisor’s confidence is supposed to help them accurately identify the level of 
expertise of the advisor (e.g., Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & van Swol, 2001; 
Soll & Larrick, 2009) and thus weight advice accordingly (Sniezek & Henry, 1989). 
Obviously, confidence is only beneficial to the extent that it is correlated with accuracy 
(Yaniv, 1997), which is however not always the case (Savadori, Van Swol, & Sniezek, 
2001; but see Sniezek & van Swol, 2001; van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Difficult tasks 
are usually accompanied by a greater uncertainty of people and thus a lower confidence 
in the accuracy of their guesses (e.g., Gino & Moore, 2007). As there is a larger 
variance in guesses at the same time, we expect the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy to be lower for difficult tasks than for easy ones. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of detecting the better judge will decrease with 
increasing difficulty. 
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We ground this prediction also on the self-consistency model (SCM) of 
subjective confidence proposed by Koriat (2012a). Koriat (2012a) observed that in 
choice tasks, the confidence-accuracy relationship is rather a by-product of the 
consistency-accuracy relationship: “It is positive because the answers that are 
consistently chosen are generally correct, but negative when the wrong answers tend to 
be favored” (p.80). Applied to our setting, we may thus expect that confidence will be a 
good indicator of accuracy for easy tasks because the majority is correct, whereas 
confidence becomes a bad indicator for difficult tasks because the majority is incorrect, 
and confidence rather mirrors the consistency of answers than their accuracy in the first 
place. 
Thus, when a good cue to accuracy is most important (i.e., for difficult items), 
the confidence cue will probably be also least valid, leading to the prediction that 
choosing will not outperform averaging on difficult tasks because the best judge will 
not be identified with sufficiently high probability. Averaging will thus also perform 
better for difficult items (unless p is high) as it makes sure that at least some weight is 
put on the best judge (cf. Soll & Larrick, 2009). This prediction will hold for judges 
even when they are better than the advisor under the condition that their estimates 
bracket the truth (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009). In case of no bracketing, the worse judge 
will still benefit from averaging; however, the better judge will not.  
To sum up the prescriptive predictions, we expect that easy tasks are 
accompanied by a low accuracy ratio and high bracketing rate leading to good 
performance of averaging. However, owing to the good cue to expertise, choosing will 
also perform well. In fact, this constellation might lead to small differences in 
theoretical performance between the two strategies. For intermediate tasks we expect 
intermediate levels and for difficult tasks we expect high levels of accuracy differences 
and lower rates of bracketing. In principle, this constellation constitutes good 
preconditions for choosing to perform well. Due to the unreliable cue confidence that 
prevents from telling who is better, however, we expect that averaging will also 
perform better on difficult tasks given some bracketing. 
 
Hypothesis 4: From a prescriptive point of view, the potential benefit of choosing over 
averaging will increase with increasing difficulty. Due to a decreasing probability of 
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detecting the better judge with increasing difficulty, however, averaging will 
outperform choosing also on difficult tasks. 
Influence of Task Difficulty on Advice-Taking Behavior 
By varying task difficulty, we systematically study a factor that is usually only 
implicitly varied between experiments on advice taking and has received little explicit 
investigation so far, although it might play an important moderating role (Gino & 
Moore, 2007). As a case in point, Soll and Larrick (2009) speculated that difficulty 
might have varied between their four experiments but had not explicitly manipulated it. 
What do we know about the influence of task difficulty on advice-taking 
behavior? The only study, of which we know that directly assessed the effect of task 
difficulty on advice taking, found a direct as well as an indirect effect of difficulty on 
advice taking: namely that, “difficulty increases advice taking by reducing confidence,” 
and beyond, namely “even after controlling for expressed confidence” (Gino & Moore, 
2007, p. 32). In this study, the task was to estimate the weight of people from pictures, 
and difficulty was varied by either blurring the picture or not. 
High difficulty is accompanied by low confidence and a lack of knowledge or 
increased uncertainty (Gino & Moore, 2007). Studies that did not directly manipulate 
task difficulty but recorded confidence and knowledge found that low confidence as 
well as a lack of knowledge made people more receptive to advice (e.g., Gino, Brooks, 
& Schweitzer, 2012; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 
2004). In other words, the more knowledgeable people were, the more they were found 
to discount advice. Drawing on previous studies and from a descriptive perspective, we 
would thus expect to find a larger degree of advice integration when people face 
difficult tasks and more discounting when they face easy tasks. As previous findings 
are, however, mainly based on aggregate analyses and do not specify advice taking 
strategies any further, more precise predictions about when which specific strategies is 
used are speculative. Given that averaging was found to be a prominent strategy (Soll 
& Larrick, 2009), we suspect to find a larger frequency of averaging in difficult tasks. 
 
Hypothesis 5: People will be more prone to integrate advice under high levels of task 
difficulty than under low levels and probably engage more in averaging. 
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Overview 
Many decisions are made in a social context, for example, under the advice of 
another person (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) or of multiple other people (e.g., Yaniv 
& Milyavsky, 2007). The present study examines the question of how advice taking 
strategies are influenced by environments with varying difficulty from (1) a normative 
and (2) a descriptive perspective. We study these questions taking the example of 
quantitative general knowledge estimation tasks, where participants had to give an 
initial estimate, received advice and had to give a second, revised estimate. We 
confronted participants with items of three different difficulty levels, and studied the 
effect of the different environments on the theoretical performance (Which strategies 
would lead to the best revised estimates?) and on the actual use of strategies (Which 
advice taking strategies can be observed?), and the fit between the two. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 90 people (45 females, Mage = 25.21 years, SD = 4.24), of 
whom 61.2% indicated being students. Participants took on average 40 minutes to 
complete the experimental task and received €10.36 (SD = 1.3; €1 = $1.25 at that time). 
Design and Procedure 
Difficulty was varied between subjects (3 levels: easy, intermediate, and 
difficult). Upon arrival, participants answered some demographic questions, completed 
a practice trial and then worked on the experimental task. Participants received rewards 
in addition to a show up fee of €5 so to be motivated to answer all estimation questions 
as accurately as possible. Possible rewards were 3, 2, or 1 point for each estimate that 
fell into the 10%, 20% or 40% intervals around the true value, respectively (1 point =  
€0.12). 
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Experimental Task 
The experimental task was an estimation task comprising 24 general 
knowledge questions covering geography, sports, and societal topics. All correct 
answers consisted of three digits, that is, they ranged from 100 to 999, which, however, 
was not known to participants. The purpose of this limitation was to reduce estimates to 
a range of magnitude in which numbers are represented in a fairly homogeneous 
fashion (see, e.g., Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). 
Participants were first asked to give an initial estimate to all 24 items and to 
indicate their confidence on a six-point scale (1 very unconfident to 6 very confident). 
Participants were then informed about the estimate and confidence rating of another 
person, who was randomly drawn from the sample of the prestudies (see below). They 
were then asked to give a second estimate for eight items of the complete set, belonging 
to one difficulty level, and again to indicate their confidence. 
The time for every estimation question was limited to 30 seconds. If time 
elapsed before an estimate was entered, it counted as a missing value (which only 
occurred in 0.3% of all trials). Feedback on the accuracy of answers was only provided 
at the very end of the experiment. After the experiment, participants were paid, 
thanked, released, and informed about the correct answers. 
Item selection 
In order to create a sample of 24 general knowledge questions that are 
commonly perceived as easy, intermediate and difficult, we conducted two prestudies, 
in which we collected the intuitive estimates and perceived difficulty of a total of 111 
participants (study 1: N = 52, Mage = 27 years, SD = 9, 50% females; study 2: N = 59, 
Mage = 33 years, SD = 11, 56 % females) for an initial set of 48 questions (30 in each 
study with 12 overlapping questions). Participants of the prestudies did not take part in 
the main study. They received a flat fee of €8 for an approximately 40-minutes lasting 
experiment. For each estimation question, participants were asked to give their intuitive 
estimates and to indicate their felt confidence (1 very unconfident to 6 very confident). 
Moreover, perceived difficulty was measured with three items: 
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1. “Please imagine 100 peers that have answered the same question. How easy 
or difficult do you think the question was for most of these people?” (1 very 
easy to 6 very difficult) 
2. “How many of these 100 people know the exact answer?” (0 to 100) 
3. “How many people’s estimates differed extremely from the true value, that 
is, their estimate is equal to the true value plus a deviation of more than 
30%?” (0 to 100; reverse coded) 
To better compare these measures, we then normalized the confidence and the 
three difficulty measures to the same scale (0 easy to 1 difficult). As expected, the four 
normalized values (as well as the raw values) were highly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 
.848 on average). 
For the question selection, we computed the means for each question on the 
four scales and ranked the 48 questions for each scale. Each question now had four 
ranks between 1 (easy) and 48 (difficult). Based on these four rankings, we then 
selected eight items that appeared four times between the ranking positions 1 and 14 
(easy items), 15 and 34 (intermediate) and 35 and 48 (difficult), respectively. We thus 
used the convergent ratings from four different difficulty measures to select commonly 
perceived easy, intermediate and difficult items, independent of the objective accuracy 
of participants. The final list of items together with the average perceived difficulty can 
be seen in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Moreover, screenshots of the experimental 
paradigm can be seen in Figure D.1 in Appendix D. 
Advice selection 
The 111 first estimates collected in the prestudies constituted the pool of 
possible advice. For every question, the estimates and corresponding confidence ratings 
of seven participants out of this pool were randomly drawn with the restriction that the 
selected sample’s mean and standard deviation would not deviate more than 25% from 
the overall mean and standard deviation, respectively. This representative sampling was 
meant to ensure ecologically valid advice, which participants might have encountered 
in reality. For every participant, one estimate plus the corresponding confidence was 
randomly drawn from this selected sample. 
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Dependent measures 
In total, we collected 2,160 first estimates (24 items × 90 participants) and 240 
second estimates per difficulty level (8 items × 30 participants; 3 difficulty levels). We 
first conducted an outlier analyses on the first and second estimates. Using Tukey’s 
method (1977), extreme values that were located at least 1.5 interquartile ranges (IQR) 
below the 25th percentile (Q1) or above the 75th percentile (Q3) were regarded as 
outliers (Q1 – 1.5IQR, Q3+1.5IQR). This widely-used method has the advantage of not 
being limited to normally distributed data and of being resistant to extreme values (Seo, 
2006). 8.7% of the first estimates and 8.4% of the second estimates were identified as 
outliers and eliminated. 
Both first and second estimates were standardized at the true value (xs = x / 
truth, where x = estimate) so that the estimates became comparable across items. To 
calculate the error, we further subtracted 1 from the standardized value and took the 
absolute (e = abs[1 – xs]), so that the truth equaled zero now; large values represented 
large errors. Subscripts 1 and 2 denote the first or second estimate (e.g., e1 for error of 
estimate 1). 
To measure the extent to which judges integrated the advice versus kept their 
own initial estimate, we computed the weight on self (ws; Soll & Larrick, 2009): ws = 
abs(x2-a) / abs(x1-a), where x1 is the initial estimate, x2 the revised estimate and a the 
advice. This measure usually takes values between 0 (indicating that the advice was 
adopted) and 1 (when the revised estimate equals the initial estimate, that is, the judge 
chose the self). Occasionally, revised estimates lie outside the range of the judge’s 
initial and the advisor’s estimates (cf. Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In our study, 9.44% of 
ws values were larger than 1 (and thus occurred slightly more often than the usually 
observed 5%, cf. Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, p.141; none was below 0). In 27 cases 
(4.34%), the judge’s initial estimate was equal to the advice, so that ws could not be 
computed (because the denominator becomes 0). 
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Results 
We structure the results part along our three goals: We first establish whether 
our different difficulty levels are accompanied by some measurable statistical 
properties in the expected directions. We then analyze the impact of difficulty on the 
theoretical performance of advice taking strategies. Lastly, we study how participants 
behaved in the three difficulty environments and compare this with the achievable 
performance. 
Do Environments Differ in Some Relevant Statistical Properties? 
Table 1 contains the statistical properties of the three item sets belonging to 
the three difficulty levels. Recall that each item set consisted of eight items. 
To start with and as a kind of manipulation check, we analyzed the confidence 
ratings and average error. As can be seen in Table 1, the average confidence levels 
decreased with increasing difficulty as predefined by our prestudies (for a comparison 
with the confidence ratings of the prestudies see Table D.1 in Appendix D). Also, the 
average individual error and variance of estimates increased with increasing difficulty. 
To illustrate, Figure 3 depicts the distribution of standardized answers for one sample 
item per difficulty level, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Statistical properties of item sets per difficulty level. 
  Item sets 
Statistic  easy  intermediate  difficult 
Mean confidence (SD)1  3.48 (0.88)  2.54 (0.93)  2.00 (0.69) 
       
Mean distance between confidence 
ratings of two judges (SD)2 
 1.43 (1.12) 
 
 1.45 (1.17) 
 
 1.13 (1.04) 
 
       
Mean individual error of initial estimate 
(SD)1 
 0.29 (0.29) 
 
 0.60 (0.48) 
 
 1.06 (2.06) 
 
       
Mean individual error of revised estimate 
(SD)3 
 0.23 (0.26) 
 
 0.46 (0.35) 
 
 0.49 (0.68) 
 
       
Mean intraindividual correlation between 
error and confidence (Spearman’s rho)1  
 - .41 (.33) 
 
 - .24 (.43) 
 
 - .01 (.43)  
 
       
% of cases in which the more confident 
judge was also the more accurate one 
(out of cases in which the two estimates 
differed in accuracy and confidence)2 
 63.57% 
 
 
 
 58.93% 
 
 
 
 53.39% 
 
 
 
       
Mean lognormal distribution parameter 
(scale parameter)1 
 0.58 (0.40) 
 
 1.24 (0.34) 
 
 1.47 (0.58) 
 
       
Mean accuracy ratio A2  1.56   1.42  2.05 
       
Mean bracketing rate Br2  0.41  0.26  0.34 
       
Mean difference between errors of two 
judges2 
 0.11 
 
 0.19 
 
 0.70 
 
       
1 Values were calculated for N = 90 participants. 
2 Values were calculated on a complete pairing of the standardized initial estimates (xs) of N = 
90 participants (resulting in up to 4005 unique pairs). 
3 Values were calculated for n = 30 participants per difficulty level, as difficulty was varied 
between-subjects. 
 
In Figure 3, it can also be seen that most initial estimates followed a lognormal 
distribution, which was skewed to the right (significant for 33% of them: for 50% of 
easy items, and for 25% of intermediate and difficult items, respectively). In Table 1, 
we report the corresponding average lognormal distribution parameters, that is, the 
standard deviation of the estimates' logarithm (scale parameter). It increases with 
increasing difficulty, thus bmaking it a good indicator of the difficulty level too. 
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Figure 3. Initial distributions of estimates (xs1, including outliers) for one representative sample 
item of each difficulty level, respectively. The normalized answers correspond to the estimates 
divided by the true value. The correct value, therefore, corresponds to 1.  The red curves show 
the best fit of a lognormal distribution, and the red bars indicate the theoretical proportion of 
outliers having a normalized answer higher than 3. 
 
According to the PAR model of Soll and Larrick (2009), two aspects describe 
the environment and allow for predictions about the relative theoretical performance of 
choosing and averaging: the accuracy ratio and the redundancy between advisor and 
judge, measuring the diversity and distribution of errors. Both were calculated for each 
possible pair of the first estimates on the eight questions per difficulty level and then 
averaged. For the observed values of the accuracy ratio and bracketing rate in the 
advice condition see Table 2. 
Accuracy ratio A 
Recall that the accuracy ratio A is the ratio between the mean errors (e1) of two 
judges, higher over lower. As expected, we observed that the accuracy ratio increased 
from easy to difficult items (thus supporting Hypothesis 1, or in short H1). On difficult 
items, for example, the worse judge was on average twice as inaccurate as the better 
judge. The reason for the rather unexpectedly high ratio for easy items (as compared to 
intermediate items) is a mathematical one: very small errors, which only appear in the 
easy environment, are in the denominator when computing the ratio, exaggerating 
actual differences in the accuracies (e.g., 0.3 / 0.1 = 3 vs. 0.5 / 0.3 = 1.67). We therefore 
also report the average absolute difference between the errors of two judges, 
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respectively (abs[e1_judge1 – e1_judge2]). Here, the expected steady increase with 
increasing difficulty is observable. 
Bracketing rate Br 
All in all, bracketing rates were above zero and rather similar to each other, 
with the largest bracketing rate for easy items and smaller ones for intermediate and 
difficult ones (H2). 
Predictions based on A and Br 
Environments with low differences in accuracy among people (low A) and 
high bracketing rates, as it is the case for easy items, favor averaging over choosing 
(Soll & Larrick, 2009). Due to the high bracketing rate, errors cancel out. On the 
contrary, environments with large differences in accuracy (high A) and a majority of 
people lying at one side of the truth (small Br), as we found it for difficult items, favor 
choosing over averaging. A third precondition, however, must hold in order for 
choosing to outperform averaging: People need to have a good cue to identify the judge 
with the higher accuracy (high probability p), since choosing the best over the second 
best judge makes a big difference due to the large accuracy differences between people. 
Probability p 
In our study, a possible cue to accuracy was provided by the confidence of the 
advisor. How well was confidence calibrated and indicative for actual accuracy? We 
report the average intraindividual correlation between confidence ratings and error in 
Table 1 (note that negative correlations indicate that smaller errors were accompanied 
by higher confidence ratings). It can be seen that the average correlations were rho = -
.41 for easy items and rho = -.01 for difficult items.1 The histograms of correlations in 
Appendix E (Figure E.1) further show that, whereas 88.8% of correlations were 
                                                 
 
1 The decrease in correlations is not merely the result of a decrease in the range of confidence 
ratings, which accompanied the increase in difficulty. When we analyzed the intraindividual 
correlations between confidence and error for the limited range of confidence 1 to 3 only, we 
find very similar correlations: rho = -.40 (SD = .46) for easy items, rho = -.20 (SD = .45) for 
intermediate, and rho = -.06 (SD = .45) for difficult items, indicating a decrease in calibration. 
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negative in the easy environment, only 69.8% and 44.4% were below zero in the 
intermediate and difficult environments, respectively. 
To get a more intuitive understanding of the validity of the confidence cue, we 
provide a second measure of the quality of the confidence cue: the percentage of cases 
in which the more confident judge was also the more accurate one (out of cases in 
which the two judges differed in accuracy and confidence). It can be seen from Table 1 
that for easy items confidence was indicative of accuracy in 63.6% of cases. This 
proportion decreased with increasing difficulty, however, still being larger than random 
for difficult items (53.4%). All in all, these results indicate that confidence was quite a 
valid cue for easy items but not for difficult items on average (supporting H3). 
Summary 
So far, we have constituted that items of different perceived difficulty levels 
also vary in a number of measurable statistical properties. From a prescriptive point of 
view, we can thus summarize that averaging should outperform choosing on easy 
items, whereas the opposite should be the case on difficult items, given a high p. As p 
plays an important role for actual behavior, however, and turns out to be rather weak 
for difficult items averaging will be also better in the difficult environment (H4). 
Is the Performance of Different Strategies Influenced by the Difficulty Level? 
In Figure 4 the theoretical performance of choosing and averaging can be seen 
(in terms of average expected error e of a strategy: large values indicate low 
performance). Values were calculated from the complete pairing of the first estimates 
of all participants. To illustrate this procedure, imagine that every participant would 
receive the first estimate of every other participant once as advice and then always 
averaged his / her own first estimate with the advice, for example; then one would 
expect an average error of 0.24 on easy items (the same would be expected for the 
strategy “randomly choosing” between judge and advisor, because initial estimates are, 
on average, equally good). Consistently choosing the self or the other would result in a 
similarly small error of 0.29. 
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Figure 4. Mean theoretical performance of strategies (average error) per difficulty level. Values 
are calculated on a complete pairing of the errors of the initial estimates (e1) of N = 90 
participants. Error bars ± 1SE. 
 
The two strategies are compared with the theoretical performance of a 
benchmark strategy: perfectly choosing the more accurate. Two ways of 
operationalizing this strategy are possible: (1) item-wise and (2) overall (difficulty 
level-wise). Measure (1) assumes that people adopt on every single item the better 
estimate, whereas measure (2) is less strict (and less accurate) as it assumes that people 
adopt the estimates of the overall better judge (as proposed by Soll & Larrick, 2009; 
whereby “overall” in our case means being better on the eight items on which people 
got advice). “Follow the most confident” predicts that the judge adopts the estimate of 
the more confident judge on each item (cf. Koriat, 2012b) and, in case there is no 
difference in confidence, averages (percentage of averaging cases was 22.0% for easy 
items, 23.7% for intermediate, and 30.9% for difficult items). 
The three latter strategies implicitly reflect the moderating role of p on 
performance: In case of a perfect cue to identify the better judge, the resulting accuracy 
corresponds to the item-wise measure. In case of confidence being the cue, the resulting 
accuracy corresponds to “follow the more confident.” If confidence perfectly correlated 
with accuracy, the two strategies would converge. In case of feedback on the overall 
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performance of the advisor being the cue, the resulting accuracy corresponds to the 
overall-measure. Note that item-wise perfect choosing and “follow the more confident” 
are in contrast to choosing and perfect choosing (overall) flexible strategies, in that they 
do not bet on one judge to be always the best. Averaging and choosing the self or the 
other do not require any cues in contrast to perfect choosing. Averaging is the only 
strategy that results in an estimate that is different from the two given ones. 
It can be seen in Figure 4 that for easy items the choice of strategies does not 
have a large impact on the expected accuracy. All strategies yield a low error on 
average because people’s estimates are rather similar. For intermediate and difficult 
items consistently choosing the self or the other performs worse than averaging, 
“follow the more confident” and perfect choosing (item-wise). This reveals the 
discrepancy we expected (H4): With increasing difficulty and given a good cue, 
perfectly choosing the better judge (item-wise) would lead to a better performance than 
averaging. Taking confidence as a cue, however, becomes less indicative and thus 
results in a lower performance. Similarly, relying on the overall performance as an 
indicator of the item-wise performance performs worse because intraindividual 
accuracy differences increase. 
To sum up the prescriptive findings, strategies perform similarly well on easy 
tasks. With increasing difficulty, the distance between the expected performances of 
perfect choosing and averaging increases. The lower reliability of cues to expertise 
(such as of confidence or the overall performance) is reflected in the lower accuracy of 
strategies that rely on these cues, so that averaging becomes the most efficient strategy 
for difficult items, not requiring any cues (H4). 
How Does Difficulty Influence Strategy Use? 
We now turn to the third step of our analyses: how people integrated advice in 
the different conditions. Table 2 contains the observed environmental parameters and 
errors in round 1 and 2 (rows “all”) of the 30 participants in each condition. It also 
depicts the values for two subgroups, choosers and combiners, to which we will refer 
later.2 
                                                 
 
2 Note that values slightly differ from the theoretical ones reported in Table 1. The differences occur to 
the previous section (Table 1) occur because judge and advisor were randomly drawn from the same 
Chapter 4: Task difficulty and advice taking  100 
Table 2 
Average observed values of environmental parameters and accuracy of initial (e1) and revised 
estimates (e2), per environment and subgroup (SD in parentheses). 
Env.  n A Br rho e1 e2 
 all 30 1.6 (.68) .43 (.19) -.49 (.27) 0.30 (0.11) 0.24 (0.10) 
easy choosers 12 1.7 (.90) .42 (.16) -.38 (.26) 0.22 (0.09) 0.19 (0.10) 
 combiners 18 1.5 (.52) .44 (.16) -.56 (.25) 0.36 (0.08) 0.27 (0.09) 
        
 all 30 2.3 (2.1) .39 (.20) -.17 (.43) 0.58 (0.14) 0.45 (0.13) 
med. choosers 7 3.2 (4.3) .29 (.12) -.38 (.44) 0.52 (0.13) 0.40 (0.13) 
 combiners 23 2.0 (1.9) .42 (.21) -.10 (.42) 0.60 (0.14) 0.47 (0.13) 
        
 all 30 2.8 (2.1) .32 (.16) -.13 (.34) 1.12 (0.76) 0.81 (0.36) 
difficult choosers 3 3.9 (2.3) .33 (.07) -.07 (.16) 0.73 (0.25) 1.05 (0.39) 
 combiners 27 2.7 (2.1) .32 (.17) -.14 (.35) 1.17 (0.78) 0.78 (0.35) 
Env = environment, med = intermediate, A = accuracy ratio, Br = bracketing rate, rho = 
intraindividual correlation between confidence and error 
Achieved performance 
The aim of advice seeking and taking is to improve judgments. Therefore, we 
shortly turn to the empirical question whether participants improved their estimate with 
the help of advice from round 1 to round 2. Column e1 in Table 2 contains the error of 
the initial estimate. Column e2 contains the error of the revised estimate. We conducted 
an ANOVA with repeated measures with round as within-subjects and difficulty as 
between-subjects factors and error as dependent variable. It revealed that participants 
improved from the first to the second round in all difficulty levels, Fround (1, 629) = 
8.472, p = .004, ηp2 = .01, and that errors increased with increasing task difficulty, 
Fdifficulty (1, 629) = 43.333, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Moreover, it can be seen from Table 2 
that (similar to the values reported in Table 1) the accuracy ratio A increased with 
                                                                                                                                              
 
population of 90 participants, whereas in the following section (Table 2) we report results of the advice 
condition, where the advisor was randomly drawn from the prestudies. The different sample sizes and the 
fact that advisors from the prestudy turned out to be slightly worse than the judges from the main study 
were responsible for the slight differences between the results reported in Table 1 and Table 2. 
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increasing difficulty, whereas the bracketing rate Br and intraindividual correlation 
between error and confidence rho decreased. 
Weight on self 
We first operationalized strategy choice by the weight on self ws as proposed 
by Soll and Larrick (2009). Values of 0 indicate that the estimate of the advisor was 
adopted for the second estimate (“choose other”), values of 1 indicate that the initial 
estimate was kept (“choose self”) and values in between indicate some integration of 
the two estimates, whereby values between .4 and .6 are regarded as averaging. Values 
larger than 1 indicate that the second estimate fell outside the range of the two initial 
estimates (“emergent responses”). As ws is a continuous measure, we classified each 
value into one of eight categories (see x-axis of Figure 5). Figure 5 depicts the 
distributions of the observed categories of ws in the three environments (mean values 
for the continuous measure of ws were Measy = 0.73 (SD = 1.24), Mintermediate = 0.63 (SD 
= 0.56), Mdifficult = 0.70 (SD = 0.50)). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of weight on self for the three difficulty levels. 
 
Comparisons within environments statistically supported what can be 
intuitively seen in Figure 5 (for better readability, all t-test results are summarized in 
Table E.1 in Appendix E): paired t-test on the arcsin-transformed proportions of 
choosing and averaging (Keppel & Wickens, 2004) at Bonferroni’s α = .05 / 3 = .016 
revealed the following: In the easy environment, participants chose as often themselves 
as they chose the advisor and as they averaged. In the intermediate and difficult 
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environments, participants averaged more often than they engaged in choosing 
(themselves or the advisor). In sum, within-environmental analyses revealed no 
differences between the modes of choosing and averaging in the easy environment, but 
more averaging than choosing in the intermediate and difficult environments. 
To compare the proportions of the eight categories of ws between difficulty 
levels, we conducted a MANOVA with the (arcsin-transformed) proportion of each 
category and the difficulty level as factor. No differences between the difficulty levels 
were revealed for the proportions of choosing the self (ws = 1), F(2, 87) = 1.493, p = 
.23, ηp2 = .03, and averaging, F(2, 87) = 0.789, p = .46, ηp2 = .02. Instead, the adjacent 
category towards averaging but overweighing the self was observed more often with 
increasing difficulty (.80 < ws < .99 rising from 11% to 25%), F(2, 87) = 2.990, p = 
.06, ηp2 = .064. Participants adopted the estimate of the advisor in 14% in the easy 
environment, but only in 8% and 3% in the intermediate and difficult environment, F(2, 
87) = 3.812, p = .03, ηp2 = .08. The proportions of occasions in which participants 
weighted the advisor more than the self without exactly adopting her / his opinion (.01 
< ws < .20 and .21 < ws < .39) were relatively constant over difficulty levels, F(2, 87) = 
0.057, p = .95 ηp2 = .001 and F(2, 87) = 0.874, p = .42, ηp2 = .02. Similarly, the 
proportion of emergent responses was very similar in all three environments (8 to 
12%), F(2, 87) = 0.490, p = .61, ηp2 = .01. Overall, the modes choosing and averaging 
accounted for 58% in the easy, 49% in the intermediate and 41% in the difficult 
environment, with decreasing proportions of choosing the advisor. The proportion of 
more mixed strategies (i.e., putting an unequal weight on self and advisor) increased 
with increasing difficulty, with a tendency to put more weight on the self. 
Classification according to ws 
So far, we have analyzed the distribution of ws of all participants together. 
Next, we test on an individual level whether people accorded with different strategies 
in the three environments. We therefore classified people according to their 
predominant strategy choice into choosers [if they chose themselves or the advisor (ws 
= 0 or 1) in at least half of questions] and combiners [if they chose themselves or the 
advisor (ws = 0 or 1) in less than half of questions]. The rows “choosers” and 
“combiners” in Table 2 contain the results for these two subgroups. This classification 
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also allows us to empirically test whether people who differ in their predominant 
strategy choice also differ in “their” environment. Besides the global differences 
between environments, each individual person also faces environments that differ on a 
local level because of his / her individual values of A, Br and p (cf. Soll & Larrick, 
2009). These local differences should influence the performance of strategies in the 
same way as lined out above. 
In all environments, more people were classified as combiners than as 
choosers, although in the easy environment class sizes were almost equal. This supports 
the overall results depicted in Figure 5 with equal proportions of choosing and 
averaging on easy tasks and more mixed strategies on difficult tasks. Differences in the 
environment characteristic A between choosers and combiners were smallest in the easy 
environment. Higher accuracy ratios could be observed for choosers facing the 
intermediate and difficult environments, which made choosing in fact more 
ecologically rational. Choosers and combiners did not differ in their bracketing rates for 
easy and difficult items, but for intermediate ones, where higher values were found for 
combiners, which made it again adaptive to average. No systematic difference of the 
quality of the confidence cue could be observed. 
In sum, the descriptive results revealed that people used different strategies for 
tasks differing in difficulty (H5). When confronted with easy tasks, participants did not 
show an overall preference for one strategy, which is ecological rational since strategies 
made very similarly accurate predictions. When confronted with intermediate and 
difficult tasks, more participants averaged and weighted the advice to some extent, 
though overweighing themselves. This was ecological rational as most participants 
lacked a good cue to identify the better judge. 
In a last step, we compared the observed accuracy with the accuracy that 
would have been achieved by consistently using one strategy in all trials. We therefore 
operationalized strategy use by applying the previously introduced strategies on the 
initial estimate of the judge and the advice to derive the accuracy of the respective 
predictions. This operationalization has two advantages. First, we are able to compare 
observed accuracies with theoretical ones and second, we can directly test strategies 
like “follow the more confident”, which is not possible with ws. Its disadvantages are 
that strategies assume the same way of integration is used on every trial, thus rather 
very inflexible. 
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Comparing Achieved with Achievable Performance 
Figure 6 depicts the observed performance after receiving advice (intuitive 
revision, which equals e2) and the achievable performance if consistently applying one 
of the following seven strategies: randomly choosing between the self and the advisor, 
choosing the self, choosing the other, averaging, perfect choosing (item-wise) and 
perfect-choosing (overall), and “follow the more confident.” Choosing the self (ws = 1) 
and the other (ws = 0) are now differentiated (1) because they constitute two 
psychologically different strategies and (2) because they can lead to different 
accuracies if judge and advisor perform differently well in the first place.3 
It can be seen in Figure 6 that for easy tasks, participants performed worse 
than the upper benchmark strategy perfect choosing (item-wise), but as well as perfect 
choose (overall) and “follow the more confident,” and better than the remaining 
strategies. All differences, however, were relatively small as expected (H4). 
                                                 
 
3 Figure 6 also reveals that advisors were in our study on average worse than judges on 
intermediate and difficult items, so that averaging suffered. Averaging would perform better if 
the advisor was better or equally good as the judge (as can be seen for the easy items and in 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 6. Mean observed and theoretical performance of strategies (average error) per difficulty 
level. Values are calculated on the errors of the initial estimates of judge and advisor (N = 30 
participants per condition). Error bars ± 1SE. 
 
When being confronted with intermediate items, participants again performed 
better than most of the strategies, except for perfect choosing (item-wise) and equally 
well as “follow the more competent.” On difficult items, participants performed at the 
level of perfect choosing (overall), worse than perfect choosing (item-wise) but better 
than the remaining strategies. To sum up, participants performed surprisingly well as 
compared to the achievable accuracy when consistently following one strategy. The 
discrepancy between achieved accuracy and perfect choosing (item-wise) can be 
attributed to the lack of a perfect cue. 
Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to investigate the relationship between 
task difficulty and the performance and use of different advice-taking strategies. We 
studied this research question from an ecological rationality perspective. In detail, we 
took three steps: First, based on the PAR model (Soll & Larrick, 2009), we described 
the statistical properties of item sets of three difficulty levels. As expected, we found a 
higher accuracy ratio for difficult items than for easy ones (H1), leading to a greater 
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potential benefit through choosing the better judge as compared to averaging. The 
bracketing rate was on a moderate level for all difficulty levels and was slightly lower 
for difficult than for easy items (H2), also favoring choosing. At the same time, 
however, the confidence – accuracy relation (confidence being the only available cue to 
expertise) was correlated with difficulty in that it decreased with increasing difficulty, 
rendering confidence rather a weak cue for the majority of participants facing difficult 
tasks (H3). These constellations suggested that averaging would perform well on all 
difficulty levels (H4).  
Second, we analyzed the theoretical performance of choosing and averaging 
and found that strategies performed very similarly in the easy environment. In the 
difficult environment, averaging and “follow the more confident” became better than 
consistently choosing the self or the advisor; but at the same time the distance to the 
upper benchmark of perfect choosing (item-wise) increased. Thus, perfect choosing 
would have led to the best performance in principle but already slight deviations (by 
inferring accuracy on a single item, for example, from confidence or the overall 
accuracy, which was illustrated by the theoretical performance of perfect choosing 
(overall) and “follow the more confident”) led to underperforming averaging, 
supporting H4. 
Third, we analyzed participants’ behavior from a descriptive perspective. 
Average values of weight on self ranged between 63% and 73% in the three conditions 
and would suggest that people adjusted their initial estimate by around 30%, thus 
replicating previous work (e.g., Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Analyses of the distributions 
of the weight on self, however, revealed that these average values were the result of 
different frequency distributions of choosing and averaging in the three environments: 
in the easy task environment, choosing the self, the advisor and averaging were equally 
often used overall. Here, the three modes also accounted for the majority of data (cf. 
Soll & Larrick, 2009). Individual-level classifications revealed that this result occurred 
because there were almost equally many participants who mainly either engaged in 
choosing or averaging, respectively. In contrast, with increasing difficulty the advisor 
was less often chosen but more averaging and more mixed strategies (putting unequal, 
but relatively higher, weights on the self than on the advisor) could be observed, 
mirrored by the increasing number of people classified as combiners. Thus, as in 
previous studies, people were more likely to integrate advice in difficult tasks (H5; 
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Gino & Moore, 2007). This was ecologically rational as they lacked a good cue to 
identify the better judge. 
Last, we wanted to know if people appropriately adapted their advice-taking 
strategy to the difficulty level. This question lies at the intersection between the 
research tradition of advice taking and ecological rationality. We approached this 
question by comparing the achieved performance with the theoretical performance of 
seven strategies. Participants were found to perform surprisingly well in comparison 
with most of the strategies, although they did not reach the level of perfect choosing 
(item-wise). On easy tasks they performed at the level of perfect choosing (overall) and 
“follow the more confident” (both converged because confidence was rather a good cue 
of performance here). On intermediate tasks, they performed at the level of averaging, 
and on difficult tasks again on the level of perfect choosing (overall). Participants thus 
outperformed a pure averaging strategy. This may have been caused by (1) the specific 
constellation in our study as participants met advisors who were slightly worse than 
them, which caused averaging to suffer, and (2) the inflexibility of most strategies such 
as averaging, which assume the same integration rule on each trial, whereas perfect 
choosing (overall), for example, is a more flexible. The distributions of weight on self 
further suggested that participants used combinatorial strategies with unequal weights 
(which we did not explicitly tested here as a competing strategy). 
Our finding that advice is combined with the judges’ own guesses to a larger 
degree in difficult tasks is consistent with previous studies that found that people were 
more likely to integrate advice when the task was difficult (Gino & Moore, 2007) or 
people were uncertain or lacking knowledge (Gino et al., 2012; Harvey & Fischer, 
1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004). Gino and Moore (2007) explained 
their finding by taking a person-centered approach arguing that, on easy tasks, people 
believe themselves to be better than others, whereas on difficult tasks, people think they 
are worse than others (Kruger, 1999; Moore & Kim, 2003; Windschitl, Kruger, & 
Simms, 2003), which makes them more willing to accept advice. This argumentation 
served also as a rationale for the prescription that averaging would have been the 
optimal strategy in the easy as well as in the difficult task condition, as there should 
have been as many “participants who believed themselves to be better than others at 
guessing weights” as there should have been “participants who believed themselves to 
be worse than others” (Gino & Moore, 2007, p. 27, footnote 3). This rationale is based 
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on the assumption that the beliefs reflect a normally distributed “ability to guess 
weights.” We found, however, that the distribution becomes skewed when the task 
becomes more difficult, that is, that the actual number of people being good at guessing 
becomes smaller, whereas the number of people being bad at guessing becomes larger. 
The result of such a skewed distribution in a difficult task environment would be that 
most people would correctly believe themselves to be worse than average (for a related 
argument why most drivers (correctly) say they drive safer than average, see 
Gigerenzer, 2002, 2004). Taking the mean would thus not necessarily lead to a better 
result if a good cue to detect the better judge was available, as our prescriptive analyses 
showed. 
The Interplay Between Environment and Behaviour 
The insight that much of people’s behavior is shaped by the environmental 
structure (cf. Simon, 1956) had a great impact on research on decision making over the 
last decades (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Todd et al., 2012), but is relatively new to 
advice taking research (Soll & Larrick, 2009). By finding systematic differences in the 
environmental structure between tasks of different difficulty levels, our results point to 
the importance of considering the interplay between the environment and behavior for 
research on advice taking. Difficulty is usually not directly manipulated or controlled 
for (for an exception see Gino & Moore, 2007), even though it constitutes an important 
moderator variable as was shown here. Besides difficulty, other factors may influence 
the statistical properties of a task environment and thus need to be taken into account 
when judging which strategy would be “optimal” to use advice. For example, adopting 
the advice of your Phone-A-Friend lifeline in a quiz show may be most appropriate 
because this person is an expert in the field (and thus the accuracy ratio is high), 
whereas averaging the guesses of you and your game partner in the game with friends 
might lead to the better outcome because you make similarly large errors, which cancel 
out each other. 
We suppose that similar effects of task difficulty can be found in situations in 
which people elicit a second guess not by asking another person but by asking 
themselves twice (e.g., with the help of dialectical bootstrapping instructions, Herzog & 
Hertwig, 2009; see also Müller-Trede, 2011; Vul & Pashler, 2008). Similarly, when 
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people combine estimates of others, the effectiveness of averaging and choosing 
between them will likely depend on environmental differences caused by varying task 
difficulty or by other factors that impact p, A, and Br (Soll & Mannes, 2011). 
Our detailed analyses of the environmental properties (see Table 1) may be a 
starting point for future studies that are directed at understanding the interplay between 
advice-taking behavior and the environmental structure. Varying task difficulty is 
certainly just one way (though a very intuitive one) to create different environments. 
The PAR model (Soll & Larrick, 2009) and Table 1 list a number of factors that could 
possibly be experimentally manipulated. Alternatively one could characterize naturally 
occurring environments with the help of these factors and study how people (should) 
act in them. 
Moderator Cue to Expertise 
The current study points to another important moderator variable in advice 
taking: the quality of the cue used to identify the better judge. As already pointed out 
by the PAR model, the relative advantage of choosing over averaging depends on the 
cue to expertise (Soll & Larrick, 2009). Particularly in the difficult task environment, 
the cue to expertise became crucial for the performance of choosing. Due to the lack of 
a good cue, averaging became better than choosing. Interesting enough, participants 
also adapted their preferred strategy in the direction of averaging. People thus seem to 
be sensitive to the naturally occurring (negative) intercorrelation between difficulty and 
the validity of confidence (which is not just the result of a smaller range of confidence 
ratings, see footnote 1; cf. Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Thus not only is difficulty 
an intuitive way to change the environment but it might also signal to people the 
structure of the environment. In this regards, using representative advice was 
advantageous as it allowed us to study ecological rational behavior. On the other hand, 
the weak confidence cue in the difficult tasks did not allow us to study the actual 
performance of choosing in this environment. Future studies should investigate whether 
people resort more often to choosing if they believe or know they have a better cue to 
detect the better judge. 
Because confidence plays a key role, interventions that aim at improving the 
use of advice could target at this cue. Providing people with a better cue would boost 
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their performance because they would start choosing the better judge. Possible ways of 
improving the calibration of the judges’ own confidence could be to provide judges 
with feedback about their own accuracy (whereas mere practice without feedback 
would not lead to a better calibration, cf. Paese & Sniezek, 1991). One way to improve 
the evaluation of an advisor’s calibration would be to track performance together with 
confidence over some past experience and to communicate both to the judge (Soll & 
Mannes, 2011; see also Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008). Also letting judge and 
advisor interact repeatedly may serve the same goal. 
A less effortful alternative would be to more often bet on averaging. In fact, 
our results can be seen as further proof of the “robust beauty” of averaging (Dawes, 
1979). Averaging has the advantage of not requiring any cues and of performing 
relatively well across all difficulty levels (if some bracketing is given; Soll & Larrick, 
2009; Yaniv, 2004, study 1). Averaging might be an intuitive strategy when being 
confronted with difficult tasks, although otherwise being often misappreciated as a 
strategy for combining estimates (Larrick & Soll, 2006). 
How Did People Decide How to Use Advice? 
How did people manage to appropriately use choosing and averaging in the 
different task environments? In line with research on decision making (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999), we assume that the environment provides cues which inform—if 
appropriately used—strategy choice. Which cues might have been used? One possible 
cue is the perceived difficulty. The perception of a task as being easy (for the majority 
of people), for example, may lead people to trust others’ guesses and average them. 
Perceiving a task as difficult, in contrast, may cause people to hesitate to rely on others 
unless their expertise can be proved. Similarly perceived difficulty may inform about 
the trustworthiness of the cue confidence. Perceived difficulty may thus act as a meta-
cue telling “kind” environments (when following the more confident is beneficial) apart 
from “wicked” environments (when confidence is rather misleading; cf. Hertwig, 2012; 
see also Koriat, 2012b). 
A second starting point for deciding how to use advice is to take the distance 
between the own and the advisor’s confidence into account. In fact, people were shown 
to be sensitive to differences in confidence: recommendations given by more confident 
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advisors are followed more often than those given by their less confident advisors 
(Phillips, 1999; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Soll & Larrick, 
2009; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005; Yaniv, 1997). Moreover, some confidence values 
may be more informative than others; for example, the highest confidence value (in our 
study “6”) may have a very persuasive effect because it is given rather rarely and if so, 
only when the judge is quite accurate (cf. Moussaïd, Kämmer, Pipergias Analytis, & 
Neth, 2012). 
A different starting point could be to take the distance between the two 
estimates as a cue. Large distances may signal that it would pay more to identify the 
better judge. In case of having a (good) cue, judges may then tend to rather choose than 
average. Lacking a good cue as it would be the case in difficult tasks would trigger 
averaging. However, there might be an upper limit to the size of the distance between 
estimates in order to be considered at all: People were found to rather ignore advice 
with an extremely large distance (of, for example, 93 years in questions on historical 
data, Yaniv, 2004; which was termed the distance effect, Harries, Yaniv, & Harvey, 
2004; Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007).  
Alternatively, people may use a combination of the distance between 
confidence ratings and between estimates. We (Moussaïd et al., 2012) showed in 
another set of studies, for example, that a decision tree describes people’s advice-taking 
behavior well: In a first step, people evaluate the distance between estimates, and in a 
second step the difference between confidence ratings comes into play (see 
Supplementary Material of Moussaïd et al., 2012). For example, people combine 
estimates in case the distance between estimates is small and their own confidence is 
far below that of the advisor. 
Benefits and Limitations 
Besides being a systematic exploration of the impact of task difficulty on 
advice taking strategies, this study constitutes an application test of the PAR model by 
Soll and Larrick (2009). It proved to be a good theory for generating testable 
predictions about the relative performance of different strategies. By creating three 
different environments based on the perceived task difficulty, we successfully created 
Chapter 4: Task difficulty and advice taking  112 
natural environments with a wide variation in the relevant conditions identified by Soll 
and Larrick (2009), without resorting to simulated advice (Soll & Mannes, 2011). 
A possible limitation of the current study (and of typical JAS) may be seen in 
the restricted availability of cues to expertise. In real life, people may have access to 
more and possibly more indicative cues, even for difficult tasks. For example, the 
advisor might also communicate the source of her knowledge, demonstrate the 
accuracy of her guess, or communicate the range in which the guess falls so that the 
judge has a better basis on which to evaluate the advice and can weight it accordingly 
(but see Yaniv & Foster, 1997 for how little people value such ranges). It might be an 
interesting research question of how people use multiple cues to expertise, especially 
when their relative validities change over different task environments. It could be that 
people employ a take-the-best strategy (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) when inferring 
the quality of advice before integrating it. 
Limited generalizability of our results may be caused by the content of our 
experimental task. General knowledge questions may not be the most frequent situation 
in which we seek advice (if we are not in a game show). Most advice seeking probably 
happens in situations in which no true answer exists or is hardly accessible by anyone. 
We suppose that the ecological rationality approach offers a good framework for 
studying advice taking in such uncertain situations (cf. Todd et al., 2012). 
Conclusion 
What can be concluded is that future studies on advice taking should not focus 
only on the behavioral side, searching for explanations within the person but should 
also study the environmental side, as behavior is usually shaped by our resources, 
strategies, and the environment (cf. Simon, 1956). An insightful framework for this 
endeavor is Soll and Larrick’s (2009) PAR model. Taking an ecological rationality 
approach to study the impact of task difficulty on advice-taking behavior, we shed light 
on an important environmental factor that moderates the performance of advice taking 
strategies and shapes our behavior. 
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Chapter 5 
 
General discussion 
 
This dissertation explored how people make decisions under uncertainty 
together and with the help of others, and thus how the environment shapes their 
behavior. Core questions of the work presented here were (1) How do people make 
decisions within a social context? (2) Does social decision making differ from 
individual decision making? (3) What environmental factors influence the use and 
performance of strategies employed by groups for making decisions or by individuals 
for integrating advice? By taking an ecological rationality perspective to study these 
questions, in this dissertation I have contributed to both the group decision-making and 
the advice-taking literature and I have extended research on ecological rationality to 
different social contexts. In the following, I provide a summary of the contributions of 
the work reported in this dissertation. 
Contributions: What Have We Learned from the Three Studies? 
All three projects investigated adaptive strategy selection, each focusing on a 
different aspect of adaptivity. They thus contribute to the body of literature that 
provides evidence that individuals are able to select strategies that are appropriate for 
the environmental structure of a task (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 
2007; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In addition, the three 
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projects extend these findings to more social contexts that so far have received little 
attention (for some exceptions see Reimer & Hoffrage, 2006; Reimer & Katsikopolous, 
2004; Soll & Larrick, 2009).   
Three core mechanisms have been discussed in the literature to explain how 
strategies are adaptively selected (cf. Marewski, 2010; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). The 
cognitive niche approach (Marewski & Schooler, 2011) suggests that constraints of 
memory capacity together with the available information determine the choice of 
heuristic. In all three projects, this principle lies at the heart of every strategy selection 
problem as it determines the initial set of heuristics to choose from. The cognitive niche 
approach is not, however, an explicit focus of this dissertation. A second explanation 
identifies reinforcement learning as a probable mechanism underlying adaptive strategy 
selection when a choice has to be made repeatedly from a set of heuristics (Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006). The study reported in Chapter 2 is in the tradition of this approach and 
investigated how well and how fast individuals and dyads are able to learn to select the 
appropriate strategy when facing unfamiliar tasks with different underlying payoff 
structures and in changing environments. The third strategy selection mechanism, 
ecological rationality, focuses on how the structure of the environment influences the 
use and performance of heuristics. The adaptivity of the recognition heuristic is, for 
example, presumed to depend on the correlation of recognition with some 
environmental criterion, an issue I have elaborated on in Chapter 3. Furthermore, 
different environmental structures having an impact on the success of different advice-
taking strategies, which was the explicit focus of the last study, reported in Chapter 4.  
The studies, of course, cannot shed light on and do justice to all aspects of 
decision making in social contexts. Three main overall findings, however, can be 
derived from the research at hand. 
The Environment Matters: Comparing Individuals and Dyads in Their Adaptive 
Use of Decision Strategies 
In Chapter 2 I explored how well and how quickly groups were able to learn to 
select appropriate strategies in a given environment and to what extent groups differed 
from individuals. The core assumption of this study was that groups are information 
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processors with cognition distributed across individuals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Larson & Christensen, 1993).  
In two experiments, two-member groups and individuals were confronted with 
an unfamiliar task. How quickly over repeated trials groups and individuals adapted 
their decision strategy was recorded. Adaptation was necessary because the 
environments differed in their payoff structure, making either take-the-best (Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1999) or weighted additive (WADD; Dawes, 1979) the most successful 
strategy. Groups not only proved to be able to select the appropriate strategy, but—in 
the take-the-best-friendly environment—also showed slight superiority over 
individuals. Groups learned faster or reached a higher overall performance level. No 
differences, however, were found in the WADD-friendly environment where all groups 
and individuals performed very well and on average better than in the take-the-best 
environment.  
The superiority of groups was expected because previous studies had already 
provided evidence for faster learning rates and a higher overall performance in 
intellective tasks (Hill, 1982; Hinsz et al., 1997). The advantage probably stems from a 
heightened ability to correct errors together with a larger memory capacity (Hinsz, 
1990). The asymmetrical superiority, however, was surprising. What was it that made 
groups superior in the take-the-best-friendly environment but not in the WADD-
friendly one? A number of possible reasons were discussed in Chapter 2, among others 
that the steps of information search and the rules of information integration might have 
been easier to verbalize in the take-the-best-friendly compared to the WADD-friendly 
environment. This would render take-the-best easier to communicate and teach to 
another person as soon as the need for this strategy had been detected by the best 
member.  
In sum, this project drew the optimistic picture that individuals and groups can 
indeed learn to adapt their decision strategies to different environments if they have the 
opportunity to repeatedly encounter the task. More research, however, is needed to 
better understand the differences between individuals and groups in terms of their 
ability to learn adaptive strategies. It is, for example, necessary to explore additional 
domains and task characteristics, such as its familiarity, as well as the role of different 
group sizes and the way “real” groups make decisions in novel or changing 
environments. 
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The Adaptive Use of Recognition in Group Decision Making 
Focusing on another facet of ecological rationality and connecting this concept 
to classic models of group decision making, the second study, reported in Chapter 3, 
explored the ecological rationality of group decision rules in terms of their fit to the 
composition of the group.  
Heuristics are considered ecologically rational to the extent that they exploit 
the structure of the environment. The recognition heuristic, for example, exploits the 
correlation between recognition and some criterion and leads to correct predictions if 
that correlation is substantial (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). It seems that humans are 
sensitive to the size of correlations. When the correlation was high, for example, 
individuals were found to rely on recognition, but they discounted recognition when the 
correlation was low (e.g., Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pohl 2006; Pachur, Todd, 
Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011). 
The question now arises, are small groups similarly sensitive to the validity of 
their members’ recognition and knowledge and, as a consequence, able to adaptively 
select strategies that lead to the best achievable outcome by betting on either those 
members who use their knowledge or those who use their recognition? In an 
experiment, 43 three-member groups performed an inference task in which they had to 
infer which of two German companies had a higher market capitalization. From these 
choices, it could be concluded that, in the majority of trials, groups indeed applied the 
most successful strategy. Additional analyses of their discussions provided further 
information about the implementation of the strategies. For example, all groups highly 
valued the recognition heuristic as an argument. Moreover, groups that more frequently 
relied on their members using the recognition heuristic used the heuristic more often as 
an argument and more frequently at the very beginning of their discussions. As a side 
effect, the interactive experimental design allowed for studying how and how often the 
recognition heuristic was verbalized and used (cf. Hilbig, 2010). 
In relation to this experiment, a number of possible mechanisms were 
identified that could underlie the adaptive use of the recognition heuristic. Common to 
all potential mechanisms is the assumption that humans have some access to the 
adaptivity of their own recognition validity (e.g., by their recognition fluency, cf. 
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Pachur, 2011; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) which they then communicate to other 
members (e.g., by their confidence, knowledge cues, or by informing others about the 
source of their recognition). More research, however, is certainly needed to shed light 
on mechanisms of adaptive strategy selection in interacting groups. In addition, 
findings need to be extended from the rather restricted task type of paired comparisons 
to a much broader set of decision problems. 
With the first two studies in Chapters 2 and 3, I concluded that the heuristics 
groups use are indeed similar to those individuals use and that groups perform well 
when they have to ignore less informative cues or less knowledgeable group members. 
That groups use simple heuristics to process information has been considered by only a 
few social psychologists (Gigone & Hastie, 1997). In contrast, the question of whether 
groups and individuals are susceptible to similar biases has received much more 
attention (for a review see Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996). It seems to have been 
largely ignored that individuals and groups face very similar conditions in decision 
making, such as constraints in time and knowledge as well as uncertain environments, 
suggesting that heuristic decision making is a likely strategy to be used also by groups. 
Furthermore, the gold standard in much small-group research is the linear combination 
of all pieces of information, which are distributed across all members of a group (e.g., 
Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995). The structure of the environment and the 
appropriateness of ignoring certain pieces of information, however, are rarely taken 
into consideration. More in-depth research could help to clarify what findings from 
individual decision making can be generalized to small groups and under what 
conditions group decision making proves ecologically rational. This is important not 
only on theoretical grounds, as “theory and research dealing with groups are relevant to 
nearly all the social sciences” (Forsyth, 1990, p.15), but also—and possibly more 
importantly—because of the great practical relevance of group work. 
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The Influence of Task Difficulty on Advice Taking: An Ecological Rationality 
Perspective 
The third study, presented in Chapter 4, investigated the impact of task 
difficulty on the use of advice from an ecological rationality perspective. This third 
study resembled the second in that it also explored the impact of different 
environmental characteristics on behavior. Tasks of different difficulty levels were 
conceptualized as constituting different environments. The tasks proved to be related to 
certain predictable statistical properties; that is, easy tasks were found to be 
characterized by only small differences in accuracy between judges and a moderately 
high bracketing rate, while the opposite was true for difficult tasks. 
The PAR model (Soll & Larrick, 2009) was applied to predict the accuracy of 
two prominent advice-taking strategies, namely, choosing and averaging, in the 
different task environments. Considering the two environmental factors identified by 
Soll and Larrick (2009), accuracy ratio and bracketing rate, I predicted that a strategy of 
averaging would perform well with easy tasks, while choosing the better judge would 
potentially outperform averaging in the case of difficult tasks. The likelihood of 
detecting the better judge was found to strongly moderate these relationships as a third 
factor. Because this factor was correlated with task difficulty, that is, because it became 
weaker with increasing difficulty, averaging turned out to be the most robust and best 
performing strategy not only for easy tasks, but also for difficult ones.  
Furthermore, descriptive analyses revealed that people’s use of averaging 
differed depending on the level of task difficulty. As task difficulty increased, they 
resorted more and more to averaging (and to more mixed strategies) and thus appear to 
have been sensitive to their lack of a good cue to reliably detect who was the better 
judge. 
This last study demonstrated the fruitfulness of adopting an ecological 
rationality perspective to study a topic that has received little attention in the advice-
taking literature, even though it probably plays an important moderating role in almost 
every experiment, namely, task difficulty. By conceptualizing environments in terms of 
task difficulty, it was possible to derive testable hypotheses on the performance and use 
of strategies. As perceived task difficulty was “translated” into neutral statistical 
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parameters (such as bracketing rate and accuracy ratio), it should be easy to further test 
our predictions in environments conceptualized in a way that differs from the one used 
here. Another interesting extension of the research at hand would be to study how 
advice from multiple advisors is used in different environments. 
Gaps: What Do We Still Need to Explore? 
While the studies presented in this dissertation provided valuable insights into 
the workings of how humans make adaptive decisions in groups and with the help of 
others, the findings indicate further investigations are needed. First and very generally, 
there is an obvious need for additional experimental studies to more comprehensively 
grasp both the boundary conditions of adaptive decision making in social contexts as 
well as the factors influencing those decisions. This could be done, for example, by 
more explicitly making use of the parallels between individual and group cognition, as 
was undertaken in the first study, in Chapter 2 (cf. Hinsz et al., 1997). In addition, a 
promising, indeed fundamental, research avenue to pursue is to closely link the concept 
of ecological rationality to models of group decision making. Study 2, in Chapter 3, has 
proposed a step in this direction (cf. Reimer & Katsikopoulos, 2004). 
Second and more specifically, the connections between formal concepts of 
simple heuristics (e.g., Katsikopoulos & Martignon, 2006) and of group decision rules 
and their applicability (e.g., Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klemperer, 1978; Hastie & Kameda, 
2005) have to be worked out more precisely. This would not only strengthen the 
theoretical basis for further experiments but would also allow for the derivation of 
testable hypotheses inspired by the respective other discipline. One promising example 
is the extrapolation from the ecological rationality of individual decision making to the 
“ecological rationality of social combination rules” (Reimer & Hoffrage, 2012, p. 356). 
Moreover, and as the three studies showed, it would be productive in this respect to 
apply more formal model testing to the field of social psychology. 
Third and with immediate practical implications, it is crucial to examine and 
understand more about the way humans search for and integrate information “in the 
wild.” One such real-world case of great practical, indeed societal relevance can be 
found in the medical domain, namely, in diagnostic decision making. An extension to 
this domain of the research presented in this dissertation is planned for next year and 
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will cover such research questions as, Does the quality of diagnoses increase if they are 
made by a small group instead of a single person? Does the selection of diagnostic tests 
change if a small group instead of a single person is involved? To what extent and in 
what way do hierarchical differences (e.g., two physicians of different status working 
together) in the level of experience or accountability affect the decision-making process 
leading to a diagnosis? 
A nuanced understanding of how people make decisions together with others 
is crucial to facilitate collaborations and to make wise use of the potential groups that 
individuals can form. This dissertation provided some examples of how applying the 
framework of ecological rationality can contribute to this endeavor. 
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Appendix A 
Experimental Material for Chapter 2 
Instructions experiment 1 (Note that the original instructions were in German, the 
translation is given below the screenshots.) 
 
 
 
1) Imagine to be a geologist and to have the order of an oil drilling company to 
find profitable oil drilling sites. In the following, you are supposed to choose the more 
profitable of two oil-drilling sites. In order to make a decision you can commission six 
different measures (that is, you can click on them). The six measures can inform you 
with different levels of certainty (“success”) whether one oil drilling site is profitable 
(“+”) or not (“-“). 
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2) See for example the figure below “seismic analyses”: If it discriminates, it 
allows you in 78% of cases a correct prediction about whether you can find oil (“+”) or 
not (“-“). The measure “chemical analyses” in the example below, however, only 
allows for 53% correct predictions. 
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3) You are free to choose which and how many measures and in which order 
you “commission” them (that is, which ones you uncover), until you choose one of the 
two oil drilling sites (X or Y). To see the result of a measure, just click on the 
corresponding box with the question mark. 
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4) In order to choose one of the two oil drilling sites, just click either on the 
box with the “X” (left oil drilling site) or on the box with the “Y” (right oil drilling 
site). After your choice, you will receive feedback about the accuracy of your choice. 
For each correct choice, you will receive 1000 Petros. At the end of the experiment, the 
experimenter will pay you €0.10 in exchange for 1000 Petros. 
 
In the following practice trial you can practice how the program works. The 
result is not yet counted. 
 
 
 
Additional oral instructions by the experimenter: 
5) “Please read through the instructions. There will be a practice trial. If you 
have questions, please ask me. There is no time limit. [in dyad condition: Please work 
jointly on the task and do not leave it to one person to click on the boxes.]” 
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Table A.1 
Item set in the WADD-friendly environment. 
 Alternative X  Alternative Y   
# C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  correct 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 0 0  Y 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 1 1 0  Y 
3 1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 0  X 
4 0 0 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 0 1 0  X 
5 1 0 0 0 1 1  0 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
6 1 0 0 1 1 1  0 1 1 1 1 1  Y 
7 0 0 0 0 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 1  Y 
8 0 0 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
9 1 0 1 0 0 1  0 1 0 0 1 1  X 
10 0 0 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 0 0  Y 
11 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 0 1 1 0 0  X 
12 0 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
13 0 0 1 1 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  Y 
14 0 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0 1 0 1  Y 
15 1 0 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 0 0 1  X 
16 1 0 0 0 0 1  0 1 1 0 0 0  Y 
17 1 1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 0 0 0  X 
18 0 0 1 0 1 0  1 0 0 0 1 1  Y 
19 0 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 1 0 1 0  Y 
20 0 0 0 0 0 1  1 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
21 0 0 0 1 1 1  0 1 0 0 0 0  X 
22 0 0 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 1 1  Y 
23 0 0 0 1 0 1  1 1 1 0 1 1  Y 
24 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 1 0 1  Y 
25 1 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 1 0 0 0  X 
26 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0  X 
Note. C1 = cue 1, C2 = cue 2, etc.; correct = correct alternative. 
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Table A.2 
Item set in the take-the-best-friendly environment. 
 Alternative X  Alternative Y   
# C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  correct 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 0 0  Y 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
3 0 0 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 0 1  X 
4 0 1 0 0 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0  X 
5 1 1 1 1 0 0  1 1 1 1 1 1  Y 
6 0 0 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 0 1 0  X 
7 1 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 1 1 1  X 
8 0 1 0 1 1 1  0 1 1 1 0 0  Y 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0  X 
10 1 0 0 0 0 1  1 1 1 1 1 1  Y 
11 0 1 0 1 1 1  0 0 1 1 0 0  X 
12 1 0 1 1 1 0  0 1 1 1 1 1  X 
13 1 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 0 1 1 1  X 
14 1 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 1 0 1  Y 
15 1 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 0 1 0 1  Y 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 1 1 1  Y 
17 1 0 0 1 1 1  0 1 1 1 1 1  Y 
18 1 0 1 1 1 1  1 1 0 0 1 1  Y 
19 0 0 0 0 1 1  0 0 1 1 0 0  Y 
20 1 0 1 1 1 0  0 1 0 0 0 0  X 
21 1 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 0 1 1  X 
22 0 0 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 1 1 1  X 
23 1 1 0 1 0 1  1 0 1 1 1 1  X 
24 1 1 0 1 0 1  0 1 1 1 1 1  X 
25 0 0 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  X 
26 0 1 1 0 0 0  1 0 0 0 1 0  Y 
Note. C1 = cue 1, C2 = cue 2, etc.; correct = correct alternative. 
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Appendix B 
Additional Results for Chapter 2 
Accordance rates with take-the-best and WADD in Experiment 1 
 
Figure B.1. Individuals’ and dyads’ mean rates of accordance with the adaptive strategy in the 
(a) WADD- friendly and (b) take-the-best- (TTB-) environments. In both environments, 
choices were strongly in accordance with the appropriate adaptive strategy. Dyads, however, 
either reached asymptotic accordance faster (take-the-best-friendly environment) or reached 
higher final levels of accordance with the adaptive strategy (WADD-friendly environment). 
Error bars: ±1 SE. 
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Accordance rates with take-the-best and WADD in Experiment 2 
 
Figure B.2. Individuals’ and dyads’ mean accordance rates with the adaptive strategy in the 
WADD-friendly and the take-the-best-friendly environment, respectively. The two left panels 
depict the rates of accordance with the adaptive strategies in the experimental order of first the 
take-the-best-friendly and then the WADD-friendly environment; n = 20 individuals, n = 20 
dyads); the two right panel depict the results for the reverse order. Error bars: ±1 SE. 
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Appendix C 
Experimental Material Used in Chapter 3 
Companies used in main study 
Table C.1 
100 companies with market capitalization and numbe of times they were recognized by 
participants (N = 143). 
# Name of company Stock 
Monthly market 
capitalization of 
May 2008 
Times 
recognized 
1 adidas AG DAX 9.086.050.220 127 
2 Allianz SE DAX 55.398.666.979 124 
3 BASF SE DAX 43.785.434.550 106 
4 Bayer AG DAX 42.367.936.968 128 
5 BMW AG St DAX 11.662.149.096 121 
6 Commerzbank AG DAX 13.351.642.721 127 
7 Continental AG DAX 12.757.207.715 113 
8 Daimler AG DAX 45.295.009.517 126 
9 Deutsche Bank AG DAX 37.428.036.733 128 
10 Deutsche Börse AG DAX 18.994.391.052 95 
11 Deutsche Lufthansa AG DAX 7.580.969.950 127 
12 Deutsche Post AG DAX 17.561.071.533 127 
13 Deutsche Postbank AG DAX 4.862.009.834 128 
14 Deutsche Telekom AG DAX 30.394.620.101 127 
15 E.ON AG DAX 82.786.198.005 124 
16 Fresenius Medical Care AG u. Co. 
KGaA St 
DAX 6.466.279.155 59 
17 Henkel KGaA Vz DAX 5.316.563.030 95 
18 Hypo Real Estate Holding AG DAX 4.337.522.867 43 
19 Infineon Technologies AG DAX 4.843.179.352 89 
20 Linde AG DAX 13.317.926.271 51 
21 MAN AG St DAX 9.677.891.582 73 
22 Merck KGaA DAX 5.798.774.688 38 
23 METRO AG St DAX 5.435.947.348 105 
24 Münchener Rück AG DAX 24.995.380.725 61 
25 RWE AG St DAX 32.587.464.970 91 
26 SAP AG DAX 29.356.960.833 79 
27 Siemens AG DAX 64.300.621.507 129 
28 ThyssenKrupp AG DAX 15.193.530.522 124 
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Continuation of Table C.1 
# Name of company Stock 
Monthly market 
capitalization of 
May 2008 
Times 
recognized 
29 TUI AG DAX 2.771.285.676 123 
30 Volkswagen AG St DAX 26.668.951.484 123 
31 Aareal Bank AG MDAX 586.495.578 11 
32 Altana AG MDAX 876.970.929 25 
33 AMB Generali Holding AG MDAX 895.928.544 26 
34 Beiersdorf Aktiengesellschaft MDAX 4.176.217.899 66 
35 Bilfinger Berger AG MDAX 1.967.648.626 17 
36 Celesio AG MDAX 2.147.277.649 7 
37 Deutsche EuroShop AG MDAX 750.498.436 15 
38 Deutz AG MDAX 417.071.720 28 
39 Douglas Holding AG MDAX 1.011.489.327 90 
40 EADS N.V. MDAX 5.043.414.881 36 
41 Fraport AG MDAX 1.564.413.614 33 
42 Fresenius SE Vz MDAX 4.221.523.942 62 
43 GAGFAH S.A. MDAX 777.963.718 33 
44 Gildemeister AG MDAX 913.593.061 10 
45 Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG MDAX 1.209.407.764 46 
46 Hannover Rückversicherung AG MDAX 2.068.606.711 65 
47 HeidelbergCement AG MDAX 1.923.376.964 21 
48 Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG MDAX 1.013.408.244 26 
49 HOCHTIEF AG MDAX 3.265.147.639 80 
50 Hugo Boss AG Vz MDAX 499.346.368 120 
51 IVG Immobilien AG MDAX 1.462.554.580 8 
52 K+S Aktiengesellschaft MDAX 10.117.589.360 21 
53 Krones AG MDAX 830.686.782 10 
54 KUKA Aktiengesellschaft MDAX 576.625.506 2 
55 LANXESS AG MDAX 2.313.128.502 4 
56 Leoni AG MDAX 992.362.466 4 
57 MLP AG MDAX 711.533.834 23 
58 MTU Aero Engines Holding AG MDAX 1.507.075.922 17 
59 Norddeutsche Affinerie AG MDAX 1.009.863.775 9 
60 Praktiker Bau- und 
Heimwerkermärkte Holding AG 
MDAX 864.447.827 98 
61 Premiere AG MDAX 1.040.496.799 117 
62 ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG MDAX 813.351.455 127 
63 Puma AG MDAX 1.419.332.559 121 
64 Rheinmetall AG MDAX 1.857.805.740 63 
65 Salzgitter AG MDAX 5.406.853.547 43 
66 STADA Arzneimittel AG MDAX 2.546.932.786 64 
67 Symrise AG MDAX 1.683.956.221 4 
68 Vossloh AG MDAX 935.096.637 15 
69 Wacker Chemie AG MDAX 2.792.828.952 29 
70 WINCOR NIXDORF 
Aktiengesellschaft 
MDAX 1.663.843.005 53 
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Continuation of Table C.1 
# Name of company Stock 
Monthly market 
capitalization of 
May 2008 
Times 
recognized 
71 Air Berlin PLC SDAX 332.842.549 115 
72 Axel Springer AG SDAX 603.620.768 128 
73 BAUER Aktiengesellschaft SDAX 526.959.928 67 
74 BayWa AG vNa SDAX 625.724.016 13 
75 Biotest AG Vz SDAX 220.000.016 6 
76 C.A.T. OIL AG SDAX 186.826.349 12 
77 Colonia Real Estate AG SDAX 198.896.196 14 
78 comdirect bank AG SDAX 247.264.649 107 
79 CTS Eventim AG SDAX 272.585.049 47 
80 Deutsche Beteiligungs AG SDAX 232.134.135 12 
81 Deutsche Wohnen AG SDAX 332.778.566 15 
82 Dyckerhoff AG Vz SDAX 185.280.767 17 
83 Duerr AG SDAX 185.098.676 18 
84 elexis AG SDAX 173.070.159 8 
85 EM.Sport Media AG SDAX 138.946.637 17 
86 Escada AG St SDAX 152.304.989 59 
87 Fielmann AG SDAX 591.221.110 126 
88 Gerresheimer AG SDAX 1.075.208.389 5 
89 Gerry Weber International AG SDAX 240.185.826 85 
90 GfK AG SDAX 442.378.885 17 
91 Homag Group AG SDAX 216.535.583 9 
92 IKB Dt. Industriebank AG SDAX 167.861.461 32 
93 Jungheinrich AG SDAX 360.550.645 17 
94 KOENIG u. BAUER AG SDAX 275.692.738 13 
95 Medion AG SDAX 301.768.021 95 
96 MPC AG SDAX 279.948.423 3 
97 MVV Energie AG SDAX 386.052.273 7 
98 PATRIZIA Immobilien AG SDAX 100.941.435 2 
99 Sixt AG St SDAX 238.013.743 97 
100 Vivacon AG SDAX 169.378.348 24 
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Instructions of Main Study 
Introduction 
Herzlich willkommen zu unserer Studie zum Thema "Bekanntheit von börsennotierten 
Unternehmen in Deutschland". Im Folgenden werden Ihnen drei Teilaufgaben 
präsentiert, mit deren Hilfe wir erfassen möchten, welche und inwiefern Ihnen an der 
Deutschen Börse notierte Unternehmen bekannt sind. Dazu möchten wir Sie bitten, die 
Fragen ehrlich, vollständig und intuitiv zu beantworten. Alle Angaben bleiben anonym 
und werden ausschließlich zu internen Forschungszwecken verwendet. 
 
Wir bedanken uns für Ihre Teilnahme! 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste um mit der Studie zu beginnen 
 
Recognition Task 
Im Folgenden wird Ihnen eine Liste mit den Namen von 100 Unternehmen (in 
zufälliger Reihenfolge) dargeboten, die an der Deutschen Börse (DAX, MDAX, 
SDAX) notiert sind. Uns interessiert, von welchen dieser Unternehmen Sie schon 
einmal gehört haben. Zunächst ist uns nicht wichtig, ob Sie auch Näheres über das 
Unternehmen wissen, nur, ob Sie schon einmal davon gehört haben oder nicht. 
 
Bitte antworten Sie ohne langes Überlegen so schnell wie möglich, ob Sie von dem 
gezeigten Unternehmen schon einmal etwas gehört haben oder nicht. 
 
Bitte verwenden Sie für die Beantwortung der Fragen den linken und den rechten 
Zeigefinger. Legen Sie vor der Bearbeitung jeder Frage diese Finger auf die 
entsprechenden Antworttasten: 
 
Q (NEIN, habe noch nie von dem Unternehmen gehört, linker Zeigefinger) 
P  (JA, habe schon einmal von dem Unternehmen gehört, rechter Zeigefinger) 
 
Bei jeder Frage wird an Stelle des jeweiligen Unternehmens zunächst nur kurz ein 
Kreuz sichtbar sein. Sobald das Kreuz verschwindet und das jeweilige Unternehmen 
erscheint, können Sie durch einen Tastendruck antworten.\n\n\nBeachten Sie dabei 
bitte, dass Sie Ihre Antwort nicht mehr ändern können, nachdem Sie sich bei einer 
Frage durch einen Tastendruck einmal entschieden haben. 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste für weitere Instruktionen. 
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Für den Fall, dass Sie von dem Unternehmen schon einmal gehört haben, fragen wir 
Sie einem nächsten Schritt, ob Sie über dieses Unternehmen auch noch mehr Wissen 
haben, oder ob Sie nur davon gehört haben, ohne mehr darüber zu wissen. 
 
Bitte verwenden Sie auch hier wieder die Tasten Q und P: 
Q (NEIN, kenne nur den Namen, linker Zeigefinger) 
P  (JA, weiß noch mehr darüber, rechter Zeigefinger) 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste um mit der Aufgabe zu beginnen. 
 
 
Figure C.1. Example of a recognition-test slide (recognized or not recognized). 
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Figure C.2. Example of a recognition-test slide (if recognized whether the person has more 
information or not). 
Individual Paired Comparison Task 
Im nun folgenden Teil unserer Studie werden Ihnen immer zwei Unternehmensnamen 
gleichzeitig auf dem Bildschirm dargeboten. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, so schnell wie 
möglich zu entscheiden, welches der beiden Unternehmen zurzeit einen höheren 
Börsenwert hat. \n\nZu Ihrer Information: Der Börsenwert, auch Markt-
/Börsenkapitalisierung genannt, spiegelt den aktuellen Gesamtwert eines Unternehmens 
wider und entspricht dem Preis, den ein Käufer für sämtliche umlaufenden Aktien eines 
Unternehmens - also eine komplette Übernahme – bezahlen müsste. Er  wird z.B. 
berechnet, indem man die Anzahl der Aktien mit dem Aktienkurs multipliziert. Bitte 
schätzen Sie intuitiv ein, welches der gezeigten Unternehmen momentan mehr wert ist. 
 
Es werden Ihnen 50 Paarvergleiche dargeboten, jedoch werden Sie nach den 
Paarvergleichen kein Feedback bekommen. 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste für weitere Instruktionen. 
 
Bitte verwenden Sie für die Beantwortung der Fragen den linken und den rechten 
Zeigefinger. Legen Sie vor der Bearbeitung jeder Frage diese Finger auf die 
entsprechenden Antworttasten: 
 
Q (Unternehmen auf der linken Seite, linker Zeigefinger) 
P  (Unternehmen auf der rechten Seite, rechter Zeigefinger) 
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Bei jeder Frage werden an Stelle der jeweiligen Unternehmen zunächst kurz Kreuze 
sichtbar sein. Sobald die Kreuze verschwinden und die jeweiligen Unternehmen 
erscheinen, können Sie durch einen Tastendruck antworten. 
 
Beachten Sie dabei bitte, dass Sie Ihre Antwort nicht mehr ändern können, nachdem 
Sie sich bei einer Frage durch einen Tastendruck einmal entschieden haben. 
 
Nach jeder Entscheidung werden Sie gefragt, wie sicher Sie sich jeweils sind. Geben 
Sie hierzu dann bitte Zahlen zwischen 1 (sehr unsicher) und 5 (sehr sicher) ein. Mit 
Zahlen dazwischen können Sie Ihr Urteil abstufen. 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste um mit der Aufgabe zu beginnen. 
 
 
 
Figure C.3. Example of an individual paired comparison-test slide (choice between two 
companies). 
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Figure C.4. Example of a paired comparison-test slide (indication of certainty level after the 
choice). 
 
Group paired comparison task 
Without time pressure 
Herzlich willkommen zum Gruppenteil der Aufgabe. Bitte entscheiden Sie nun 
gemeinsam, welches der beiden Unternehmen den höheren Börsenwert hat. Zur 
Erinnerung: 
 
Q (Unternehmen auf der linken Seite) 
P  (Unternehmen auf der rechten Seite) 
 
Bei jeder Frage werden an Stelle der jeweiligen Unternehmen zunächst kurz Kreuze 
sichtbar sein. Sobald die Kreuze verschwinden und die jeweiligen Unternehmen 
erscheinen, können Sie durch einen Tastendruck antworten. Beachten Sie dabei bitte, 
dass Sie Ihre Antwort nicht mehr ändern können, nachdem Sie sich bei einer Frage 
durch einen Tastendruck einmal entschieden haben. 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste um mit der Aufgabe zu beginnen. 
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Figure C.5. Example of a group paired comparison-test slide (indicating a new comparison). 
 
 
Figure C.6. Example of a group paired comparison-test slide (choice between two companies, 
without countdown, condition without time pressure). 
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Figure C.7. Example of a group paired comparison-test slide (slide between two comparisons). 
 
With time pressure 
Herzlich willkommen zum Gruppenteil der Aufgabe. Bitte entscheiden Sie nun 
gemeinsam, welches der beiden Unternehmen den höheren Börsenwert hat. Zur 
Erinnerung: 
 
Q (Unternehmen auf der linken Seite) 
P  (Unternehmen auf der rechten Seite) 
 
Bei jeder Frage werden an Stelle der jeweiligen Unternehmen zunächst kurz Kreuze 
sichtbar sein. Sobald die Kreuze verschwinden und die jeweiligen Unternehmen 
erscheinen, können Sie durch einen Tastendruck antworten. Beachten Sie dabei bitte, 
dass Sie Ihre Antwort nicht mehr ändern können, nachdem Sie sich bei einer Frage 
durch einen Tastendruck einmal entschieden haben. 
 
Sie haben jeweils 30 Sekunden Zeit, was Ihnen auch durch einen Countdown angezeigt 
wird. 
 
Drücken Sie die Leertaste um mit der Aufgabe zu beginnen. 
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Figure C.8. Example of a group paired comparison-test slide (choice between two companies, 
with countdown, condition with time pressure). 
 
 
Figure C.9. Last slide of group task indicating the reward for each participant. 
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Argument Recall Task 
 
 
 
Figure C.10. Page of argument recall task (recall of the most important arguments speaking for 
and against a high market capitalization). 
 
Appendix C 166 
Rules for Coding Discussion Behavior with DCS (Schermuly & Scholl, 2012) 
What to code 
All discussion behaviours between the releasing a new trial and finishing a 
trial (by entering the decision) were coded, but not the interaction between two trials. 
Categories 
Recognition cue 
An act was coded as recognition cue when a person used the recognition 
heuristic as an argument or simply let the other members know that she/he recognized 
one company name but not the other. It was also coded when a person used the 
recognition cue of another member or the whole group as an argument. Thus, it is 
coded when (un-)recognition is given as a reason for a decision. 
Examples:  
“If you do not even recognize company A, it cannot be big.”  
“Let’s take company A, since we all recognize it.” 
“I only recognize company A.” 
“I chose A because I don’t know B.” 
Knowledge cue 
Acts were coded as knowledge cues when a group member provided cues 
about a company other than recognition. This comprises situations in which a person 
simply stated his/her cue knowledge or used a cue as an argument for or against a high 
market capitalization and thus as a reason for a decision. 
Examples: 
“I know that company B produces drugs.” 
 “Company A is a bank, and banks have money.” 
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Appendix D 
Experimental Material Used in Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Figure D.1. Screenshots of the advice condition. Participants were first asked for their initial 
estimate (a). Before giving their second estimate, they received the estimate of another 
randomly drawn person from the prestudies and this person’s confidence (b). 
(a) 
(b) 
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Table D.1 
Items, true answers and mean confidence ratings of the prestudies and the main study. 
       Confidence Mean (SD) 
# Item Truth  Main study  Prestudies 
 easy      
1 What is the maximum speed of a cheetah (in 
kilometres per hour)? 
110  3.61 (1.40)  3.58 (1.25) 
2 What is the average height of a 10-years old 
boy (in Germany, in centimetres)? 
141  3.40 (0.98)  3.32 (0.99) 
3 What is the monthly amount of child benefit 
in Germany for the first child (in 2012)? 
184  4.19 (1.34)  3.75 (1.45) 
4 What is the distance between Berlin and 
Hamburg (in kilometres)? 
256  3.79 (1.19)  4.31 (1.12) 
5 How many feet (English measure of length) 
equal 100 meters? 
328  2.63 (1.34)  2.88 (1.39) 
6 What is the monthly amount of basic 
security benefits for full-aged, single job 
seekers (Hartz IV, in 2012)? 
364  3.66 (1.38)  3.93 (1.35) 
7 What is the height of the Fernsehturm in 
Berlin (in meters)? 
368  3.28 (1.41)  3.67 (1.50) 
8 How much does the iPad3 with 16GB cost 
(RRP)? 
479  3.09 (1.31)  3.14 (1.38) 
 intermediate      
9 How many movie theatres are there in Berlin 
(retrieved 2008)? 
170  2.69 (1.21)  2.66 (1.12) 
10 How many countries take part in the general 
assembly of the United Nations as active 
members? 
193  2.64 (1.38)  2.73 (1.37) 
11 How many active nuclear power stations are 
there in Europe (retrieved 2011)? 
196  2.49 (1.18)  2.49 (1.09) 
12 What is the world record in high jump of 
men (in centimetres)? 
245  2.77 (1.24)  2.32 (1.21) 
13 What is the world record in ski jumping of 
men (in m)? 
247  2.37 (1.28)  2.37 (1.28) 
14 What is the length of the border between 
Switzerland and Germany (in kilometres)? 
316  2.66 (1.26)  2.53 (1.29) 
15 What is the speed of sound in the air (on sea 
level, in meter per second)? 
343  2.27 (1.62)  2.55 (1.69) 
16 What is the length of the river Oder in 
kilometres? 
866  2.17 (1.07)  2.21 (1.02) 
 difficult      
17 How many earthquakes with a value of more 
than 6 on the Richter scale happen in an 
average year worldwide? 
150  2.22 (1.06)  2.09 (1.08) 
18 How many athletes took part in the first 
modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896? 
241  1.81 (0.96)  1.60 (0.80) 
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Table D.1 (continued)      
       Confidence Mean (SD) 
# Item Truth  Main study  Prestudies 
19 Of yow many days does a year according to 
the ritual Maya-calendar comprise? 
260  1.89 (1.15)  1.37 (0.55) 
20 How deep is the Baltic Sea at its deepest 
point (in meters)? 
459  2.08 (1.04)  1.94 (0.99) 
21 How many people have the Vatican 
citizenship (retrieved 2011)? 
572  2.00 (1.12)  1.80 (1.00) 
22 How many (earth)days has a year on the 
Mars? 
687  1.84 (0.97)  1.75 (1.18) 
23 How many accomplished murders and 
homicides were officially registered in 
Germany in 2010? 
690  2.18 (1.04)  1.81 (0.97) 
24 How many inhabitants has the East Frisian 
island Wangerooge (retrieved 2010)? 
919  1.92 (0.95)  1.86 (1.01) 
Note. The average confidence ratings per difficulty found in the prestudies were (with SD in 
parentheses): for easy items: 3.57 (1.13), for intermediate items: 2.48 (1.00), for difficult items: 
1.78 (0.76). 
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Appendix E 
Additional Results for Chapter 4 
 
 
Figure E.1. Histogram of intraindividual correlations (Spearman’s rho) between confidence 
and error (e1) for (a) easy, (b) intermediate, and (c) difficult tasks. 
 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
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Table E.1 
Results of paired t-tests for comparisons within environments. 
Environment  Comparison  Paired t-test result 
easy  ws = 0 vs. ws = 1  t(29) = -0.438, p = .664, dz = 0.08 
  ws = 0 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = -0.930, p = .360, dz = 0.17 
  ws = 1 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = 0.574, p = .570, dz = 0.11 
     
intermediate  ws = 0 vs. ws = 1  t(29) = -0.396, p = .695, dz = 0.07 
  ws = 0 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = 2.945, p = .006, dz = 0.54 
  ws = 1 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = 2.975, p = .006, dz = 0.54 
     
difficult  ws = 0 vs. ws = 1  t(29) = -1.500, p = .144, dz = 0.27 
  ws = 0 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = 4.517, p < .001, dz = -0.24 
  ws = 1 vs. ws = .5  t(29) = 2.679, p = .012, dz = 0.49 
     
Note. ws = 0 = choose the other, ws = .5 = average, ws = 1 = choose the self  
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